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
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


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PSYCHOLOGY,

OR,

ELEMENTS

OF A

NEW SYSTEM OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY,

ON THE BASIS OF

CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMON SENSE.

DESIGNED FOR COLLEGES AND ACADEMIES.

Samuel

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P R E F A C E .

As the following publication proposes a system of mental philosophy in some degree new, a few words in regard to its origin may be due alike to the writer and the reader. In general, it owes its existence to the author's desire to promote the cause of truth and science. That cause he regards as identified with the happiness of his fellow-men and the glory of his God. At an early age, he was deeply impressed with the conviction, which no reflecting mind can fail to feel, that mental philosophy is properly the basis of all science, and that a correct acquaintance with the properties and operations of the mind, would not only facilitate our progress in the study of every department of truth, but, what to him was a matter of supreme importance, would also enable us to acquire a more correct view of the moral condition of the soul, and shed abundant light on some of the practical doctrines of Revelation. This latter consideration is mentioned here, because it was really the writer's principal motive for pursuing this subject, although he has by no means mingled religion with metaphysics in the following treatise ; on the contrary, his

investigations of the one were conducted altogether independently of the other. About sixteen years ago, having been called to take charge of a theological seminary, he felt it a duty to devote particular attention to his instructions in this department, and formed a resolution, which has doubtless had some influence on this system. He had considerable acquaintance with the patriarchs of British metaphysics, Locke, Reid, Stewart, and Brown, as well as with some few German authors; but neither of them seemed to present an entirely natural and satisfactory exhibition of his own mental phenomena. He then resolved to study exclusively his own mind, and for ten years he read no book on this subject. During this period, he spent much of his time in the examination of his own mental phenomena, and having travelled over the whole ground, and employed the leisure of several additional years to review and mature his views, he now presents to the public the following outline of a system, as in all its parts the result of original, analytic induction. That he regards it as a more natural, faithful, and intelligible exhibition of the operations of his own mind than is contained in any other work which he has seen, he will not dissemble. Since the features of his own system have been settled, the writer has looked at various other works, and found much that is valuable, especially in the re-

cent publications of his own countrymen, Professors Upham, Day, Tappan, and others, yet nothing which seemed to invalidate his system, or render dubious the propriety of its publication.

As this work is designed, not only for intelligent popular readers, but also for use in colleges and academies, the author has abridged his manuscript, and made it sufficiently brief to leave ample room for the explanatory remarks or lectures of professors and teachers, as well as written exercises of the students. For an experience of more than twenty years in teaching has convinced him, that the most successful method of imparting a thorough knowledge of such subjects, is to combine with a brief text-book the explanations and illustrations of the instructor, and, at the same time, to require the student to exercise his pen in preparing either essays on the most prominent topics, or an analysis, or a regular compend of the whole.

After frequent solicitation from those who heard the author's lectures, and from some other gentlemen of high literary and scientific rank who examined the manuscript, this work is at length submitted to the public, with an earnest solicitude that it may subserve the cause of truth and human happiness. The author does not flatter himself that his views on all the topics discussed, have reached entire accuracy; he will thankfully receive and carefully

weigh any suggestions which may be made, especially if presented in the spirit of benevolence or of literary comity. If the map of the human mind here presented is found to be more faithful and intelligible than those heretofore in use, if it tends to make perspicuous a subject hitherto proverbially abstruse and obscure, it will doubtless find friends, and the author will rejoice in the assurance that he has not toiled in vain. Of the salutary influence of the principles and results attained, on the grand interests of fundamental Christianity, he entertains no doubt.

The influence of the views here presented on logic, rhetoric, and a number of related sciences and topics, will be evident to the scientific scholar. Perhaps at a future day some of these relations may be prosecuted by the author, if his health and numerous other duties will permit. With these remarks the work is now commended to the blessing of God, and the favour of the friends of true philosophy and religion.

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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

It has long been a subject of remark, that while the science of mathematics, which discusses the properties and relations of space and number, is accompanied by the most conclusive evidence, and bears conviction with it at every step of its progress, the philosophy of the mind still remains enveloped in comparative darkness and uncertainty, after the intellect of ages has been expended in its investigation. The question arises, Are not both similar in their nature, and alike susceptible of demonstrative discussion? It seems evident, that they are not precisely alike, and yet much of the obscurity enveloping mental science, doubtless arises from the unphilosophical manner, in which its investigations have been conducted, and the inappropriate style in which the result of them has generally been recorded. The superior force of mathematical reasoning, arises from three sources. *First*, from an intrinsic difference in the nature of the subjects discussed. *Secondly*, from the more rigidly analytic method of investigation, pursued in the mathematics. And, *thirdly*, from a less elegant, indeed, but more precise and perspicuous method of conveying to others the knowledge we have acquired.

A distinguished and popular writer* of the present day, alleges the difficulty of ascertaining with precision the operations of other minds, as a prominent cause of the uncertainty of mental science. But this appears to us to be an erroneous view. All minds are, in healthy subjects, constituted essentially alike; and as every student of this science has access to the phenomena of his own mind, he can draw from this source abundant materials for the examination of any and of every aspect of the subject. We have, moreover, the candid testimony of a multitude of writers on these topics, each presenting the details of his own mind; so that this science need not labour under obscurity for want of the experience of different and independent witnesses. The testimony of consciousness in regard to our individual mental operations separately considered, seems also to be distinct and satisfactory. And the testimony of others concerning the clearness of their consciousness, coincides with our own experience. But when we attempt to trace the unknown cause of these operations which lies behind them; or to determine and systematize their relations to each other, which are often diversified and obscure, we encounter difficulties on every side. And these difficulties encumber the investigation of our own mental phenomena, as well as those of others.

It is indeed true, that in morbid mental action, the operations of different minds are very diverse, and the careful collation of these diversified phases

* Dr. Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, p. 15, 16, Harpers' ed.

of mental obliquity, is interesting to the student of mental science and essential to the physician; but the true intellectual system must be deduced from the phenomena of mind in its ordinary, its healthy condition. We return therefore to the position, that the causes of superior lucidness awarded to mathematical science are chiefly three.

The first of these causes, namely the intrinsic difference between the subjects discussed in these sciences, is derived from the Author of our being. We are so constituted that the properties and especially the relations of space and number, are more clearly apprehended by us than those of mind. Yet this difference is not so great as might, at first view, be supposed. Much of it arises from the fact, that from our earliest years we are engaged every hour in perceiving and judging of space and number, while the phenomena of the mind are seldom thought of until we reach the years of maturity, and then generally at short periods as subjects of theoretical study. Our perceptions of the former are therefore improved in an incalculably higher degree than our views of the latter.

The second source of superior clearness has been stated to be a more rigidly analytic method of investigation. This has led to greater improvements in these sciences, and hence the evidence attending their discussion is also greater. The fact that a better method of philosophizing has usually been pursued in the mathematical sciences is not altogether adventitious. We believe it to be chiefly owing to the peculiar nature of the properties and

relations of space and number, and to the fixed and simple nature of mathematical language, which consists chiefly of a few figures and signs, and a small number of well-defined words, while it wholly rejects the flowers of rhetoric.

The same method of inductive investigation is the only one, by which real progress can be made in mental science, or in any other department of human knowledge. It will appear more clearly in the sequel, that all those of our ideas which are *knowledge*, are mental representatives of entities; i. e., of things, and their relations, existing in nature; and can be obtained, originally, in no other way than by the careful examination of entities themselves. Hence, however knowledge already acquired may afterward be combined and arranged, the only accurate method of obtaining its original elements is by patient successive examinations of those entities of which we wish to obtain a knowledge. After such a careful examination of all the facts in the case has been made, and we have thus obtained accurate mental representatives of them all; then, and not until then, can we with certainty decide, whether or not any supposed property or law belongs to them all. That method of philosophizing, therefore, which affirms a general law after the examination of a few facts, must forever be insecure, and tend to obstruct the progress of any science.

The third source of the superior lucidness of mathematical discussions, is the simple, literal, concise style, in which they are recorded for the instruction of others, and the specific numeric no-

tation of every item of knowledge obtained. It will hereafter appear more clearly, we trust, that one of the most prolific sources of error in human knowledge, is the use of language which does not express our ideas with entire, specific exactness. But mathematical language, consisting of a few figures, letters, and signs, and a small stock of well-defined words, the same idea is almost universally designated by one and the same term. No attempt is made to avoid the repetition of the same word in the same sentence, however often the same idea may recur; and the man would expose himself to ridicule, who should attempt to embody the demonstrations of Euclid in profuse and florid language. Hence arises a degree of perspicuity of style never attained and rarely aimed at in the discussions of any other science. Nor is the precise separation of each item of knowledge from every other, and its numerical notation unimportant. It enables the reader to know exactly how far an author has succeeded in establishing the positions assumed, and of which of them the evidence is inconclusive. Thus, those positions, the demonstration of which appears conclusive to all, become a common stock of knowledge. On these others can build, assuming them as correct, and can then direct their attention to positions yet doubtful.

The same inflexible precision of style and the distinct separation of the items of our knowledge would doubtless tend in a high degree to advance the science of mental philosophy; and ought, so far as the different nature of the subjects will admit,

certainly to be introduced. Yet, if even equal precision could be attained, the style of discussion in *Mental Philosophy* would still be far more copious and diversified, because the subjects of which it treats are incalculably more numerous and difficult.

The question here arises, What is the exact nature of the demonstration and proof in mathematics, and what in mental science? If a writer wishes to produce conviction, which of his ideas relating to the subject under discussion, should he exhibit to his readers in the language just recommended, and what active operation of mind must he perform?—Geometry discusses the properties and relations of space. Demonstration in this science sometimes consists in bringing the several diagrams or figures, between which any relation is affirmed, or in supposing them to be brought into such local contiguity as will enable the eye to perceive the relation at a glance. Such is the nature, e. g., of the demonstration of the theorem of Euclid known as Prop. IV. of Book I., viz. : If two triangles have two sides, and the included angle of the one equal to two sides and the included angle of the other, they must be identical or equal in all respects. For it virtually consists in supposing one of the two figures to be placed upon the other, and then conducting the eye through the successive survey of its several parts; and it is found that in this survey the mind intuitively perceives the coincidence of each. Sometimes the demonstration consists in reducing the diagram into such other elementary figures by additional lines, &c., as are intuitively discovered

by the eye to possess the property in question, and which exemplify some of those self-evident cases termed axioms. Axioms in Geometry consist of generic affirmations of certain facts or properties of space which are intuitively perceived to be true in individual and specific familiar cases. E. g., the axiom—things equal to the same thing are equal to one another—is first learned from the observations of early life. We perceive in the familiar objects around us which we touch, see, and handle, that if any two of them are equal or like to a third, they are also, in the same respects, like each other. The observation is extended from one case to another, until, finding no exceptions to it, we set it down as a universal maxim, and confidently employ it as one of the instruments of reasoning. This is the case with other axioms. In arithmetic the same observation is intuitively made in reference to small numbers, and gradually extended to large ones, in regard to which the mind could not intuitively see its truth, but yet confidently and safely assumed it.

The process of reasoning in mental science is entirely different. The items of proof and the subjects of discussion are all mental phenomena, of which each individual must judge for himself by the testimony of his own consciousness. The art of understanding the subject well, and of writing upon it lucidly and conclusively, consists in the habit of carefully studying the operations of our own minds, and of clothing the result of our observations in such perspicuous and appropriate language, as will most successfully conduct our readers or hearers through

the same process on the points in question. Discussions on this subject are successful in producing conviction, just in proportion as they enable the reader to verify the writer's assertions in his own mind. The reader's own consciousness must respond at every step to the truth of the positions advanced ; and conviction terminates, as soon as the response is doubtful, or the reader cannot perceive, in the operations of his own mind, the truth of the author's assertions.

THE SUBJECT MATTER AND DIVISIONS

OR

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY may be defined to be that science which discusses the properties and operations of the human soul. Other objects, that is, entities, in the universe, are also the subject of investigation; but only in as far as their influence on the phenomena of mind is concerned. Thus, in treating of some of our ideas, we find them to be mental representatives of external objects around us, and we are necessarily led to examine those objects or entities, to ascertain what we may and do know of them, and what is the process by which, through the bodily organs, we obtain this knowledge.

This science was formerly termed *Metaphysics*, a term barbarously derived from the Greek, in which its appropriate primitive metaphusikē (μεταφυσικός, -η, -ον) is not found. It is supposed to have originated from the misapprehension of the inscription on a work, consisting of fourteen books, concerning which it is doubtful whether, at least in their present form, they belong to the productions of Aristotle, among which they are found. It is an ancient, though not perfectly substantiated opinion, that Andronicus of Rhodes, who arranged the

works of Aristotle into classes, after he had thus assorted the books on logic, ethics, and physics, placed together several disconnected tracts on different subjects, and endorsed them "meta ta physica" (to be placed or read, *after the works on physics*). Subsequently the discussions contained in those books, were united into a science, which from the above inscription was termed Metaphysics; because it succeeded, or because it went beyond physics.

The term *Anthropology* is used especially in Germany, to designate that science, which discusses the nature of man, as consisting of a body and mind, and especially the influence of the former on the latter. It is sometimes divided into Somatology and Psychology, the former embracing all those bodily peculiarities and circumstances, which are supposed by some writers to exert an influence on the mind. In this department much that is fanciful and ridiculous has been written.

By Psychology is meant everything, that appropriately belongs to the discussion of the nature, structure, and operations of the mind, exclusive of Logic, which is a more extended exhibition of the laws of the mind in one branch of psychology, namely, the *process of reasoning*. It is this latter science which we propose to discuss on the present occasion.

An important preliminary question here arises, What are the proper materials which ought to be embraced in this science? These we maintain are, not so much the supposed faculties, of which we know nothing directly, but the known phenomena

of the mind, and all those other known entities or existences, which exert an influence upon these phenomena, or are concerned in their production. The proper basis for a division of mental phenomena is another important aspect of our subject. We suppose it evident that any correct classification of mental operations, must be based on those phenomena of mind, which are known to us, and not on unknown and supposed faculties or essence of the mind. The divisions adopted in the various systems extant are numerous. The first and most generally received in the English philosophical world, is that into about *nine faculties of the mind*. This division was in the main adopted by Dr. Reid, Mr. Stewart, and the other principal metaphysicians in England and America, until the recent introduction of Dr. Brown's system, which has gained many admirers.

We shall first specify some of these divisions and definitions which have heretofore been received. The mind has usually been divided into the following faculties :

1. The faculty of *perception*, which is regarded as that inherent part of the original constitution of the soul of man, by which he obtains knowledge of external objects, through the instrumentality of his bodily organs.

2. The faculty of *consciousness* is that power of the soul of man by which, according to Dr. Reid, he has "immediate knowledge of all his present thoughts, and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of his mind."

3. The faculty of *conception* is that power of the soul of man by which he has knowledge of things not perceived through the instrumentality of his senses ; or, according to Stewart, it is " that power which enables the mind to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation which it has formerly felt."

4. The faculty of *judgment* is that inherent power of the soul by which we decide that any proposition is true or not true. It is also termed the faculty of *understanding*.

5. *Memory* is that faculty of the soul by which we have a present knowledge of our past mental operations.

6. By the faculty of *reasoning* is commonly meant that inherent power of the soul by which we infer conclusions from premises. " Reasoning," says Dr. Reid, " is the process by which we pass from one judgment to another, which is the consequence of it. In all reasoning, therefore, there must be a proposition inferred, and one or more from which it is inferred."

7. The faculty of *conscience* has by some been considered as that power of the soul, by which we experience either remorse or self-approbation on a review of our conduct ; while others regard it " as that internal sense which decides upon the moral character of actions."

8. The faculty of *feeling* is that power of the soul, by which we experience sensations or feelings and emotions.

9. The faculty of *volition* is that power of the

soul by which we choose, determine, resolve, purpose, or will to perform or not to perform any contemplated action, of which we judge ourselves capable.

The general division of these powers adopted by Dr. Reid was into two general classes, viz. : First. INTELLECTUAL POWERS. Secondly. ACTIVE POWERS.

By *intellectual powers* he means those powers by which we perceive objects and conceive of them ; and remember, analyze, or combine them, and judge or reason concerning them.

By *active powers* he understands all those powers of the soul which lead to action, or influence the mind to act, such as appetites, passions, affections, &c.

Mr. Stewart, the successor and commentator of Dr. Reid, divides the powers of the mind into three classes. First. *Intellectual*. Secondly. *Active or Moral*. And, thirdly, *Social Powers* ; which latter belong to man as a member of political society.

The last division, which has obtained much currency in the English philosophical world, is that of Dr. Brown, who divides the powers of the soul into *two classes*, and designates them by the terms EXTERNAL and INTERNAL *affections* or *states of the mind*. This division appears to bear a distinct affinity to the old classification into *sensations* and *reflections*, although Dr. Brown expends not a little labour in refuting that ancient division. The EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS Dr. Brown has subdivided according to the organs of sense which are employed in their

production, viz., *Smell, Taste, Hearing, Touch, and Sight*. These he denominates the more definite external affections, while he makes another class of a less definite character to embrace hunger and muscular pleasures and pains. The INTERNAL AFFECTIONS he subdivides into two orders. Order I. embraces the *intellectual affections*. Order II., the *emotions*.

Order I. embraces, First. *Simple suggestion*. Secondly. *Relative suggestion*, or feelings of relations. Order II. he divides into, First. *Immediate*. Secondly. *Retrospective*. And, thirdly, *Prospective Emotions*.

In Germany, a different division of the powers or faculties of the mind has, for some time past, been adopted by many writers on psychology. "The greater part of psychologists," says Professor Fischhaber, "have arrived at the conclusion, that the soul of man possesses three principal powers or faculties, viz., the power of sensibility (Gefühlsvermögen), the understanding or intellect including the various operations of what are termed the intellectual powers (Vorstellungsvermögen), and the will (Begehrungs or Willensvermögen)." This division, which is in many respects a very good one, has been substantially adopted by that excellent writer of our own country, Professor Upham, if we may judge from a brief notice of his recent work which we have seen. He, however, very properly changes the order of these faculties, placing the intellect first, which the Germans had assigned to the middle; and by the introduction of Dr. Brown's

system of suggestions, and of his own numerous investigations on other important aspects of the subject, he has doubtless prepared a work of high and lasting merit.

After mature deliberation, we are unable to adopt either of these divisions, although each of them contains much that is true and useful; but we propose another which appears to us more simple, more natural, more clear and intelligible, and more accurately conformed to the known phenomena of mind. This is a threefold division, into

I. COGNITIVE IDEAS.

II. SENTIENT IDEAS.

III. ACTIVE OPERATIONS.

When we strictly contemplate the phenomena of mind, apart from the powers from which they result, we perceive no other differences of a *generic* character between the intrinsic nature of our ideas themselves, than a threefold one. They are all, in their own nature, either *knowledge*, or they are *feeling*, or they are *action*. Let the reader verify the truth of this assertion by an examination of his own mental phenomena, and he will be the better qualified to judge of its accuracy, and to enter into the subsequent discussions. Let him take any one within the wide range of his thoughts, and upon examination it will be found that it is in its nature either *knowledge* of something in the external universe or in the regions of mind, or it is a *feeling* pleasant or painful, or it is an *active process* of some kind or other, in which his mind was engaged. This triple division is marked out by criteria, which

we shall more fully discuss, when we enter upon the separate consideration of each individual class of our ideas.

This system differs from the one last mentioned in its essential features.

(a.) They differ in the principle on which they are constructed, the former being a division of the supposed faculties or powers of the mind, of which we have no immediate knowledge; while the one we propose is strictly a division of the *operations* of the mind, actually and immediately known to us by consciousness. As we know nothing certainly of the mind except its operations, it seems to be more philosophic and safe to base our divisions on these operations, and in a great measure limit our discussion to them.

(b.) These systems differ in the lines of division actually adopted by them, and in the operations of mind severally assigned to each. The first division of the former system embraces all the operations, both of our first and third divisions, excepting only a subdivision of our third, namely, the voluntary mode in which our active operations sometimes occur. And that which forms but a subdivision of our third division, constitutes the whole of it, in the other system.

(c.) It will also be found upon examination of the contents of their different parts, that the two systems diverge materially from each other.

ON THE EXTENT OF THE SEVERAL PARTS OF THIS
THREEFOLD DIVISION.

I. *The extent of the* COGNITIVE CLASS OF IDEAS.

This class, we suppose, embraces,

First. What are termed *Perceptions*, which are, by the definition itself, evidently “knowledge of external objects obtained through the instrumentality of our bodily organs.”

Secondly. Our acts of *Consciousness*. According to the old definition of consciousness, as being our knowledge of all our present mental operations, the very existence of this operation has been denied, and not without at least partial grounds. May not the whole difficulty of writers on this subject have arisen from their not observing the grand threefold division of all our mental operations on which our system is founded? Of the first class of our ideas, viz., the *cognitive* class, it may justly be said that they could scarcely be considered as knowledge at all, if we did not know them at the very moment in which they are attained. As to the second class, that of our *feelings*, the case is somewhat diverse. Yet certainly we have a knowledge of them, that is, are conscious of them, and can distinguish our knowledge of the feeling from the feeling itself, the very moment after it occurs. In reference to the third class, it seems, at all times, a matter of great facility, to discriminate between an active operation, which we are performing, and our knowledge of the fact, that we are, at present, engaged in it, and

of the nature of the operation itself. It is by consciousness that we have a knowledge of all the operations of our mind. It is, therefore, an extensive source, or rather department, of our knowledge. It embraces our knowledge of all the so-called internal states of the mind.

Thirdly. Our *conceptions* also manifestly belong to the cognitive class of ideas. It cannot fail to be perceived, that every conception which we have, is a conception of something, is knowledge. It has indeed been maintained, that our conceptions are "knowledge, not obtained through our bodily organs." This, so far as their original elements are concerned, we are compelled to regard as erroneous. Our system leads us to a different opinion; yet, as this subject will meet us at a future stage of our discussions, we shall not now enter on it. Conceptions are evidently knowledge of relations, abstract truths, &c., and thus belong to the cognitive class of our ideas. Thus our idea of virtue is termed a conception; and when carefully analyzed, we find it to be a cognitive idea of the relation of agreement, between certain actions and the law of God, or standard of right. Again, we are said to "conceive" the meaning of general propositions. Our idea of the proposition: virtue is productive of happiness, is termed a conception. When examined, this idea is a *cognition* of the fact learned by experience or observation, that actions of a given kind are productive of happiness. The cases in which this truth is witnessed, are all individual, but by a mental process of frequent occurrence, hereafter to be explained, which we term *Modification*.

we omit the individual actions, or subjects of the proposition, and employ the general term, virtue, embracing them all. Of this general term virtue we affirm the predicate of the proposition, affirm the relation of causation, our idea of which is cognitive, and was learned from individual cases.

Fourthly. It embraces our *judgments* : for what are they but a knowledge of the relations between propositions ?

Fifthly. It embraces our *recollections*. These are nothing else than retrospective knowledge, as will easily be perceived by all.

Sixthly. It embraces the results of reasoning, such as belief, &c. The process of reasoning is itself an active operation, and belongs to our third class; but the result of the process is a distinct thing. It is conviction of the truth or falsity of some alleged truth, it is belief. This belief, or conviction, is evidently cognitive, it forms an item in our stock of knowledge.

Seventhly. It embraces the dictates or decisions of conscience, which are nothing else than the results of our judgment concerning the propriety or impropriety of our own conduct. As acts, or rather the results of judgment, are evidently cognitive, the dictates of conscience are in part also of the same nature. Yet there is also obviously something active about the dictates of conscience. They contain not only a cognition of duty, but also an impulse to obey it. This impulse is active, and will be discussed in the third general division of our subject, when we treat of our first Constitutional Inclination.

II. *On the extent of SENTIENT IDEAS.*

This class embraces what are usually termed, First, *Sensations*. Secondly, *Emotions*. Thirdly, *Affections*. Fourthly, *Passions*, to a certain extent.

Sensations have been regarded as the feelings, which are connected with the perceptions of external objects. They are simply pleasant or painful, and evidently they are sentient in their nature.

By *Emotions* are indicated feelings, consequent on other mental operations than present perceptions of external objects; yet this distinction is not uniformly observed by the best writers.

Affections is a term applied to emotions of a pleasant character.

Passions also are regarded as emotions, but of a painful kind. Yet as all emotions are feelings of a certain kind, it is evident that they all belong to the second class of ideas according to our division.

III. *On the extent of ACTIVE OPERATIONS.*

This class embraces what are usually denominated,

First, *Volitions*, in which is comprehended the whole extent and every variety of the direct action of the will.

Secondly. Those operations of the mind termed *processes* of reasoning, but not their results; for the results of reasoning are knowledge or conviction, and therefore they belong to cognitive ideas.

Thirdly. The *act* of memorizing, and not its results.

Fourthly. The *intellectual act* of communicating our thoughts to others, either orally or by letter.

Fifthly. Some other active processes, the nature of which will hereafter be more fully explained.

When we term the third class of mental operations active, we do not wish to convey the idea, that the soul itself, in acquiring either knowledge or feeling, is in a state of entire passivity; for there is, doubtless, activity in the soul during all its operations. But, it must be remembered, we are here classifying and characterizing the *ideas* or *operations* of the mind, and not the *powers* of the mind itself. Our division is a classification, not of the activity of the soul itself, but of the *results* of its agency. The soul is often voluntary and active in seeking the excitement of feeling; yet the feeling itself, thus excited, seems to be in its own nature merely sentient. It is in itself simply pleasure or pain. Thus also the act of acquiring knowledge by inspection is active, and often even voluntary; but the ideas acquired, the knowledge obtained, is not active; but consists simply of mental representatives of entities, and is best characterized by the term *cognitive*. These ideas are simply knowledge and nothing more.

As all the ideas or operations of the mind thus resolve themselves into three classes, viz., Cognitive, Sentient, and Active, the entire science is most aptly divided into three general parts, one of which is devoted to each of these classes of mental operations.

PART I.

COGNITIVE IDEAS.

It is evident, even on a superficial survey of those ideas which are knowledge, that at least some of them, especially such as relate to material objects around us, are mental representatives of things, or subsistencies, or entities, which exist without the mind. Thus, no one can doubt, when reflecting on his idea of an orange, that the fruit, of which the idea in question is the representative, had a real existence; for he has often handled, tasted, and eaten it. In short, when we carefully examine our cognitive ideas, and the source whence we derive them, we find that they are acquired through the medium of certain parts of our body, called organs of sense; and from the operations and powers of mind, of which all men are possessed. We see, also, that our mind, which perceives, and the organs, through which it perceives, are not in themselves sufficient to furnish us with these ideas. It is farther necessary, that the organs of sense be brought into a particular relation to certain external objects. This relation is either that of actual contact, as in the case of touch and taste, or, it consists in bringing the organ into the direction of the object, with nothing intervening which prevents the rays of light from being reflected from that object to the eye;

or it consists in a relation of proximity to the object, so that the vibrations of the air may be conveyed to the ear, as in sound. We, therefore, here clearly perceive three distinct things: *first*, the external entity, or object, of which our cognitive ideas are the mental representatives or knowledge; *secondly*, the knowledge itself, or the representatives, or ideas, which we have of external objects; and, *thirdly*, the organic process, by which we obtain our ideas, or knowledge. The discussion of each of these three things will therefore appropriately form a subdivision of this part of our subject.

CHAPTER I.

OF OBJECTIVE ENTITIES AS SUBJECTS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

It is indeed true, that in all our reflections on the properties of objects around us, it is not the objects themselves, but only our ideas or mental representatives of the properties of those objects, which are the immediate subjects of observation to the reflecting mind. But, it may be asked, What evidence have we, that anything beyond our ideas has a real existence? How do we know, that such a thing as even the material universe, does actually exist? To this we reply, that if we were deprived of the power of bodily action, and capable of performing no other mental act than that of reflection, and, what we, in the sequel, term the process of *Inspection*, it might indeed be impossible for us to establish the objectivity of external objects, that is, their

real existence, out of, and independently of the percipient mind. But, when we can take a supposed object or entity, such as an apple, into our hands, and perceive that it has weight; when we feel its shape or relation to space; when we take a knife and cut it in pieces and eat it, we constitutionally judge it to be different from our idea of an apple, in which idea, we cannot perceive either weight, or shape, or divisibility, or capability of being eaten. Moreover, all these operations may be performed with closed eyes upon an apple which we never saw, and of which identical apple, therefore, we never had and can never acquire any farther idea than is obtained by touch and taste. In short, whenever we are using our bodily organs in touching, tasting, seeing, hearing, or smelling any object, then the external object itself, either directly, or mediately, and not our idea of it, is the subject of the operation. But as soon as we reflect on some idea, formerly obtained through our bodily organs, this idea, and not the entity itself, is the subject of the operation. During this reflection, we neither do nor can use the bodily organ; for if that organ be employed, and the attention of the soul be directed to it, the act of reflection immediately terminates. We therefore, through the instrumentality of our senses, perceive in external entities properties entirely different from those of an idea; and we also judge that the entity or substratum, to which they belong, is a different one; we judge that the external entities are possessed of real objectivity, that is, have an actual existence out

of our minds. As to the accuracy of this judgment, it would be equal folly either to question it, or attempt its confirmation by fine-spun trains of abstruse ratiocination. All mankind constitutionally believe the well-ascertained testimony of their senses; and all judge, by similar constitutional necessity, that combinations of properties entirely different from each other, appertain to different substrata, or subjects.

The universe, as known to us, consists of nothing else than infinitely various combinations of properties, and their relations.

Again; every combination of properties in nature is individual, that is, it is, in some respects, different from all others.

Again; many combinations have the greater part of their properties in common, and differ only in the residue.

Finally; the various gradations of this similarity form a just basis for the classification of entities. Human language is based on such a classification, having words to express,

First, Our ideas of each individual property; as black, soft, hard, heavy, &c., and these properties are not so very numerous as might, at first view, be imagined.

Secondly, Words to express our aggregate idea of each species of combination, as tree, stone, bird, fish, &c.

Thirdly, Words for our ideas of some other classifications and abstractions still more generic, such as quadrupeds, biped, graminivorous, carnivorous, &c.

Fourthly, Words to express our ideas of the relations of entities.

Some entities, such as solids and liquids, may be classified chemically, according to the constituent elements to which they may be reduced. These simple substances or constituent elements are all individual combinations of properties, and, as such, each of them constitutes a substantive entity, in every respect similar to other entities, or combinations of properties in nature: but a large portion of the entities, or objects in existence, cannot be reached by this analysis.

A classification for metaphysical purposes must embrace all entities, or objects in nature, of which we have any knowledge; otherwise it would omit some entities of which we may have mental representatives; it would omit the subjects of some of our cognitive ideas. The classification of all things into matter and mind, is objectionable for several reasons. It does, indeed, properly divide the combinations actually existing in nature, and not the individual chemical elements; but, admitting the customary definitions of the terms matter and mind, there are some entities of undoubted reality, which do not belong to either class; such as space, number, &c.

In all our reflections on absent entities, and our attempts to classify them, our *ideas* of their properties, and not the properties themselves, are the subjects of our attention. We spend our whole life in acquiring mental representatives of different entities in the universe; but can classify these entities

only by comparing and arranging the ideas thus obtained.

The only proper method, therefore, by which we can classify all the entities or combinations of properties in the universe, of which we have a knowledge, but of which a small portion only can at any time be present before us, is by examining and classifying all those of our ideas which are cognitive, that is, which are mental representatives of entities.

When we examine the whole mass of all our ideas, which we judge to be cognitive in their nature, we find, that they all relate to one or other of the following classes of entities, and their relations, viz., *Solids, Liquids, Gases, Light, Caloric, Electric fluid, Magnetic principle, Space, Number, Time, Mind, Spirit, Glorified bodies, Deity*. The precise number of these classes is not at all material to our system; it may be increased or diminished to any extent, as the future investigations of science may dictate.

That we have ideas relating to all these classes of subjects, no one will dispute; and, that many of these are ideas of realities, is also admitted. The only question, is whether they are not all alike in that respect; whether they are not all mental representatives of real existences, of something, of entities, and not of nonentities. That they are, will, we think, appear evident in the sequel.

Having thus made some general remarks, in regard to objective entities, as subjects of our knowledge, we pass on to a more particular consideration of the first subdivision of this part of our subject.

SECTION I.

Objectivity of the different classes of entities.

As our cognitive ideas of all those entities, which we can more easily test by the senses, are obviously, and by universal consent, mental representatives of realities, of real entities; analogy would lead us to expect, even prior to investigation, that our cognitive ideas of all other entities are of the same kind. Accordingly, we have reason to believe, that our cognitive ideas, belonging to all the different classes of entities, are real knowledge, are mental representatives of real entities, of realities, and not of nonentities. Our ideas of the cognitive class, all appear to us to be generically of the same kind, they appear to be mental representatives, and in the ideas themselves we can perceive no difference. Our minds regard them all as knowledge, and we constitutionally think of them as such, in our mental operations.

In the case of the grosser entities, solids, liquids, &c., all admit that our ideas of them are mental representatives of realities. The same is believed of our ideas of the most elevated and refined entities, mind and Deity; which we have placed at the other extreme of the ential chain. Nor do we perceive any reason, why we should doubt the reality of the intermediate entities, and believe that our ideas of them are deceptive; that God gave us, indeed, the idea, but that it is an idea of nothing, of a nonentity. The reality of solids has generally

been admitted, though not universally. That there really exist such objects as trees and stones, independently of our ideas of them, is so plain a dictate of common sense, that all mankind in practice admit it, and very few, indeed, have ventured to dispute it in theory. Yet the infidel Hume, Mr. Berkeley, and others; have not shrunk from the task of denying, that we have any conclusive evidence of the existence of the material universe around us.

The reality of liquids, that is, of incompressible fluids, is in like manner evident. That gases, or aëriiform entities, have objective reality, is undisputed. In like manner, the objectivity of light is admitted, and also that of caloric, the electric fluid, and the principle of magnetism.

We have reason to believe, that there is such a thing as *space*, because we know something of its properties, and constitutionally judge these properties to appertain to a real something. The properties of space appear to be length, breadth, divisibility, and capacity. All our ideas of direct, not comparative, magnitude, seem to be nothing more than a knowledge of the relation of entities to space; that is, the knowledge of their occupying more or less of it. Our idea of comparative magnitude, is our knowledge of the relation, which two or more objects bear to space, as occupying equal or different portions of it. *Space* may be defined to be *that absolute entity in which all concrete entities exist*. That space is a real entity, seems evident from the following facts: (a.) We discern its properties and

relations through the organs of sight ; as, e. g., the equality or inequality of the space circumscribed by two lines, and the extent of space we learn by locomotion or other measurement. (b.) Because we can speak of it, and all men do speak of it, as a substantive entity, as a something having a substantive existence, and not as a mere property of something else. We every day apply to it the forms of speech, which belong to substantive entities alone ; that is, we speak of it as having permanent properties, we speak of different portions of space as having definite relations to each other. (c.) That space, time, and number are not mere subjective limitations of our ideas, having no existence in themselves, but resulting from the structure of our mental constitution, seems evident, because, in that case, the changes which occur in the relations of other (of concrete) entities to space, time, and number, would likewise be occasioned, not by any real change in the objects themselves, but only by changes in the mind of man, which every one will judge to be absurd. No man can believe that two vessels at sea, approaching each other at the rate of nine knots an hour, do not really change their position ; do not occupy different portions of space. No man can believe, that their progress is only conceived to take place, in consequence of some change in the mind of the observer, and not of any change in the position of the vessels themselves.

That time, space, and number are *not mere properties* of other entities is evident, because mere properties cannot be conceived as existing by them-

selves, apart from the entity to which they belong ; but time, space, and number can be conceived as existing apart from all other entities. Moreover, if you destroy an entity, you necessarily destroy all the properties belonging to it ; but we may conceive all other objects in the universe to be obliterated, and yet time, space, and number will remain unimpaired ; and will be ready to receive and characterize other worlds, if the Omnipotent should see fit to create any.

Again, they cannot be *mere relations* of entities, as is often supposed. A relation is a something existing between two or more entities or objects, and which ceases to exist the moment those related objects are destroyed. But we by no means conceive of space as being something which exists merely between two or more objects, or as being at all bounded by any number of objects. On the contrary, we conceive of all other objects as existing in space, and however far we suppose them apart, we conceive of space as extending still beyond them. Nor is space annihilated by the destruction of any entities between which it is conceived to exist, as relations are ; but we may destroy all such objects, and space remains unimpaired.

It is equally evident, however, that space, time, and number are generically different from all the other classes of entities, and, accordingly, they are classed by themselves in the sequel. They appear to be separate entities of a peculiar kind, and, were we called on to characterize them, we would say, they appear to us as *three absolute and universal*

forms of existence (not of thought), which the Creator has impressed (not upon our minds, but) upon the entire universe, and also upon all other entities in it; or, as we judge them to exist prior to, and independently of, all other entities, we may more definitely regard them as three universal, fundamental entities created by God, of entirely peculiar properties, in which, or in the forms of which, all other created entities exist.

Of *time* and *number*, as of mind, we have no other certainty than our knowledge of them, obtained partly through the bodily organs, and partly from the other operations of the mind itself, which knowledge we constitutionally judge to be true. We cannot see, touch, or taste the entity mind any more than time or number. The properties of number are augmentability, or addibility, subtractibility, multiplicability, divisibility. We can conceive of number separately from every other entity. Nay, a moment's reflection will convince us, that all the operations carried on with numbers, not only may be, but generally are carried on independently of the objects, from which the date of the calculation are derived, and to which its results are again to be applied. It is a matter of indifference to the mathematician, when requested to perform certain operations on given numbers, whether he knows to what purpose his calculations are subsequently to be applied or not. Any series of figures or letters, stated in the form of a sum, with the customary mathematical signs, is nothing else than a sentence describing certain relations of

number, or asking what those relations are. In short, all statements of numerical operations, of every species, arithmetical, algebraic, or mathematical, are nothing else than sentences expressing by signs our knowledge of the various modifications or relations of number. And all these operations themselves are active operations performed by man on numbers, which, however extended or complicated they may be, may ultimately be reduced to a few elementary operations based on the attributes of number above enumerated; and hence, deriving their name from their nature, they are termed addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. These may indeed be reduced to two, if it be thought preferable, as the former two include the latter.

Number comprehends an indefinite series of units. The decimal system of designating and calculating numbers is arbitrary; and seems to have been adopted fortuitously. It is neither based on anything peculiar in the intrinsic nature of numbers themselves, requiring ten figures, and calculation by tens, rather than by any other number; nor is it, by any means, as the ancient Pythagoreans supposed, the most perfect system that could be devised. The dodecadal (duodecimal), having twelve different figures, would be far more convenient; as the number twelve can be divided more frequently without a remainder, and consequently calculations by the dodecadal, or duodecimal system, would be far less encumbered by fractions, than when conducted on the decimal plan. The Roman

method of quintal calculation, having only five figures, is virtually the same as the decimal. They employed the letters I and V; and then double V thus V_Δ , forming X; then C (centum), for hundred, M (mille) for thousand, &c.

The properties of *time* known to us, appear to be duration (or length), augmentability, and divisibility. All the different words in a language referring to duration, as epoch, year, month, day, hour, minute, second, are so many words to express our ideas or knowledge of different portions of time. These portions exist, independently of our ideas of them. They would exist, and be conceivable, if we had no words by which to express them. But the selection of these particular words, to designate those particular portions of time, as well as the selection of those particular periods for designation, is arbitrary; and similar terms might with equal truth be used to express all the infinite variety of other portions of time. The only difference is, that some of these periods the Creator has himself measured out by the revolution of the heavenly bodies and of the earth, while others are not thus designated. The former, or natural divisions, can be employed with greater facility and uniformity, being marked out by the infallible hand of God with such absolute accuracy, that those ponderous worlds, though their orbits may be hundred of millions of miles, yet pass through them and return to precisely the same spot, without the variation of a single second of time!

It might, at first view, appear doubtful, whether

time is not merely an attribute of other entities, instead of being a distinct entity itself. But, on reflection, we find that it is, like space and number, a necessary form of existence for all concrete entities. We are under a subjective necessity, that is, a necessity arising from the structure of the mind, to conceive all concrete entities as existing in space and time, and with a relation to number. Yet we find no difficulty in conceiving of time itself, apart from all other objects existing in it. In searching for the properties of time, space, and number, we cannot philosophically ask for the same kind of properties, as those of solids, or liquids, or light, or mind, or Deity. *Each class of entities has properties more or less peculiar to itself.* The question is not, whether time, space, and number have the properties of any other class of entities, but *whether they have any properties at all.* If they have properties, these properties must be properties of something, of an entity, or of a nonentity, of nothing; which would be absurd. Thus we cannot prove, that mind possesses the properties of any other class of entities; yet we all believe in the existence of mind, because it has properties of its own. And, as the same is true of time, space, and number, we have conclusive evidence of their existence, as realities of a peculiar nature, each having properties peculiar to itself.

It is admitted that the entity *mind* possesses objective reality. The properties of mind are knowledge, feeling, and action, or cognition, sensibility, and activity, together with susceptibility of influ-

ence from bodily organs. Every mental operation is either knowledge, feeling, or action ; but no simple operation is one or all of these properties together.

It has been customary to consider the phenomena of mind as generically different from the phenomena of other entities, in their relation to our minds as subjects of knowledge. This habit we are compelled to regard as incorrect. We know generically just as much about one entity as about another, that is, we know certain properties of each, and these properties are the subjects of our ideas about them respectively. This much we also know about mind, and more we do not know of anything else, even of the grossest forms of solid matter. It is therefore erroneous to assert, that we know less of the essence of mind, than of that of other entities. With regard to solids, liquids, gases, space, time, and number, we know no more about their essence, than about that of mind ; neither do we know less, because the substratum, or essence, of all the entities or things in existence, is unknown to us. Our knowledge of each, regards only its properties or operations. But in all other entities except mind, men agree in admitting, that there must be a substratum to which these properties belong. It is regarded as an intuitive judgment of the mind, that, wherever we observe properties or operations, they belong to a subject or agent. All languages distinguish mind from its properties, as clearly as they do solids and other entities from their properties. The structure of the human mind seems to require us to suppose the ex-

istence of such a substratum ; as is evident from the fact, that all languages are constructed on this principle or supposition. As the Author of our nature gave us this structure, it is probable that such substrata do belong to all entities. Indeed, what are these properties, but properties of the entity itself ? What are they, but those aspects of the substratum, which, by virtue of our organization, are within the reach of our knowledge ? The known properties of any object, such as copper, lead, silver, gold, are the several aspects, in which these metals are perceptible to us, with our present organization. In a different state, with more organs or senses than we now possess, we might perceive additional properties of these metals ; but those properties perceived by us prove, that the subject, or substratum, to which they belong, is known to us as far as these properties extend. Hence, as there is no difference in this respect between mind and other entities, we are compelled to regard the views of Hume and others, who consider the mind as merely a bundle of ideas, and of Brown, who considers all ideas as the mind itself in certain states, as unphilosophical in themselves, independently of their tendency to foster a skeptical or infidel disposition. The habit of regarding the phenomena of the mind as generically different from those of other entities, has probably arisen in part from the old imperfect division of all entities into matter and mind, material and immaterial, and from the maxim thence inferred, that mind is indivisible. But the different properties and operations of mind, which are the

subjects of all the ideas we possess of this entity, are as distinct from each other in their nature, as are the different properties of solids and liquids. Hence, it is evidently unphilosophic to assert, that the unknown, ulterior something, supposed to belong to mind, as the substratum of its phenomena or properties, is or is not possessed of indivisibility.

It is also admitted, that *spirit* has objective reality. The cardinal known distinction between mind and spirit, is the connexion of the former with a body as the organ of its action, and its susceptibility of being influenced by the body in various ways. To this class of entities belong the spirits of departed saints, whose bodies shall slumber in the grave till the resurrection, as also the angels, arch-angels, and devils; in short, all created spirits, of which we have any knowledge, or which may exist, unknown to us, in the boundless empire of Jehovah.

Glorified bodies also possess objective reality. We class these separately from all other entities, because, although we know only that little about them which the Scriptures teach us, the Apostle Paul evidently represents them as different from all other objects, as "spiritual" bodies (*σώματα πνευματικά*), "celestial bodies," and incorruptible, which predicates necessarily imply an entity radically different from ordinary matter.

Finally, the *Divine Being* has objective reality. The ideas we possess concerning God are derived partly from the works of nature, and partly from revelation. Mortal eyes have not seen him, mor-

tal ears have not heard him, but that the reality of his existence may be deduced from evidences of various kinds, establishing his agency and attributes, is admitted by all except the atheist.

Our knowledge of the attributes and existence of God, so far as it is derived from nature, consists of ideas of virtues, which we observed in good men, separated by a mental process from every imperfection, with which they are mingled in human beings, and elevated to the highest conceivable degree. We thus acquire our ideas of the incomparable excellences of the Divine Being. Perceiving, in the structure and operations of the universe, the evidences of these incomparable attributes, we constitutionally judge (know) that they appertain to some *substratum, or being*; which being, we in the same constitutional manner, judge to exist. We do not affirm, that we actually obtain our knowledge of the Divine character and existence by such a process of reasoning; but suppose, that by this process we can verify and confirm these truths, which are ordinarily taught us by tradition, long before we reach the maturity of mind necessary for such trains of ratiocination.

Our additional knowledge, derived from revelation, concerning the Divine Being, his works, his will, and his moral government, likewise consists of ideas, the constituent elements of which were originally derived from human beings and human institutions. Through the medium of these ideas, and their various and new combinations and applications, together with anthropopathic representations,

the most minute and detailed account of the will, the providence and the moral government of God is presented to us, and we are instructed by precept and example, what the Author of our being would have us to do.

Whether the human mind, if left wholly to itself, would have discovered the existence of God, from the contemplation of the works of nature, is somewhat uncertain ; as it is much easier to see the truth, propriety, and excellence of an invention or discovery after it is made, than to make it. But there is obviously an aptitude in the human mind, to see the evidences of the Divine existence and attributes, after they have been revealed to us, which is generally done either by tradition, or the written revelation.

In regard to all these classes of entities, it is evident that, as arranged above, they gradually recede, in the nature of their properties, from the grossest forms of matter, to such as are more refined, until at last we reach the Deity himself. Or, in other words, we perceive the relation of increasing diversity between the first class, solids, and each of those that succeed it.

SECTION II.

Division of these Classes.

All these classes of entities, when attentively examined, appear to be of two distinct kinds, and may therefore, with propriety, be referred to two generic classes :

I. *Absolute*, or universal.

II. *Concrete*.

Absolute entities, are those of which we can conceive, without any reference to those of the concrete class. To this class belong *Time*, *Space*, and *Number*. The properties and relations of the absolute entities are, in their very nature, more definite and clear than those of the concrete. They are, moreover, immutable in their character; hence the sciences discussing these entities, such as arithmetic, geometry, and mathematics in general, are more certain, conclusive, and immutable. Accordingly, they are termed "exact sciences," and not without obvious reason. Between the absolute or universal entities time, space, and number, the mind perceives some points of difference; but they are rather specific than general, and all three properly belong to one general class.

Concrete entities are those, of which we cannot conceive, except as existing in the absolute class, or, as being related to it. To this class belong *Solids*, *Liquids*, *Aëriform substances*, and, in short, all the different classes of known entities, except *Time*, *Space*, and *Number*.

SECTION III.

Subdivision of Individual Entities.

All entities of every class may naturally be divided into *substantive*, *adjective*, and *composite*, because all objects perceived by us in nature, are either entire individual objects, or they are one or more properties of such object, or they are relations of some kind or other, perceived to exist be-

tween the perceived properties of objects. As every entire individual object has in reality substantive existence for itself, it may, with propriety, be designated a substantive entity. There is an additional advantage in the adoption of this term, which will appear in the sequel, when we make some application of this subject to the structure of language and universal grammar.

A substantive entity, then, is that in which properties cohere, or coexist; or, we might say, a substantive entity is that to which any number of co-existing properties appertain. Accordingly, every simple substance, or chemical or ential element, separately viewed, as also each aggregate of all these ential or chemical elements found coexisting, is a substantive entity; such as wood, water, tree, horse, &c. These ential elements are known to us only relatively; we know their properties and their relation to time, space, and number, and to each other. In the case of solids and liquids, and such other substances as can be subjected to chemical analysis, the ential elements and chemical elements are the same. But the term chemical, in this application, is not so well adapted to metaphysical purposes, because the usage of our language confines it to a certain portion only of entities, such as solids, liquids, gases, &c. It is not improbable, that all the classes of entities have ential elements, as well as those which chemical analysis can reach; though of course they are very different from them in their nature. Ential element is a more suitable term, and designates

the substratum, to which any set of properties, found coexisting in any class of entities, belongs.

The idea which we have of a substantive entity, is the aggregate of our ideas of all those essential, permanent properties, which are found coexisting in the same entity, and, without any one of which, the residue could not be designated by the substantive name, which they collectively bear.

An *adjective* entity is any one property of a substantive entity considered individually; as length, breadth, colour, gravity, or any other known property. Human language, in most cases, contains words to designate, not only each individual property of an entity of which we have an idea, but also names or words, by which those properties, which are found coexisting, are collectively designated; as stone, tree, house, &c.

A *composite entity* consists of two or more adjective entities, viewed together, and considered in regard to some relation subsisting between them. Sometimes, several properties of the same entity, constitute a composite entity, between the parts of which some relation is observed. Thus, different parts of a painting may have different colours, and may be viewed in relation to this difference. These relations of entities exert a very important influence on some of the active operations of the mind, and an acquaintance with them, belongs to the most important branches of our knowledge. These relations are not the properties of either part of the composite entity alone; nor have they a separate existence of their own apart from the related enti-

ties; but they are relations existing between them, and perceivable by the mind. Still, in this case also, our knowledge is a knowledge of relations which actually exist independently of our minds. Thus, we behold two beautiful, dark, Arabian horses, and perceive a similarity of colour between them. Who can doubt, that this similarity would have existed, whether we had seen it or not? Or whoever imagined, when contemplating the exact adaptation of the wheels of a watch to act upon one another, that this supposed adaptation existed only in his own mind? Our ideas of relations, like our ideas of substantive and adjective entities, do not resemble the entities themselves, but are only the divinely appointed mental representatives of them. Yet, our idea of the relation of similarity of colour between two gray horses, is as certainly seen by the eyes, as is the colour of either horse alone, and the constitution of our minds compels us to believe the similarity of colour between them to be real; that is, we just as invariably believe our idea of the perceived similarity to be an idea of an objective truth, of a reality, as we do believe our idea of the colour of each horse individually to be such.

SECTION IV.

Relations of Entities.

I. What are the perceptible relations of *Absolute Entities* to each other?

II. What are the perceptible relations of *Concrete Entities* to each other?

III. What are the perceptible relations between *Concrete* and *Absolute Entities*?

The relations which the human mind is capable of perceiving between entities, both absolute and concrete, are exceedingly numerous, and may be variously divided. The following division may serve as a basis of a comprehensive and accurate classification.

I. *The relations of ABSOLUTE ENTITIES to each other.*

(a.) Equality, diversity, antecedence, subsequence, &c., of different portions of *Time*.

(b.) Equality, difference, progression, or ratio, plurality (plus), minority (minus), &c., of different *Numbers*.

(c.) Equality, diversity, contiguity, remoteness, superiority (above), inferiority (below), of different portions of *Space*.

In reference to each of these relations, language embraces a vast multitude of words, expressing them in different methods and different aspects.

II. *The relations of CONCRETE ENTITIES to each other.*

(a.) Similarity and diversity of any of the different classes of entities, in regard to any one or more of their properties.

(b.) Contiguity of any of the concrete entities to each other in regard to *Space*, *Time*, or *Number*.

(c.) Fitness, physical, intellectual, and moral. Physical fitness includes the relations which are the basis of beauty, symmetry, taste, &c., in the material world. To this class must be referred the relations of harmony or discord, perceived between different sounds. The relation exists between the

atmospheric vibrations themselves, and even in the vibrating chords which produce the undulations of the atmosphere. The reason why discordant vibrations produce unpleasant feelings in us, while those which accord are pleasing, is unknown to us. But these vibrations themselves are well understood, and their chords and discords are the subject of the most obvious mathematical calculation. Intellectual fitness embraces our perceptions of fitness in the operations of the mind, in all the various departments of its agency. Moral fitness embraces all our duties to God, to ourselves, and our fellow-men. They are all fitnesses perceived by the mind to exist objectively between us and God, and our fellow-men. The whole field of moral and religious obligation, of philosophic and Christian ethics, is embraced in this relation. Thus, a dictate of conscience is our knowledge of a composite entity, viz., a law; that is, the expressed will of the law-giver or his acknowledged representative, and some action of a person under obligation to this law. The relation perceived between them, is that of moral fitness or agreement, or of unfitness or disagreement.

In virtue of our constitutional activity we must act somehow. By inspection we perceive the moral fitness of some actions, viewed in relation to the law, and the unfitness of other actions; and the first Constitutional Inclination of the soul (see part iii. of this work) urges us to that which is morally fit, which is right. This complex operation, when referring to our own actions, constitutes the dictates

of conscience. There is, therefore, in the dictates of conscience, something that is impulsive and something that is judicial; both a judgment and an impulse.

(d.) The relation of analogy. This relation is based on past experience. The maxim, "Every effect must have a cause," is an analogous judgment, resulting from experience. Stated at length, it would read thus: Every effect we ever knew had a cause, hence all others probably will have.

(e.) Causation, or agency in general. That causation differs from mere antecedence is evident. They can often be distinguished by the following circumstances: 1. The cause also produces such consequents, under other circumstances; whereas the mere antecedent, is, on other occasions, and under other circumstances, not attended by the consequent. 2. By some known, intelligible aptitude in the cause to produce the effect, while this is not found in the mere antecedent. The light and heat of the rising sun, are both antecedents to the melting of the snow on a winter morning. That the heat and not the light, is the *cause* of the effect, is demonstrated by the fact, that caloric without light will produce the same effect; as when snow is brought near to a dark but heated stove or other iron; while light, with little or no caloric, produces no such effect, as is exemplified in the case of a candle borne over the snow. Thus also in the machinery of a watch, there is a perceptible adaptation between the parts to act upon one another, and to produce the effects for which they are designed.

But even this judgment of perceptible adaptation, is the result of former experience in similar cases. And this experience amounts only to a knowledge of the fact. In any new case, not embracing perceptible adaptation on which former experience has instructed us, our belief of the existence of a causative relation is purely the result of present observation, and strong or weak according to the extent and uniformity of that observation. These facts appear clearly to prove, that our confidence in the uniformity of the operations of nature, and of the relation of cause and effect, is not, as has sometimes been affirmed, an original instinctive principle in the mind; but is a general abstract belief or confidence, derived from our experimental observation of individual cases. Experience teaches us, that the world is governed by general laws, or, rather, that God causes the properties of all objects in our world, to act in uniform ways or modes, termed laws of nature. Many of these we learn in youth. To these laws, we refer all the phenomena, for which they will account. If we meet with an event or effect which the known laws do not explain, we look for another law. Thus additional laws are occasionally discovered, and thus our confidence in the uniformity of nature's laws, is acquired without the supposition of any instinctive, or original, or *à priori* principle or knowledge in the mind. The relation of causation, or agency, is very comprehensive and embraces three different species:

(1.) *Mechanical agency.*

(2.) *Instinctive agency.*

(3.) *Rational or moral agency.*

By *Mechanical agency* we mean all the unintelligent and merely physical changes of inert matter, such as the motions and changes of the heavenly bodies, of solids, liquids, &c. The mechanical changes may be divided into two classes: *First*, the uniform or universal changes, viz., gravitation, attraction, cohesion, repulsion, &c. These are termed laws of nature, by which phrase, however, cannot properly be meant an agent or cause of action; but it is merely a statement of our cognitive idea of a uniform mode of action or of changes observed in entities, of which action or changes God is the agent or cause. *Secondly*, mechanical agency includes contingent changes, such as those actions, motions, or changes which are occasioned by the impulse or influence of other bodies.

The *second* kind of general agency, viz., the *instinctive*, embraces all those actions of irrational animals, which result from what is termed instinct, that is, a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction; such as the incubation of hens, &c.

The *third* species of agency is *rational or moral agency*. To this class belong all those actions of men, either voluntary or spontaneous, which are free, for which we are accountable, and which may be termed moral actions. This class is of the very utmost importance, and embraces in it the entire field of all that diversified agency, which is peculiar to man, as a rational and accountable creature of God.

III. *Relations between ABSOLUTE and CONCRETE entities.*

(a.) In reference to number : addition, multiplication, subtraction, and division of numbers (not of concrete entities). These operations are active relations of agency, performed by the *concrete entity* man, on our ideas of the *absolute entity* number.

(b.) In reference to space : mensuration of its parts by the concrete entity man ; and fitness or unfitness of any concrete entity to occupy any given portion, or form of it.

(c.) In relation to time : calculation of its parts by man ; and the relation of fitness or unfitness of a given portion of it to any specified purpose.

The relations of entities may be divided into *transitive* and *intransitive*. The first, or transitive class of relations, embraces the relation of causation or agency in general, mechanical, instinctive, and moral. The second, or intransitive class, embraces the relations of similarity, diversity, contiguity, and, in short, all the other relations excepting those of causation and agency in general.

These two classes may again be subdivided into *absolute* or indicative, and *hypothetical* or subjunctive. These relations are, in human language, most naturally expressed by verbs. Those words expressing transitive relations are in their primitive nature active verbs ; those expressing intransitive relations are in their original form neuter verbs, verbs expressing a state of being. Passive verbs appear to be an improvement in language, and are not based on any separate distinction in the rela-

tions themselves, but refer simply to the entities between which they exist, and determine whether the speaker was the agent or recipient of the active influence, which they always express. This is beautifully illustrated by the Hebrew verbs in the Kal voice. The radical word throughout expresses the relation of *action*; the appendages prefixed and suffixed only designate the relations of the speakers and others, as the agents or recipients of the action. The same is also true, in a certain degree, of Latin and Greek verbs.

The subdivision of both classes of relations into *retrospective*, *present*, and *prospective*, is obviously natural, and is expressed in language by the past, present, and future tenses of verbs. Each of these is again twofold; the relation is either absolute or hypothetical. In the former case the verb expressing this relation is in the *indicative*, and in the latter case it is in the *subjunctive* mood. The *imperative* mood is the annunciation to an individual, of his relation of obligation to perform a prescribed act; whether this obligation results from his relation to the speaker as authorized to command him, or to some other human being, or to God.

CHAPTER II.

OF OUR COGNITIVE IDEAS, OR MENTAL REPRESENTATIVES OF ENTITIES.

SECTION I.

What is the exact nature of those of our ideas which are knowledge?

IN reply to this inquiry, we remark that it is probably impossible to describe the intrinsic nature of our ideas in any other way than by stating, that they belong to the class of entities termed mind; and that every individual knows for himself, what his ideas are, by the testimony of his own consciousness. One cardinal feature of the first class of ideas, by which they are clearly distinguished from all others, is, that they are representatives of things actually existing. The disputed question, whether our ideas are to be considered as something distinct from the mind itself, we feel constrained to answer in the affirmative; while we, of course, must reject the old Peripatetic notion, that these ideas are literal images, resembling the entities, which are the subjects of them.

SECTION II.

What are the criteria by which the cognitive class of ideas is distinguished?

The following criteria may, we think, be clearly perceived, and should be regarded as characteristic:

I. The cognitive ideas have for their objects entities existing out of the mind, that is, things of any and of every description. As we regard the mind as distinct from its operations, it is evident that this language does not exclude from the list of cognitive ideas the knowledge of our own mental operations. In short, our knowledge of mental phenomena of every sort is embraced in this class, whether they be past, present, or prospective; whether they be the operations of our own, or of other minds.

II. The cognitive ideas derive their form and are dependant for their character on the entities themselves which are the subjects of them, which have existence independently of us, and would be what they are if we had not this knowledge of them. We, of course, do not mean, that there exists any literal resemblance between our ideas of entities, and these entities themselves. Thus, our idea of a peach or a pear, does not resemble the object itself, in any one particular. But we mean, that there is a correspondence between the difference subsisting among different objects in nature, and the intellectual representatives of them, which, by the constitution of the mind, these objects produce, when brought within its observation. The same entities, when fairly viewed, always produce the same representatives in the mind of the same person; but it also affords the same idea to all other persons, or rather an idea exactly similar. All men have the same uniform representatives of entities; hence they can converse intelligibly about them. If the same entity afforded to different persons different

representatives of itself, men could no more converse intelligibly about it, than if they did not understand the same language. Our idea of an entity, accordingly, is not what we please that it shall be, but is such, as, by the constitution of our minds, is naturally produced by the entity itself, when brought under the observation of the mind. Nor is our knowledge of the relations of entities, what we choose to make it; but what God has made it by our mental structure. Thus, whether a landscape, or any other object, shall appear to us beautiful, or otherwise, does not depend upon our wishes. Beauty, and the reverse, are properties and relations inherent in the objects, to which they belong, and our apperception of them depends on their existence in the object, which is the subject of our observation.

Our knowledge of the truth or falsity of a proposition no more depends upon our previous wishes, if the examination was impartial and faithful, than does the shape of a book, or the colour of an apple, when presented to our eyes. How often are not men called to attend the examination of a friend, who has been charged with some heinous crime, which, if established, would hurl him from the respectable eminence which he occupied in society, and prove him unworthy of the confidence which they had reposed in him, and of the affections of which he had been the subject. These friends protest his innocence, and gladly lend him every aid in obtaining able counsel, and the attendance of every desired witness, to wipe away the odious stain

from his character. With intense feeling they enter the halls of justice, anxiously wishing that their friend may succeed in proving himself still worthy of their affections and respect. But, alas! one witness after another is heard, one item of evidence after another is brought to light, until the guilt of their former friend no longer admits of any doubt. They hear the testimony in his favour, they listen to the arguments of his counsel, and find nothing but subterfuge and conjecture; find, indeed, even in the nature of the efforts made to save his character, collateral evidence of his guilt, and are compelled, though with bleeding hearts, to believe that he who stands before them convicted as a criminal, is no longer the upright man, whom they loved and respected as a friend. Here the result of the investigation was the knowledge, that the charge alleged against their friend was true; a knowledge of the relation of probation (proof or evidence), between the facts adduced in the trial and the guilt of their friend. Surely no one would contend that the nature of the result depended on their wishes, or on anything else than the nature of the testimony itself, that is, on the facts, the entities and their relations, of which they acquired knowledge during the trial.

III. The entities which are the subjects of our cognitive ideas, must have an existence previously to our knowledge of them. When we make a volition, the subject of that volition is the intended *future* exertion of some physical or intellectual power, and the subject of the volition has no previ-

ous existence. But when we have a knowledge of an apple, a stone, a mind, of space, or number, these cognitive ideas, or knowledge, are mental representatives of entities previously existing; and, according to universal consent, they presuppose such previous existence. Thus, even in a fictitious narration, all the elements, so far as they are cognitive, are made up of ideas of entities which separately had a real existence.

SECTION III.

The nature and sources of ERROR in our cognitive ideas.

In order to obtain a correct view of this extremely important subject, it is necessary first to advert to the exact nature and divisions of truth. All truths may be divided into three classes:

I. *Real or objective truths*, that is, entities themselves, existing in nature.

II. *Idealistic or subjective truths*, that is, correct mental representatives of objective entities, that is, of objects in nature.

III. *Nominal or verbal truths*, that is, propositions or sentences, expressing in accurate language, correct ideas of things, correct mental representatives of objective entities.

This division is evidently based on the nature of things, and affords us no small aid in understanding the sources, whence sprung the former philosophical sects of Realists and Nominalists, as well as the modern Idealists.

The rancorous contentions of the former sects,

about the metaphysical question, whether our generic ideas are mere names (*nomina rerum, seu flatus vocis*) as the Nominalists contended, or *realities* existing in nature, generic archetypes according to which all individual entities are formed, as was maintained by the Realists from the days of Aristotle till the time of Roscellinus, in the eleventh century, were continued through subsequent ages, and rose to such a height, that the blood of several distinguished leaders was shed in the contest. It was in no small degree the hatred of the Nominalist priests and bishops, who greatly preponderated in the Council of Constance, which induced them in 1415, to commit to the flames the innocent Huss, who was a learned and distinguished leader of the Realists; and, for the same reason chiefly, the Realists in return obtained the condemnation of the Nominalist, John de Wesalia, doctor of theology in Erfurt, in 1479, who ended his life in prison.

Philosophers of modern days, especially in Germany, have used the terms Realism and Idealism in a somewhat different sense, as characteristic of their several systems of philosophy.

By *Realism* they designate that system of philosophy, which not only admits the existence of something real or actual, something objective in nature; but also regards this real something as the original material, anterior to the ideal, and out of which the ideal (that is, consciousness, conception, knowledge) was deduced. The principle of this system is "*reale prius, ideale posterius*," the real existed first, the ideal is posterior to it. But to the various modifica-

tions of this system, it may justly be objected, that the derivation of the *ideal*, that is, of mental action, from the *real*, that is, from the organization of matter, necessarily results in materialism. There is, moreover, no necessity whatever of deriving either mind from matter, or matter from mind, either the ideal from the real, or the real from the ideal. Both are realities created by God, and it is one of the idle conceits of philosophy, falsely so called, to suppose, that a system, to be complete, must have some one element to start from, out of which everything else can be evolved.

By *Idealism* they designate that system of philosophy which regards "*the real*" (das Reale), that is, the actual or material world, as merely ideal or imaginary, and assumes that there exists nothing in nature corresponding to our ideas of the material world; but that we ourselves confer objectivity on those ideas, that is, conceive the existence of something real as corresponding to our ideas (to the ideal), because by a necessity of our nature we find ourselves possessed of those ideas. This system regards "*the ideal*" (das Ideale) as first, and the real as posterior to it, yea, admits the existence of the real or material universe, only because and as far as, the belief of it is the necessary result of our mental structure. The real (say they) is the mere product of the ideal. But this system is after all not what it boasts to be, a system of pure idealism, for it begins by assuming the "reality" of the "ideal," that is, it assumes the existence of the *mind* which is the subject of the ideal, the mind in

which the ideas of the universe are found. To escape from this difficulty, some idealists have supposed, these ideas of the material universe, to be produced in us immediately by God, the infinite mind. Fichte and others suppose the mind itself to be the originator of these ideas, acting by virtue of its original activity, according to certain laws or limitations of its nature, which are incomprehensible to itself (to the ego). This system is termed by German philosophers *Egoistic Idealism*.

The *transcendental* Idealism of *Kant* is, however, materially different from this. He admits or assumes the existence of "the real," that is, of the material world; but maintains that it cannot be *known to us* as it is *in itself* objectively, apart from our views of it, but only as it appears to us through the medium of our senses.

But our present design does not permit us to enlarge on the opinions of these writers; yet we think the view of this subject to which our system naturally leads us, will enable the reader to form a clear conception of the extent to which each system adheres to the truth. The exact truth in the dispute between the ancient Realists and Nominalists, will fully appear in the discussion of the third active process of the mind, *modification*, in the last part of this work; where abstraction or generalization is discussed as a part of that process. The mind doubtless does possess the power of framing general ideas, which, though derived from real objects in nature, do not exactly correspond to any specific one. Yet are these not merely names, as the

Nominalists held, but actual generic conceptions, as the later conceptualists maintain.

But we return to the discussion of the nature of truth.

We have said, that all entities in the natural, intellectual, and moral world, and their relations, are realities or truths objectively considered. The word *truth* is indeed not often used precisely in this sense. Most generally it has a reference to our *ideas* of entities, and is therefore used subjectively ; but, if we wish to begin at the ultimate ground of our subject, we may be permitted to employ the word in this signification. The objective realities exist out of the mind, and would be what they are if we knew nothing about them. They are the subjects of our knowledge, and the ultimate basis of truth.

Our cognitive idea of each objective reality, or entity, if it accord with the original, that is, if it be what by divine appointment and the constitution of our minds, that entity is designed to give, is an *idealistic truth*, or a truth subjectively considered, and evidently differs from objective truths. Subjective truth is more limited in its extent than the objective, and is of different extent in different minds. There is an immeasurable difference between the extended and diversified knowledge of a Mosheim, a Leibnitz, or a Newton, and the limited stock of ideas found in the mind of an ignorant, unlettered savage ; but doubtless the knowledge of the most deservedly celebrated universal

scholar, falls short of the entire range of real existences in an inconceivably greater degree.

The manner in which God determined the nature of our representatives of entities, is by the structure of the human mind itself; so that if we have freely and impartially examined an entity with all the light attainable, the idea then formed of it in the mind, is that appointed by God as its representative.

A *nominal* or *verbal truth*, is a sentence or proposition, spoken or written, in which a correct idea of a real entity is expressed by the precise words, which, according to the usage of language, are employed to designate those very ideas.

All error in statements, whether oral or written, must be situated in one of these two latter departments. There may be an error in regard to the entire objective entity. Thus a timid individual, in a dark night, indistinctly beholding a stump before him, may believe it a robber, and so relate his story; but he has made a premature and gratuitous inference from the indistinct testimony of his senses, and thus obtained a false idea of an entity. The error here is evidently in the idealistic department. Though the error in this case concerns the objective entity, it specifically consists in the want of conformity of the subjective idea or mental representative, to the objective or real entity. In short, the error can never lie in the first department, namely, that of real or objective truth. Objective truths, or entities, are and must ever be, just what they are independently of our knowledge of them.

The fact that our mental representatives of them are correct or incorrect, cannot affect them in any degree.

But, if an individual, who has a correct idea of an entity, either inadvertently, or through design, or through ignorance of language, describes his idea in terms which express either more than his precise idea, or something radically different from it, the error will be a nominal or *verbal* one; it will consist in the incorrect selection of words to express the ideas. In addition to these two locations of error in statements, there is another in the hearer or reader. Error may be seated in the incorrect association in the mind of the reader or hearer, between the words which he reads or hears, and his own ideas. Thus, a sentence describing correct ideas in accurate language, might be mistaken by an ignorant person. With these preliminary views, we can find no difficulty in tracing the following sources of error :

SOURCES OF ERROR IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

Involuntary Error embraces,

I. *Incorrect original mental representatives* of entities. These may arise from the following sources :
(a.) From a hasty, superficial inspection of entities.
(b.) From forgetfulness of the exact mental representative originally obtained, and a consequent misstatement of it. (c.) From listening to one part of a statement, and neglecting to listen to the whole. This remark applies not only to substantive and adjective entities, but also to composite. The re-

lations of sameness and contrariety may be easily observed by attentive inspection. But haste and inattention may also lead to error. The relation most difficult to be accurately discerned is that of causation, which is often prematurely admitted, where there was mere sequence.

II. Involuntary error may arise from *incorrect selection of sounds and written words*, to express to others the true mental representative which we really have. Thus we may select a word more or less specific than it ought to be; as, for example, when we charge many with a crime which belongs only to few; or, our expression may convey different circumstances from those which actually exist; we may incautiously denominate that self-interest, which was really gratitude, and that pride, which, in fact, was vanity.

III. Involuntary error may arise from the real imperfection of language, which does not furnish words to express our ideas with precision on all subjects. Thus, in translating a work, and giving an account of foreign countries, we find offices, coins, &c., different from any found in our own country, for which we have no exact name in our tongue. In the New Testament, *denarius* is translated a penny, and *δαίμων*, devil; not because the English words were supposed by the translators exactly to correspond in meaning to the Greek, but because our language furnishes no words of precisely the same meaning. We have no coin exactly corresponding in value to the denarius, and, therefore, no word in popular use to designate it.

IV. Involuntary error may arise from mistakes in judging of the motives of others. We may suppose we perceive the relation of causation, between ambition and certain conduct of an individual, whereas that conduct results from a sense of duty in him.

V. Involuntary errors may arise from unintentional, illogical reasoning, from fallacy either in the major or minor proposition, or in the conclusion. This embraces also premature generalization, in which the conclusion is more general than the extent of our induction justifies. In short, it embraces every species of sophism, which can occur in any form of the syllogism. But it is unnecessary to specify these minutely at this time.

VI. Another source from which involuntary error may arise, is the misapprehension of a correct sentence, through ignorance of language.

SOURCES OF VOLUNTARY ERROR.

I. *Intentional misstatement* of entities, simple or composite; that is, of things or actions, from malice or any other motive. In these cases, men intentionally use words which recall or suggest to others erroneous mental representatives, words which excite in them the idea of some evil property or relation, in connexion with an individual, to whom that property or relation does not belong.

II. Voluntary error may arise from indulgence in the habit of mere high colouring, without directly stating a falsehood.

III. Voluntary error may consist in voluntary ig-

norance, resulting from the neglect of the means of information within our reach. It is obviously the duty of man to avail himself of all the opportunities appropriately within his reach, to extend the sphere of his knowledge, and to correct any errors which he may have adopted, either innocently or through neglect. Whoever, therefore, remains in error from this cause, may be justly charged with voluntary error, and will doubtless be held responsible for it by the omniscient Judge.

IV. Voluntary error may arise from the indulgence of prejudice in regard to persons or things. So strong, indeed, is the influence of our personal feelings upon us, that every friend of the truth should incessantly be upon his guard, lest he be led captive by it.

V. Voluntary error may result from the indulgence of passion. Passion prompts to speedy and premature action, and thus prevents deliberate investigation, and enlightened, conscientious choice. When error has been detected in our knowledge, or when we have reason even to suspect the accuracy of any of our opinions, it becomes us to institute inquiry and settle the point. The generic method of rectifying any mistaken views, is to pass successively and carefully through the several steps by which, according to the laws of mind, we obtain our information on the point in question. Truth may justly be regarded as that which the constitution of our minds compels us to believe, when its evidences are fairly presented, and impartially weighed. We may assume it as an undeniable position, that the

evidences of truth are stronger than those of error, and will, when carefully pondered, produce on a well-balanced mind a conviction precisely as strong as it was designed by the Creator to be, and as it is our duty to entertain.

From the above considerations we see, at a glance, the fallacy of the favourite sentiment of free-thinkers, that man is not responsible for his opinions, that they are what they are by a constitutional necessity of our minds, and lie beyond the sphere of human responsibility.

SECTION IV.

Division of our Cognitive Ideas.

All our cognitive ideas may be divided into *Individual* and *Relative*: and again into *Retrospective*, *Present*, and *Prospective*.

I. Of Individual knowledge. To this class belongs our knowledge of every individual substantive entity in nature, and also of every individual property belonging to any entity. Our *retrospective* knowledge of individual entities is also of the same individual class; as is, in like manner, our *prospective* knowledge of them.

II. Of Relative knowledge. To this class belongs all our knowledge of composite entities, that is, of two or more adjective entities viewed in connexion, in respect to some particular relation between them. Of this kind are our perceptions of all the different relations of sameness or difference in size, colour, shape, local contiguity, &c., of all perceivable objects. They are nothing else than a

knowledge of two or more of these adjective entities viewed together, and viewed in reference to some one or more of their relations to each other. Thus, I see before me a father and his son; my perception of each of them alone is individual knowledge; but the father is twice as tall as the son. I view them in connexion, to ascertain their relative magnitude, and my knowledge of this relation of difference is relative knowledge. It is a knowledge of something really existing, not in either of them alone, but in both taken together.

To this class, also, belongs the greater part of our *conceptions*. Many individual, abstract terms, when rightly examined, are nothing else than signs of such composite entities. What do we mean by the terms virtue and vice, more than our knowledge of the relation of agreement or disagreement, between human actions of a certain kind and the law of God, or the structure of the universe. Just as the mind, though it at one view acquires a knowledge of the size, form, and colour of an object, may make either of these items of its knowledge the exclusive subject of reflection, or of other mental operations; so it may, by the process of abstraction, make these items of its knowledge of the characteristics of human actions the subject of reflection, without connecting with them the idea of individual persons. Of this kind, evidently, are our ideas of virtue and vice; and language affords us words to designate these items of knowledge, as well as others.

Geometrical axioms also belong to relative knowl-

edge. Thus the axiom, "Things which are equal to the same thing, are equal to one another," expresses our knowledge of the relation of sameness in dimensions or number, between three given entities. The axiom, "When equals are added to equals, the wholes are equal," more definitely stated, would stand thus: If to quantities, dimensions, or numbers already equal to each other, equal additions be made, the results will also be equal: and in this form what does the proposition express but our knowledge of the relation of agreement in quantity, dimension, or number between several entities viewed together as one compound entity under the specified circumstances. Thus we might review all the twelve axioms of Euclid, and would find them all to confirm the statements we have made.

To the same class of relative knowledge belong all the relations (not properties) of numbers in arithmetical calculations. Thus, "twice three are six," when fully stated, means, that the number three twice taken, or counted, bears the relation of equality to the number six.

Metaphysical axioms, when rightly examined, also belong to this class of relative knowledge. Thus, "Every effect must have a cause," or, more fully stated, every effect we ever knew had a cause, hence all other effects most probably have, seems to be nothing else than our knowledge of the relation of analogy, between two or more given substantive or adjective entities, viewed in relation to each other. Self-evident truths consist mainly of relations between entities.

Moral abstract propositions are also resolvable into expressions of our knowledge of some relation or other. Thus the maxim, "Vice is productive of misery," may be regarded as an abstract expression of the relation of causation, subsisting between sinful actions and misery; or it may be changed into the knowledge of the relation of analogy by thus altering the terms: "Vicious actions have, so far as we have been able to observe, always sooner or later produced unhappiness, therefore they, in all probability, will do so also in future."

Belief of a relation, is also relative knowledge. Belief may be divided into *immediate* and *acquired*; the former embracing what are usually termed constitutional or intuitive judgments, and the latter, acquired or deduced judgments. There is no other difference between immediate and acquired judgments except that the relation subsisting between the two entities is so obvious in the one case, that the mind immediately perceives it to exist; and in the other, that the relation is so indistinct, that other additional related entities, must be examined before the mind perceives it to be true.

Both intuitive and acquired truths may be divided into those relating to our own minds, and those which refer to other entities. To the first class of truths, belong such as these: that the testimony of our senses fairly ascertained, is true—that we exist—that the several operations of our minds may generally be relied on—that we are possessed of personal identity. The second class embraces truths relating to the absolute and to the concrete entities.

Among them are the truths, that every effect must have a cause—that the laws of nature, i. e., the established modes of the Divine agency, are uniform—metaphysical axioms—moral truths, &c.

All belief, therefore, of whatever degree, whether presumptive, or probable, or certain, differs in degree, but not in kind. And the all-wise Creator has so constituted the mind, that when the evidences of any truth are fully exhibited and impartially weighed, the strength of our belief will be proportionate to the degree of evidence.

Retrospective, Present, and Prospective Knowledge.

Our cognitive ideas may again be divided into retrospective, present, and prospective.

I. *Retrospective knowledge* is our knowledge of all our former cognitive, sentient, and active ideas, and is usually termed recollection or acts of memory. It embraces all our past operations. This species of knowledge may be subdivided into *spontaneous* and *voluntary* retrospective knowledge. By the former, or spontaneous retrospective knowledge, is meant that, which is not produced in the mind by a volition to recall it. By the latter is meant those recollections of former mental operations, which are produced by a voluntary effort to recall them. This effort consists in an active review of related things, times, and places, and sometimes in a review of the letters of the alphabet, in expectation that the sight of the first letter of a word, will recall the whole word, and with it, our knowledge of the thing or entity. The extent of our

spontaneous retrospective knowledge and the extent to which, and the facility with which we can voluntarily recall it, depend on the following circumstances.

1. On the natural aptitude of the mind for this exercise ; or, in other words, the natural retentiveness of memory. This differs in different persons, but is, among all the powers of the mind, the most susceptible of improvement by practice. Some men appear to have at constant command an intuitive retrospect of the great mass of the former incidents of their life, and of the sciences which they have studied. Doubtless this superior and abundant mass of materials, must necessarily give superior scope and success to those active operations of the mind, which are based on them. It is thus, that men of genius, having the vast experience of former ages, and an extensive acquaintance with the laws, properties, and relations of entities at command, can produce much more accurate specimens of prospective knowledge, and make more able vindications of the positions they assume with regard to any subject.

2. The second ground of difference in the extent and facility of our retrospective knowledge, is found in the different degrees of logical accuracy, with which our knowledge is arranged, on paper or in the mind, according to the different relations themselves which subsist between the entities. It is a well-established fact, that our knowledge of those entities, which are clearly connected by some obvious relation, such as sameness, contrariety, genus,

species, &c., are most easily and most extensively recollected. Hence, one method of facilitating our voluntary recollections of former entities is, habitually to classify our knowledge according to the most obvious relations of the entities themselves, which are the subjects of them, or with some principle or fact, confirmed or illustrated by them. This habit we strongly recommend to the young student. If early formed, and steadily persisted in, it will lead to the gradual and easy accumulation of an amount of useful knowledge, far greater, more various, and more readily at command, than would otherwise be retained. One important method of aiding us in committing a speech, or sermon, or any other composition to memory, is to write it in such a logical manner, according to the objective relations of the subjects themselves.

3. The third ground of difference, is found in the different degrees of frequency, with which the knowledge to be retained was revised by the mind, and the feeling or interest which was felt in it.

Our retrospective knowledge will be increased by the following methods: 1. By thinking frequently of the ideas intended to be recollected. 2. By reviewing those ideas together, which we wish to recollect together; and in the very same order in which we desire to remember them. 3. By connecting them, in the act of memorizing, with some principle or fact, which we will be sure to remember at the intended time. 4. By the habit of studying *subjects* rather than *books*. This is an extremely important habit, which, as it is of constant

application, and may be continued through life, exerts a very perceptible influence on intellectual character and attainments. The man who reads through, even the more important works to which he has access, not only vainly expends his time in perusing much that he knew before, but also pursues an intellectual habit not the most profitable. It is not even every good book that deserves to be read through. Far better is it for the student, to keep up merely a general acquaintance with the publications which he deems worthy of his attention, by an examination of their table of contents, and a *tasting* of them on some of the most important topics, so as to form an estimate of the character and strength of the author, and then lay them by for future use ; while he devotes the greater part of his time to the systematic study of subjects, examining, on each such subject, all the valuable authors to which he has access, and tracing the subject through all its various ramifications and relations. The selection of these subjects should be influenced by the professional duties of the individual ; and, while collateral matters of taste and science should not be excluded, yet the more extensively the choice of subjects coincides with our daily duties, the greater will be the eminence attained. 5. Our retrospective knowledge will be increased by interesting our feelings in the subject, by viewing its relations to some of the constitutional inclinations of the soul, hereafter to be explained.

Scarcely any bounds can be affixed to the degree of improvement which the retentive powers have

sometimes attained. Kepler, the celebrated German mathematician, could repeat the whole of Virgil's *Æneid*, and even specify the first and last lines on every page of the copy which he used. Henry de Mesmes could repeat the whole of Homer; and of the celebrated Pascal it was said, that he very rarely forgot anything which he had ever known. Cyrus, we are told, knew the name of every soldier in his army; and Themistocles could call by name the twenty thousand inhabitants of Athens. Even admitting that these accounts must be received, as we suppose they must, with some qualification, they are remarkable and most interesting examples of mnemonic power.

II. *Present knowledge* embraces the testimony of consciousness, that knowledge which we have of all our present mental operations of every class. Of course, if the lines of division be strictly adhered to, that portion of our knowledge which can correctly be called present, is comparatively small; for, the moment after any act of present cognition is past, it belongs to the retrospective department.

III. *Prospective knowledge*. By this we mean all our knowledge of the probable future existence of entities and their relations. That God has actually bestowed on us some knowledge of futurity, is evident from an examination of our ideas themselves, and even from the structure of human language. Every individual instance in which we use the future tense of a verb, is an exemplification of our remark. The vast sphere of human expectations, of hopes and fears, is distinctly embraced

within the limits of prospective knowledge. Indeed, calculations and expectations of a prospective nature enter into all human pursuits and occupations. Without them, all business would be at a stand, the principal motive to human action would be destroyed, and the world itself would cease to be what it is. But here the question arises, Is our prospective knowledge also a knowledge of entities, and their relations really existing? To this we reply, that in part it is; and we suppose the following to be a correct view of this subject:

The subject of our prospective knowledge, objectively considered, seems always to be a composite entity, viz., a present entity and another supposed, future entity of some given character, as existing at some future time more or less distant. The relation between these two, observed by the mind, is that of fitness, or analogy, or causation, &c. Thus our prospective knowledge or belief of the probable future existence of the material world, and of all existing classes of entities and their relations, is nothing else than a knowledge of the relation of fitness or causation, as existing between present entities and the same entities as existing at a future time. Thus, also, we behold a drunkard, fast hastening to the grave, and believe that he may yet live six months, but not six years. In both instances, the subject of our belief, is a composite entity. We observe, in one case, the relation of fitness between the entity, a drunkard, now existing with materially injured health, and his being still alive six months hence; but we also perceive the

relation of unfitness, between his present state, and his existence six years hence. Or we might say, we see between his present conduct and his death before six years, the relation of probable causation. We see that intemperance will cause his death in less than the specified time. Our prospective knowledge of future human actions, under given circumstances, is nothing else than a prospective knowledge of the relation of suitability, or causation, between a given character of an individual, and a particular course of probable conduct. Of the many relations, perceivable between the different classes of entities, a few only seem to serve as bases of our prospective knowledge; viz., *fitness*, by which we mean suitability, reasonableness, or accordance with the nature of the entity, *analogy*, *causation*, and *revelation*. Analogy, causation, and revelation may be regarded as the arches of the bridge, over which we pass from the present to a knowledge of the future. The relation of fitness is general in its nature, and seems to embrace analogy and causation; yet there are cases in which the mind cannot clearly determine how far the antecedent is really the cause of the consequent, or whether it be merely the antecedent. The revelation, which God has given us, is another totally distinct basis of prospective knowledge. In many items of prospective knowledge derived from this source, we can now clearly perceive also the relation of fitness and causation, since that knowledge has been communicated to us; although we were totally unable, *à priori*, to discover it. Our belief in a

Divine revelation is a knowledge of a composite entity, viz., the Divine character, as known to us, and certain superhuman actions, termed miracles, of some kind or other. The relation perceived between them, is that of suitableness or exclusive causation; that is, causation which creatures could not exert.

Our prospective knowledge of the future operations and states of all inanimate entities, would be as certain as our present and retrospective knowledge of them, if we possessed a present, omniscient acquaintance with all their properties; and if their circumstances and relations were not changed by the voluntary agency of animated beings, and if we knew that the Divine Being would not withdraw or change these properties. Or, in other words, in a world purely mechanical, in which no voluntary agency was mingled, an omniscient present knowledge, would necessarily imply an omniscient prospective knowledge to beings, endowed like ourselves, with the ability to perceive these relations. In such a world, the prospective knowledge of any creature constituted like man, however limited it might be, would probably be of equal extent with his present knowledge. Yet in our world, the operations of inanimate nature are constantly influenced by the agency of animate beings, rational and irrational; and therefore our prospective knowledge, even of the inanimate world, is, in many cases, very uncertain. Our prospective knowledge of the future conduct of animate beings, especially those of the higher class, must, for obvious reasons, be still

more indistinct and uncertain, on account of the voluntary agency possessed by man. Yet here also, whatever prospective knowledge we do possess, is strictly a knowledge of composite entities. Thus, the late sagacious politician Talleyrand had a prospective knowledge of the French Revolution, of 1830, some time at least before it occurred. What else was this knowledge, than a knowledge of the relation of causation between the arbitrary measures of the French king and his cabinet, and a revolution, that is, resistance to these measures on the part of the discontented French people? In short, every individual has a certain sphere of intellectual vision all around him, which, like the torch of the benighted traveller, enables him safely to steer his course through the circumstances and pursuits of life.

This subject is one of great interest to every reflecting mind. The principles above detailed, seem to present a definite and intelligible view of all our knowledge of futurity. It is nothing else than a knowledge of composite entities, one part of which is present, and the other future. In the *present* part we see the relation of fitness, of causation, of analogy to the supposed future part. On our knowledge of these relations in present entities, depends our power of prospection. All our knowledge of futurity, which is so important in human life, and is the basis of all our plans and enterprises, may be reduced to the simple view, that it is a knowledge of the relations of causation, analogy, and revelation, seen by us in some existing entity, or learned from the inspired volume. On this pro-

spective knowledge, the politician bases his calculations, the man of business and the Christian their arrangements for future operations. We know almost with certainty, that the physical universe, the properties and tendencies of material things, will continue: and it is probable, that the other circumstances of our situation will, in the main, remain unchanged. Thus, we have a highly probable foreknowledge of the future continuance of nine tenths of the circumstances and prospects of our situation. We also know, that the changes which may occur will be limited by the powers of the different agents, and the laws of nature. Hence, the possible changes cannot materially affect our prospects, or alter the propriety and wisdom of our course, and the principles of our action. Relying on all these circumstances, we pursue our course of business, secular or sacred, with confidence and delight.

CHAPTER III.

ORGANIC PROCESS BY WHICH WE OBTAIN OUR IDEAS.

THE whole human body, considered as an organ for the influence of entities, may be viewed in a twofold light, as a general organ, and as embracing several local organs. The effects produced in the mind through the bodily organs, are a knowledge of the shape, colour, odour, flavour, and sound of entities, together with feelings more or

less pleasant or unpleasant, attending the operation of each organ. We might divide these influences into those produced through the medium of every part of the surface of the body, such as shape ; and, secondly, those for which only particular parts of the body, such as the eye, the ear, the nose, serve as organs, viz., colour, odour, sound, &c.

In all cases, the influence of entities is exerted by the actual contact of the organ ; nor does any "operatio in distans," so far as we know, take place. Thus in taste, the palate and tongue are touched by the article tasted ; in hearing, the tympanum of the ear is struck by the vibrations of the atmosphere ; in smelling, the olfactory nerves are touched by the particles emanating from the odoriferous body ; as is proved by the fact, that the most fragrant rose or shrub, if placed under a glass cylinder, cannot be smelled. In vision, the eyes are touched by the rays of light, proceeding from the object which is seen, either by refraction, or reflection, or repulsion, as the case may be. We are therefore under no necessity of having recourse to the exploded theory of animal spirits, or nervous fluid, or of intervening cerebral vibrations, to form a connexion between the mind and the object of its perception.

The superficial texture of all visible objects, may be reduced to precisely as many varieties, as are found in colour. Each of these textures reflects, or, according to a different theory, repels the light, in a manner somewhat different from every other ; and reflects or repels a surface of rays equal to its own bulk. These rays light upon the lens of the

eye, and are converged with the peculiarity of every different texture to the retina; and thus, by divine constitution, we have the knowledge of different colours. So that the rays of light, coming from the objects in different degrees of spissitude, and in the particular state of reflection or repulsion, corresponding to the particular texture of the objects, are as much, and in the same sense, the cause of our knowledge of colour, as the particles emitted by the rose and touching our nostrils are of smell, or the peach touching the palate and tongue is of taste.

The *eye* affords us the knowledge of colour, and, by the improvement resulting from practice, the knowledge also of the shape and distance of objects. In vision we see nothing but colour originally, and not shape or distance. Distance is not the direct object of vision, because children will stretch out their little hands to catch the moon, until experience teaches them the futility of the effort; and a person cured of congenital blindness, by an operation for the cataract, will for some time hold out his hand and feel, lest he strike against the stove or table at the other end of the room.

That the eye does not originally give us a knowledge of shape, is evident; because a well-executed painting will deceive even an adult, and all effort to represent the shape of objects in portraits or other paintings, is based upon this fact, and demonstrative of it. In short, the entity which is the object of our knowledge in vision, is not the external person or thing said to be seen; but is merely the rays of light. What we see is nothing else than those

rays of light, which actually enter into the pupil of our eye; and it is experience that teaches us, that there are external objects corresponding to them, from which they proceed. It is the different textures or affinities, corresponding to these different colours, which we see, of which we thus acquire a knowledge. But again, the eye is also, at the same time, the medium through which the pleasing feelings, excited by the beauties of a landscape, that is, the varieties and combinations of its colours, are produced in the mind. In short, the eye is also the medium of feeling as well as of knowledge. But in regard to vision, and to perception through any of the senses, the attention of the mind is necessary to the perfection of the process. The rays of light may be reflected from an object to the eye, and form an image on the retina; but we have no recollection of a perception, unless our attention be directed to the object. The rays of light are at all times, as fully reflected to the eye from all other objects within the entire field of vision before us, as from that one, to which our attention is at any given time directed; and yet we recollect only the one which has attracted our attention. In short, there are hundreds of images formed on the retina at all times; but it is a law of the soul, that although we have an indefinite simultaneous vision of several objects before us, we take cognizance only of one at a time, and of our perceptions of that one alone, do we retain any recollection.

The *ear* is the medium not only of our knowl-

edge of the vibrations of the atmosphere called sound, but also of the feeling of pleasure or pain, which the different combinations of these sounds, either harmonious or discordant, are intrinsically calculated to produce. When we listen to a piece of music, we find no difficulty in distinguishing between the different notes, that is, the different vibrations of the air, of which we obtain a knowledge through the ear, and the pleasant or unpleasant feelings excited by these vibrations or notes. Nor can we for a moment hesitate in believing, that the difference in the feelings excited by the harmonious or discordant combinations of sound, arises from a difference in the notes themselves, considered as simple entities, or from the relation of concord or discord subsisting between them. These notes, or rather the ideas of them, are the subjects of mathematical calculations in the science of music. But who ever heard of a writer on this subject, speaking of a chord or discord of feeling, that is, a chord of pleasure or a discord of pain? Or who ever heard a musician speak of an octave of pleasure or pain? Common sense, and the structure of the mind, have led men to distinguish between these things, and to acknowledge our perception of each note individually, and of the relations existing between them, as entirely different from the feelings, pleasant or unpleasant, excited by them.

The organ of *touch*, which is the whole body, wherever nerves extend, either over its surface or through its interior, is the medium by which we acquire not only a knowledge of the shape, texture,

solidity, or fluidity of bodies ; but also the pleasant feeling which a soft and smooth body is calculated to excite, as well as the pain produced by one that is hard and acuminated.

Taste. It is indeed true, that, if with our eyes closed we introduce a peach or apricot into the mouth, we obtain not only the idea of the flavour, which those species of fruit are calculated to excite, but also some knowledge of their solidity and shape. By flavour is meant that adjective entity (property) in the fruit itself, which is the subject of our knowledge, and the excitant of feeling pleasant or unpleasant. The word taste is used to designate our *knowledge* of the flavour, and the words pleasant and unpleasant express the *feeling* excited by it: Thus also the word *odour* means the adjective entity (property) in objects, of which the term smell expresses our knowledge, and the words pleasant and unpleasant the *feelings* excited by the odour.

But the knowledge of solidity and shape is, in the above-named instances also, obtained by touch, and the only thing of which the organ of taste is the medium is, 1. A knowledge of the flavour of the fruit ; and, 2. A feeling, pleasant or unpleasant, connected with it. Oftentimes several of the bodily organs are acted upon simultaneously. Thus in eating a peach the several senses of smell, touch, and taste may be affected at the same moment, and each organ be the medium of the appropriate feeling and knowledge, which the entity peach is capable of producing. The flavours of different esculent entities are almost as various as the entities themselves ;

but it has not been found necessary in human language to distinguish many of them, in any other way than by the name of the object itself.

Smell. This sense gives us no knowledge of the colour or shape of the entity to which the odour belongs, but only of the odour itself. In odours of a familiar kind, we instantly recognise the entity by which it is excited. But this we do by a recollection of the fact, that whenever we saw or felt a shrub or rose near us, we perceived the same odour; and hence we discover the relation of analogy between the cases, and believe that the same entity is again the exciting cause of the odour. It is thus, that we can, by taste and smell, infer the entities by which they are excited, because almost every entity which can act on these two organs, excites a different idea or mental representative. That the organ of taste is the medium of knowledge, as well as feeling, is evident,

1. Because our ideas of the flavours of different objects, are almost as numerous as the objects themselves; while the feelings excited by them are simply two, pleasant or unpleasant. There are some odours concerning which, though totally distinct from all others, and easily distinguished from them, as they have something very peculiar and striking in them, we may scarcely be able to determine, whether they are pleasant or unpleasant. But this does not arise from the fact of their having but little flavour; on the contrary; their flavour may be very strong.

2. While all men agree in the knowledge, con-

veyed by the terms sweet or acid flavour, they very often differ entirely as to the question, whether a particular flavour, such as that of the tomato, is pleasant or unpleasant. Yea, the very same articles of food will at one time be pleasant, and at another unpleasant to the same person ; and yet, to that same person the flavours of these and other entities, will appear as distinct from each other as they ever did. In short, we perceive, that all these several organs are the vehicles both of knowledge and feeling to the mind.

The acuteness of our perceptions by any one organ, is not only augmented in a surprising degree by continued practice and the force of habit thus formed ; but is also greatly enhanced by the loss of one or several other senses. Indeed, when one organ is destroyed, the improvement of the residue often amounts to a virtual compensation for its loss. So acute does the sense of touch become in the blind, that some of them have been able to distinguish colours by it.

In concluding this part of our subject we may yet remark, that although the body of man exerts so important a part in his perception of external objects, that any material derangement of the bodily organ often impedes, and sometimes entirely precludes the specific action of mind, to the perfection of which it is constitutionally necessary ; these two parts of our being, are nevertheless separate and distinct. That a degree of mind, even approximating to that of man, is not necessary to the health or perfection of the mere animal economy, is dem-

onstrated in the case of irrational beings. That mind can exist and prosper separate from body is also evident from the decided testimony of revelation concerning disimbodied spirits. Hence, it is by no means a necessary inference, that because body and mind co-operate in man, to qualify him for the purposes of his existence on earth, therefore they are amalgamated into one substance, or have undergone a reciprocal transfusion of properties; or are of such a nature, that the dissolution of the one, implies the death of the other. This fact is fully confirmed by the phenomenal appearances of every day's experience. The properties of the mind and those of the body, remain as perfectly and evidently distinct and different, in the most intricate and involved operation of which man is capable by their joint action, as they are in those of the simplest character. Often also we find the mind exhibiting its greatest vigour, after the body has been mutilated in every possible manner, yea, even after the greater part of the brain itself has been destroyed. On the other hand, the body is often found to vegetate best, after almost the last ray of intellect has been extinguished by misfortune or disease. Now a single case of this kind demonstrates, that mind and body cannot, as the materialist affirms, be one and the same substance; while all contrary cases only establish the fact of a strong sympathy between them in their present connexion.

PART II.

SENTIENT IDEAS.

HAVING completed the discussion of the first species of mental operations, to wit, the *Cognitive class*, we now proceed to call the reader's attention to what we have ranked as the second general class, namely, *Sentient Ideas*, or feelings. We stated on a former occasion, that entities bear a threefold relation to the human mind; first, as subjects of our knowledge; secondly, as excitants of our feelings; and, thirdly, as motives or materials for our action. Assuming, for the present, that entities are the ultimate excitants of feeling in us, we define feeling as follows: By *Feeling* is meant *every degree of pleasure or pain mediately or immediately excited in the mind, by entities simple or composite*. This influence is immediately excited, when the objective entities themselves, are at the time acting on us through the appropriate organs; and it is excited mediately, when our feelings are either retrospective or prospective. In the case of present entities, which are, at the time, the subjects of our attention, the entity itself is the excitant of our feeling. But when the entity is retrospective or prospective, our cognitive idea of it seems either to be itself the excitant, or, in some way, the medium or conductor

through which the external entity acts. Very often feelings accompanying our knowledge of some entities, are so feeble and indifferent, that we can scarcely pronounce them either pleasing or painful; yet, whenever they are sufficiently increased in degree, they will be found to assume this characteristic.

The criteria, by which feelings are distinguished, are such as these :

I. They have no object beyond themselves. If we have knowledge, it is a knowledge of something—of some entity. But, in feeling, we can distinguish nothing but the simple state of the mind itself, to which we attribute the name feeling. If we form a volition, that volition has for its subject some action, physical or intellectual, of which we judge ourselves capable. But in feeling, we can discover no such subjects.

II. Our feelings are not so absolutely dependant for their character on entities without us, as our knowledge is. Thus acids, when tasted, afford to some persons a pleasant feeling, and to others a contrary one; thus, also, the entity man, in the act of falling from his horse, excites a painful feeling in the breast of his friend, and, perhaps, a pleasant one in that of his inveterate and bitter enemy.

III. Feelings are always preceded by a cognition of the entity which mediately or immediately produces them.

In the farther discussion of our sentient ideas, we invite your attention to the following three topics :

I. To the classification of Feelings.

- II. To entities as their ultimate excitants ; and,
 III: To the susceptibility of the mind for feeling ;
 that is, to the laws of feeling.

CHAPTER I.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF OUR FEELINGS.

ALL the feelings of which the human mind is susceptible, may be divided into two classes: *Individual* and *Relative* Feeling.

By *individual feelings* are meant those which have reference exclusively to ourselves ; such as joy, contentment, cheerfulness, hope, sorrow, grief, despair, &c. By the phrase *relative feelings* we would designate those which have a relation to some other sentient being, or other object ; such as love, hatred, friendship, compassion, gratitude, anger, envy, &c. We, therefore, present the following tabular analysis of human feelings.

| | | |
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| Individual Feelings. | { | <p>Joy, contentment, hope, sorrow, despair, and all other feelings of pleasure or pain, derived through the bodily organs.</p> <p>To this class belong the pleasures and pains of what are termed the five senses. To this class also belong the pleasures of taste, imagination, and memory ; emotions of the beautiful, the sublime, &c.</p> |
|----------------------|---|--|

1. *Benevolent Feelings*; such as love, or benevolence, friendship, gratitude, respect, veneration, religious adoration, parental, filial, and fraternal affection, and feelings of a similar character.

2. *Malevolent Feelings*; such as hatred, malice, or anger. Anger is a painful, malevolent feeling accompanied by a pulse accelerated, sometimes even to one hundred and fourteen strokes to a minute, and thus, by the accelerated state of the circulation and the action of the whole system, it produces mental and bodily action in the most rapid and unpremeditated manner. Persons excited by anger think, speak, and act with the greatest rapidity.

3. *Sympathetic Feelings*; such as condolence, pity, compassion, &c.

4. *Antipathetic Feelings*; such as envy, grudging, jealousy, and what the Germans term *schadenfreude*, a malicious pleasure in the misfortune or sufferings of others.

A division of relative feelings might also be made, into, 1. Those which refer to *animate*, and, 2. Those relating to *inanimate* objects. But this division would be based on the difference in the objects of the mental operations, rather than in the operations themselves.

Feelings may again be divided into the following three classes:

I. *Sensuous*; by which we mean those feelings obtained immediately through the bodily organs.

II. *Intellectual or Reflex*, or those resulting from

the reflex operations of the mind ; including the pleasures of taste, the feelings connected with our views of the beautiful, the sublime, the ludicrous, &c.

III. *Moral or Religious* ; viz., those resulting from the consideration of the actions of moral agents in reference to the laws of man, and ultimately of God.

Feeling has frequently been divided, in relation to time, into *Present*, *Retrospective*, and *Prospective*. This division is clear in its nature, and distinct in its lines of separation ; although we do not consider it so useful as the one first given, nor at all inconsistent with it. We consider the first the most natural and the best.

CHAPTER II.

OF ENTITIES AS EXCITANTS OF FEELING.

SECTION I.

All feeling, like knowledge, may be traced mediately or immediately to entities without the mind. The eye could never afford us feeling if the rays of light were not reflected from external entities to it, or did not reach it from the surrounding atmosphere. The pleasing or painful feelings, excited by entities through the eye, are produced immediately by the rays of light which reach the eyes ; and ultimately, in a certain sense, by the particular object from

which the rays pass, and which give them their peculiar texture or combination of colours.

The ear could never be the medium through which either knowledge or feeling is excited, if the vibrations of the atmosphere were not permitted to reach the tympanum. The vibrating atmosphere is therefore the entity which immediately excites the feelings connected with sound, and the sounding body is the ultimate entity which gives the air its vibratory motion.

The nose could never be the vehicle of knowledge or feeling to the mind, if the effluvia emanating from surrounding odorous bodies were not permitted to touch the olfactory nerves.

Nor does *religious* feeling seem to be different in its nature. Thus, the Christian meditates on the glorious character of God, and the feelings of his heart are excited to the highest pitch. But what is this meditation else than an inspection of the entity God, and his relations to us? By these it is that our feelings are excited. The case is similar, when our feelings are occasioned by reading the Divine word; for the signs or letters read remind us of the sounds for which the letters stand, and the recollection of these recalls the ideas of real, objective entities. The daily habit of meditating on heavenly or Divine things, by the same law of mind, keeps alive our interest, or, rather, our feelings, on this subject, and increases the frequency of our reinspection of them; thus, a kind of rapport is formed between the soul of the Christian and that heaven which is his home, and that God who is his everlasting friend.

SECTION II.

Entities of every class possess some tendency, though very different in degree, to excite feeling in the mind. Our remark is not that this tendency is perceptible in every entity belonging to each class, but that it is perceptible in some of every class. With regard to solids and liquids, the truth of this remark is evident. It is self-evident, that all articles of food or drink possess it in some degree. Other objects of these classes, which at first view might seem incapable of exciting feeling, change their aspect when more closely examined. Thus, who would attribute to the earth and minerals the power of exciting feeling in the mind; and yet what else is the pleasure found by men in the pursuit of Geology and Mineralogy, than the result of this very feeling excited by a contemplation of the laws and principles of these sciences, as delineated in nature? The pleasures experienced in the study of optics, exemplify the feelings excited by the entity light, its laws, properties, and relations. Space and number, which would seem, from their nature, least capable of exciting feeling in the mind, are, in fact, found more operative than some others, and afford all the pleasures of geometrical and mathematical study.

Our retrospective and prospective knowledge of entities also produces feelings similar in kind, though generally inferior in degree, to the objective entity itself, when it is the subject of present attention; yet our retrospective ideas are also entities without

the mind. I can reflect on a former interview with a long-absent and beloved friend, and derive the purest pleasure from the recollection. The various relations of entities often exert this influence. Thus, the pleasure experienced by the mind when contemplating the beauty of holiness, is excited by the composite entity, a perfect law, and the conduct of a moral agent; and the relation which excites this feeling, is that of agreement between them.

SECTION III.

The degrees in which different entities possess this exciting power are very different, and can be accurately learned only from experience. Nor can any organ originally afford us this information, except the one through which the feeling is produced. We should be unable, from the mere appearance of an orange or a peach, to know, à priori, that their redness or yellowness is indicative of superior aptitude to gratify the palate. Yet after we have by experience learned the fact of this tendency, and learned that the degrees of it are usually attended by these external appearances, they serve as indexes to the mind. But not only is the feeling, produced by entities of different classes, different in degree; the same diversity belongs to one and the same entity, when acting in different ways, and under different circumstances. So far as this arises from a different susceptibility in different minds, or in the same mind at different times, its discussion falls under a subsequent division of our subject; other circumstances only claim our present attention.

The influence of different entities in exciting our feelings.

(a.) Their strongest influence entities certainly exert when brought into contact with the particular organs of our body, through which, according to the divine constitution, they act upon the mind. Thus, a peach affords most pleasure, when brought into contact with the palate; a beautiful landscape, when actually viewed by the eye; an escape from the hands of a murderer, when really experienced by us; and the pains of disease, hunger, disappointed hope or ambition, when we are actually the subjects of them.

(b.) When we have a prospective knowledge, that we shall, at some future time, probably be the subjects of their influence, they exert their next greatest power; that is, when they are the subjects of hope or fear.

In many instances our prospective view is accompanied by stronger feeling than when we are the direct subjects of the influence of the entity. But this arises from erroneous ideas of the pleasures or pains which will be occasioned by actual experience. The law of nature seems to be that present feeling is stronger than retrospective or prospective.

(c.) When these entities excite retrospective feeling, they are again productive of a different degree of pleasure or pain.

(d.) Sympathetic feeling is, as a general rule, weaker than its corresponding direct class of feelings.

(e.) The least degree of feeling is excited by en-

tities, when we view only their abstract tendency to produce pleasure or pain, without supposing ourselves or others to be actually the subjects of them. This might be termed their original degree of influence, and is, perhaps, the exact degree of strength which the Author of our being designed they should exert upon us as motives. It might also be termed their simple influence, because in all other cases additional principles, such as self-love, &c., are called into action.

SECTION IV.

Entities of the classes of solids and liquids excite more feeling, and exert more motive power, when near us than when far off. This circumstance may be demonstrated by a variety of cases, although it is not so easy to assign the philosophical reason of the fact. This appears to be the case particularly with those solids and liquids, which gratify our periodical susceptibilities of feeling, such as hunger and thirst.

SECTION V.

The manner in which entities act in exciting feeling, seems to be very similar to that observed in the production of knowledge. Each adjective or composite entity can originally excite feeling in the mind, only through that organ by which it becomes the subject of our knowledge. The flavour of fruit can excite pleasure in us originally only through the palate. Again; each individual property or relation of an entity acts independently and individual-

ly, in exciting feeling ; so that the same substantive entity may produce different feelings in us, when we inspect different properties or relations of it. Hence, if I now love him whom I once hated, it is because I now contemplate different properties, or relations to me, or to others, from those which were formerly prominent in the same individual. This principle is extremely important to enable us to understand how it is, that the penitent and converted sinner finds very different feelings excited by the contemplation of the Divine Being, from those which he formerly experienced.

SECTION VI.

In feeling, as in knowledge, two things are necessary ; first, the action of the entity on its appropriate organ ; and, secondly, the attention of the mind to that entity. Thus, if a peach or pear be placed before my face, and my attention is firmly fixed on some other object of thought, the rays of light are indeed reflected from the peach to the retina of my eye, but the soul derives neither knowledge nor feeling from the peach, because my attention is otherwise directed. Hence attention, and the power of directing the mind to one or other object, are highly important active powers of the soul.

CHAPTER III.

THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE MIND FOR FEELING, AND
LAWS OF FEELING.

HAVING discussed the nature and classification of feelings themselves, and also the cause from which they spring, that is, entities as excitants of feeling, we now proceed to examine the susceptibilities of the mind for feeling, and the laws by which they seem to be regulated.

First law. *Sensation, no less than cognition, is an attribute of the mind, and not of the body.* That is, all sensation is in the mind. As sensations are obviously *ideas*, it must be admitted by all except materialists, that they are phenomena appertaining to the entity to which ideas belong, that is, to mind. As to the materialist, since he supposes cognitions also to be attributes of matter, or the result of bodily organization, he can without greater absurdity extend the same supposition to sensations. But, so long as all the known properties of matter are totally different from all the known properties of mind, we may well leave the absurd supposition of their being the same substance, to those who delight in philosophical nonsense and paradoxes. The popular impression, that sensations have some kind of local habitation in the organs, through the instrumentality of which they are produced, results from a confusion of the organ through

which we perceive, and the thinking being itself. But obviously, there is little more propriety in regarding the eye as the being that sees, than the telescope through which we see ; nor ear as the being that hears, than the acoustic tube by which the hearing of the partially deaf is improved. In like manner, the feeling produced by touch is wholly in the mind ; although the antecedent perception, which is different for some different parts of the body, enables us, by practice, generally to tell what part of the body has experienced the contact.

Second law. *The original susceptibility of different minds for feeling is evidently very different in degree.* In this there is a striking similarity between the susceptibility for knowledge and feeling. Whether the ground of this diversity is seated partly in the mind itself, or wholly in the different texture or perfection of the bodily organs by which the operations of the soul are limited, it is difficult to decide. That there is a striking diversity in the texture or organization of different individuals, cannot admit of a moment's doubt ; it is a subject of ocular and anatomical demonstration. The fact, moreover, is one of universal ocular observation, and its expression provided for in popular language. What else is meant by the phrases, a person of ardent feelings, and, a cold-hearted man, than persons characterized by a diversity in the degree of their habitual feelings ; i. e., by a natural diversity in their original susceptibility for feeling. The diversity in the texture of the organs themselves is designated by the term temperament. It is a point doubted

by no man of observation, that mankind are distinguished by those diversities, and that they may be reduced to several classes, such as the phlegmatic, sanguine, choleric, &c. The various commixtures of these temperaments are almost infinite; nor is the difference in the texture of the body which is designated by the word temperament, confined to any particular organ of sense; the characteristic pervades the whole organization of the body, the skin, the lymphatics, flesh, blood, bones, nerves, &c. Nothing, however, is more certain, than that the temperaments of men are hereditarily transmitted according to certain laws, which are fixed by the Author of our nature; but which are not, and probably never will be, fully understood by us.

Third law. *Excepting this diversity, which results from the different temperaments, the relative degrees of susceptibility for the influence of different entities is, in all minds, naturally the same.* Although A is twice as sensitive as B, yet, the difference of temperament excepted, an entity which produces twice as much feeling in A as another given entity would, also naturally produces in B twice as much as the other would. A will be operated upon twice as forcibly as B by all motives to good, and it might be supposed that he was favoured by Providence more highly than B, whose natural susceptibility is only half as strong. But it must be remembered that A is also operated upon twice as forcibly as B by all motives to evil, and therefore the relative degree of his susceptibility for feeling is, in effect, equal to that of B. The relative equality of the influence

of different entities has an important bearing on the subject of the moral government of God; because feelings are motives to action, and, other things being equal, they naturally exert a power proportionate to this degree. That the above peculiarity of the natural susceptibility for feeling also occurs in feelings of a religious character, seems to be certain. This fact must be taken into consideration by every pastor, who wishes to form a correct view of the religious progress of his spiritual children, and also by every individual, who would judge with accuracy of the religious state of his own soul.

Fourth law. *Feeling is, in a great measure, involuntary at the time.* We cannot, when acted upon by an entity, and when our attention is directed to it, determine whether feeling shall or shall not, in the first instance, be excited in us.

Fifth law. *We can, however, at the time, add to the intensity and duration of the feeling, or subtract from both, by either confining our attention to the exciting entity, or directing it to another object.* Thus, the more wholly we fix our attention upon a piece of music performed within our hearing, the greater will be the feeling excited in us; and the more wholly and intensely we direct our attention to the truths pronounced from the sacred desk, the more fully will they exert their proper influence of feeling and motive power upon us.

Sixth law. When any particular feeling, or passion, or purpose becomes dominant in the soul, and absorbs in a great measure its other energies, all

feelings at variance with this are impaired. Thus the sensualist, the miser, and the votary of ambition, are in most cases found comparatively insensible to objects unconnected with their favourite pursuits. In like manner, when men find it necessary to success in any of their habitual pursuits, to suppress those feelings which would endanger that success, they can, by a settled purpose and continued effort, succeed in steeling their hearts against those feelings, and can acquire an insensibility, which at first is artificial, but if persevered in, becomes habitual and natural. It is on this principle that the most benevolent physician from the best of motives, the desire of benefiting his patient, studies to acquire that control over his feelings amid scenes of the most distressing character, which is requisite to enable him to judge wisely of his patient's condition, and to select the most appropriate remedies for his case. And it is upon the same principle, though from far less honourable motives, that military chieftains and professional soldiers acquire the unenviable ability to wade in the blood of their nominal foes, and even to climb unmoved over the mangled bodies of their slaughtered comrades.

Seventh law. *The tendency of entities to excite pleasant or unpleasant feeling, when they are the subjects of prospective or retrospective knowledge, depends, in a great measure, on their accordance, or discordance, with what will hereafter be described as the CONSTITUTIONAL INCLINATIONS of the soul, especially the love of well-being or happiness.*

Eighth law. *The influence of an entity, in exciting feeling, is, to a mind of given susceptibility, stronger when it for the first time acts upon us, on account of its novelty.* We may here refer to an analogous case in medical science. A medicine, administered for the first time, produces a greater effect than the same dose does after having been repeatedly taken. How far this analogy is occasioned by similarity of cause, would be an interesting subject of inquiry, in which, however, we have not time to engage. This principle accounts for the fact, that the feelings of the newly-converted are so peculiarly vivid when the entities exciting them, that is, their new relations to God and his law, and to the Saviour, are first presented to their minds. Yet, as continued attention increases the constitutional susceptibility of feeling, the same mind may, by such attention, subsequently have feelings as vivid as those first experienced.

Ninth law. *Feelings produced by the same substantive entity, in the same person, at different times, are in some cases different.* This fact is explained by the principle adverted to on a former occasion, that every property or relation of an entity acts separately in the production of feeling. Every property, indeed, and every relation of an entity, produces a feeling peculiar to itself, and produces this feeling invariably; but, as entities have various properties and relations, the different properties and relations of the same entity, in many cases, produce contrary feelings. Hence it will always be found, that when an entity produces feelings diverse from

those which it formerly excited, the reason is, either that the entity has changed its properties or relations, or that a different property or relation is now the subject of our attention, and the excitant of our feeling. At one time we habitually dwell on one property or relation of an entity, and our feelings are correspondent; but when our feelings change, it is because we dwell upon another relation of the same entity. Thus, reflecting on the death of my friend, viewing its relation to me as a social loss, I am grieved, that is, this relation produces painful feeling; but when I reflect on it as a means of his translation from a bed of long-protracted, painful, and hopeless sickness to a world of bliss, I rejoice; this relation of the same event excites pleasant feelings. When our feelings change towards any of our fellow-men, it is always because either their character has changed, or we have acquired additional knowledge concerning it, or, from a change in our own character, we now dwell on different relations of it. The character of men being so very mutable, changes in the relative feelings existing among them, are constantly occurring.

Tenth law. *The susceptibility of the mind for feelings of every kind is increased by ATTENTIVE practice.* Here the question arises, whether the cause of increased susceptibility from practice is occasioned by an improvement in the bodily organs or in the mental power. Probably it may be found jointly in both. This principle is exemplified in the pleasures of the glutton, the drunkard, the musician. In other words, the feelings of men are

augmented by habit, just as all their cognitive and active operations are. The law of habit pervades the entire man physical and intellectual, and adds facility and strength to all his operations. Feelings of benevolence or of malevolence may be and are confirmed and increased by repetition; and it is owing to this principle that we are enabled, as moral agents, by repeated voluntary exercise of our affections on proper objects, to cherish and cultivate those habits of feeling and traits of character which we know to be good.

Eleventh law. *Intense and long-continued feeling produces a temporary exhaustion, and fatigues the system in a manner similar to intense cognitive mental action.* Yet it is difficult, as knowledge and feeling always go together, to distinguish what portion of the fatigue is to be attributed to each. The question might arise whether the sleepiness of the glutton after dinner be owing to the debility occasioned by this feeling during eating, or by the fact that nature has been compelled to concentrate her energies upon the stomach to digest the newly-received load.

Twelfth law. *The susceptibility for feeling naturally declines with age and with the decline of the constitution, even if that be premature.*

Thirteenth law. *A NEGLIGENT review of entities diminishes their tendency to produce feeling.* Upon this principle it is that religious formality tends to produce insensibility of mind.

Fourteenth law. *Time wears off retrospective feeling.* There are cases of exception to this law,

such as in those persons who have become melancholy in consequence of severe afflictions, and of always pondering over their loss. But here there is a morbid state of the mind, which, therefore, does not disprove the general law.

Fifteenth law. *Feeling is, in general, not instantly excited*, as is knowledge, when an entity becomes the subject of our attention. Oftentimes feeling is elicited by continued application of the mind.

Sixteenth law. *The feelings connected with the gratification of our periodical appetites, such as hunger and thirst, have the following peculiarities.*

(1.) They are stronger in proportion to the length of previous abstinence, unless that has been extreme, and has impaired the organs. (2.) They are increased by the frequent attention of the soul to the entities capable of gratifying these appetites. (3.) This feeling is diminished and eventually suspended by gratification. (4.) It is interrupted by the debility and increased by the vigour of the body.

From the preceding laws and considerations, it is evident that the state of our feelings is, to a certain extent, under our own control. It is indeed true, that no man can instantly change his feelings by a mere volition to do so. But the end can be accomplished eventually, by his habitually directing his attention to those entities and truths, calculated to produce the desired feelings. We are, therefore, justly held responsible by our moral Governor for the character of our feelings. Nor is the case different with what is often termed the habitual

state of our feelings or affections. As every feeling is *individual* and *transient*, as it continues only so long as our minds dwell on the entity or idea which excited it, and as it must, in every instance, be excited anew by the appropriate entity, or our knowledge of it, it follows that by the state of our feelings or affections must be meant our *susceptibility* for feelings from any particular entities. This susceptibility is *permanent*, being a part of our original mental constitution, and is either increased or diminished according as it is more or less frequently and designedly exercised towards any given object.

To this increased susceptibility must be added, the increased tendency to the spontaneous recurrence of the ideas of the objects, on which our susceptibility is most frequently employed. These two things, the *increased spontaneous recurrence of the ideas* of the entities which excite feelings of any given character, and the *increased susceptibility of the mind* to their influence when presented, constitute those different habitual *states* of feeling, or of the affections, by which different persons are characterized. In this, so far as known to us, consists the difference between the virtuous and the vicious, the pure and the impure, in regard to the state of their affections. The licentious, for example, by continued voluntary indulgence of criminal thoughts, if not actions, have formed the habit of frequent spontaneous recurrence of licentious thoughts. By the same course they have increased the susceptibility of their minds to be excited by thoughts of

that kind; and thus they have corrupted the state of their affections, and made them far worse than they naturally were. For this corrupted state of their affections, they will justly be held liable by the Judge of all the earth.

Thus a person of malevolent disposition, is one who has formed the habit of indulging in such views of human character as are calculated to excite the malevolent feelings, and who has thus augmented the susceptibility of his mind for feelings of that description.

Persons of a benevolent disposition are those of a directly contrary habit. As our feelings are always preceded by a cognitive idea of the entity by which they are produced, we cannot determine whether there is any immediate connexion, any *nexus rerum*, between the several feelings themselves, by which their tendency to recurrence is increased, or whether that tendency is based only on the association between the cognitive ideas, while the recurrence of these superinduces the repetition of the feelings. If, however, the individual feelings themselves have this tendency, it is exerted only through the medium of our cognitive ideas.

The feelings connected with what are termed our periodical appetites, such as hunger and thirst; might at first view seem to form an exception to the remark, that all our feelings are transient and individual, and must be excited anew in every instance by their appropriate entity, or the recurrence of our idea of it; because they seem often to be permanent, at least for a season, and to continue

even without the presence of the external entity or the thought of it, by which they are gratified. But, upon closer examination it will be evident, that during the whole time of their continuance, there is an objective entity acting on the organ and exciting the feeling. Thus, for example, in hunger, the exciting entity has been supposed to be the gastric fluid irritating the coats of the stomach, which in this case are the organ of sensation. This irritation is continued so long as there is not a sufficiency of food thrown into the stomach to absorb or occupy the gastric fluid, and divert it from the coats of the stomach. And just so long, and no longer, do we experience the feeling we term hunger, and the desire of food resulting from it, without its being excited by any external article of food or the thought of any. Still, even while this desire and feeling are excited by continued action of the gastric fluid within us, the idea of food of some kind or other is almost constantly present to the mind, and adds its excitement to the feeling and desire excited from within. The feeling of hunger thus seems simply to be that pain produced by the gastric fluid. The desire connected with it is the result of the motive influence of some article of food, or the idea of it, acting on the mind, and tending to a volition to procure it. The *feeling* of hunger can exist independently of any idea of food; the desire of any kind of food whatever cannot exist without either its presence, or the thought of it.

PART III.

ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL.

HAVING taken a brief survey of the various classes of entities around us, and having discussed the two kinds of mental representatives, which are obtained by the soul, when these entities are the subjects of our attention, viz., the cognitive and sentient; that is, those ideas which constitute our knowledge and feeling, we must next advance to the examination of those active operations of which the soul is capable, and which certainly constitute the most important feature of our character, as beings responsible to God. Our knowledge and feeling may be regarded mainly as our acquaintance with the universe which God created. They are what our Creator has made them, and, with the exceptions detailed in former portions of this work, we have in general little or no influence over them, so far as their mere original nature is concerned; but these entities, simple and composite, are the materials with which, and the motives in view of which, all the active operations of the soul are performed.

Before we proceed in the attempt to enumerate the several species of active operations, we shall first call your attention to the *criteria by which mental operations of the third class are distinguished*. The more we compare the active operations of the

soul with its knowledge and feeling, the more distinctly do we perceive that they are radically different in their nature.

The marks of distinction are such as the following :

(1.) One grand feature of this diversity is, that, while knowledge and feeling are effects, ultimately produced upon the mind by external entities, our active operations are mainly causes originating in the mind, or rather they are the mind itself, exerting its influence on the entities which are the subjects of its action. Knowledge and feeling are inward effects produced from without ; the active operations are outward effects caused from within. In short, in the two former mental operations we are, to a certain extent, passive recipients of external influence ; but in the third we are the active agents, ourselves originating the action.

(2.) The entities by which our cognitive and sentient ideas are excited, must have an existence before we can have either knowledge or feeling by them ; but the action, which is the subject of our volition, is yet future, and cannot have an existence at the time when we resolve to perform it. I can have no knowledge of an orange or a peach which has no existence, nor can either affect my palate by feeling unless it exist ; but when I will or resolve to perform any action, the act which I determine to perform has no existence at the time when I resolve upon doing it.

(3.) Our feeling is, in some measure, and our knowledge still more, dependant for its character

On the entities which produce it. But when we resolve to perform an action, that action does not necessarily depend for its character on anything without us; it is what, within the limits of the laws of nature, we determine that it shall be.

Of Entities as the Materials on which our Active Operations are performed.

As the soul, in both cognitive and sentient operations, is the subject of the influence of entities without us; so the active operations of the soul have also their subjects on which the exerted action is performed. This subject is, in every instance, entities without the mind, which is the case even when some operation is performed upon ideas. Entities of every class and of every species are the materials which, in a greater or less degree, are within the range of our active influence; and on these all our active operations are performed. The soul, like a mechanist, goes to work on these materials, and is capable of producing various combinations, modifications, and alterations in them, limited indeed by the laws of its own nature, and the nature of these materials; but nevertheless important in themselves, and sufficient to enable us to accomplish the customary purposes of daily life, and the grand ultimate end of our existence upon earth.

In order that you may be prepared for understanding the active operations of the soul, it will be advantageous to fix in your minds a specific view of the various materials for *human* action. These are the following:

(a.) The external objective entities of the different classes.

(b.) Past mental operations of any class; that is, mental representatives of entities, and sentient ideas, and active operations either of our own or other minds.

(c.) The natural signs by which these representatives or ideas are expressed; such as, (1.) The sounds which constitute oral language, and (2.) The signs employed; such as the expression of the countenance, gesture, and pantomime in general. The artificial marks or letters by which these sounds are designated in written or printed language, might at first view appear to be an additional class of materials, but they are merely the results of physical action on paper or other materials, which are embraced in the class of external entities already designated.

CHAPTER I.

DIVISION AND DISCUSSION OF THE ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL.

ALL the active processes of the soul are essentially alike, so far as mere activity is concerned; but they differ in the end contemplated by each, in the operation performed, in the different results of the action, and in the different objects on which they terminate. The first place among these ac-

tive processes seems, for various reasons, to be due to what may be termed the process of inspection, by which we mean the survey or investigation of entities.

SECTION I.

Of Inspection.

By Inspection we would designate *that active operation in which the attention of the soul is directed to some entity, simple or composite; prospective, present, or retrospective; with a view to acquire some knowledge concerning it.* Or, in other words, inspection is that active process of the mind by which we contemplate, either some external entity through the bodily organs, or some idea or operation of the mind, without employing the bodily organs, at least at the time. Some of the ideas thus inspected, are often ideas originally obtained through the bodily organs; although this is not always the case. Thus, we inspect the objects in nature around us, and the result of this act of inspection is a knowledge of the properties perceptible to us. Thus, also, we inspect a train of argument, which we lately heard, on the importance of phrenology; and the result is the belief, or knowledge, that the merits of that science are much overrated, and that it affords few instructions that can safely be relied on, beyond those general indications which have long since been established as a branch of physiognomy. Or, I inspect the abstract proposition, "That things equal to the same thing are equal to one another," and perceive, acquire a knowledge of its truth; or

the metaphysical proposition, "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time," and I judge, perceive, know its truth. The sphere in which this operation is conducted, embraces all the entities within our knowledge, including our own mind and its operations, as well as our ideas concerning all these entities. If the entities inspected were always present, external entities, and never retrospective or prospective, the definition might be altered thus : Inspection is that active operation in which, by a voluntary effort, the attention of the soul is directed to some one or more of the bodily organs, and that organ directed to a particular entity. Thus, when a man who is partially deaf, and does not hear the carriage that is rushing on at some little distance behind him, is called to by a person standing near him to look at the carriage approaching, the information conveyed to him through the ear induces him to look at, that is, inspect the entity by which his safety is endangered. By what action is this accomplished ? First, by volition or resolution to inspect ; secondly, by a direction of the bodily organ towards the entity to be inspected ; and, thirdly, by directing the attention of the soul to the organ, or, rather, to the rays of light reflected from the carriage to the retina of the eye. But when we contemplate the mind itself or its operations, or when we take a retrospect of an external entity, that is, inspect our knowledge of a past entity, or when we view an entity, either past, present, or prospective, in its relation to some abstract truth, or proposition, or law, the bodily or-

gan is not used at all; and to embrace such cases, the definition must be more general.

The specific objects of the soul in this inspection may be various. In present entities its object may be, and its results are, the following :

(1.) To obtain more correct mental representatives of the properties of entities. For instance, suppose the Capitol of the United States were the subject of our inspection. We direct our attention to it, and, in so doing, also our eyes, and the first glance gives us an idea of its general structure. We, however, wish to acquire a more minute acquaintance with its structure, and for this specific purpose continue to direct our eyes and our attention successively to every part of it. We may examine it with a specific design of ascertaining its general plan, or the execution of any particular part of the work, such as that performed by the mason, or the plasterer, or the carpenter; and thus, by repeated and continued inspection, we acquire more correct and minute mental representatives of the external entity.

(2.) The second object in inspecting present entities may be to give more vividness to our mental representatives of them. This vividness may perhaps consist in the additional feeling, excited by a reiterated and attentive inspection. After having examined all the features of a painting, we have a correct mental representative of it; but we may resolve to fix our attention successively on its different features, and exert the intensity of that attention on them; and thus, perhaps, it is in part, that

our ideas of it become more vivid, because our feelings are more interested.

(3.) We may inspect entities with the express view of ascertaining their relations. Thus, we inspect different entities for the purpose of ascertaining their relation of sameness, or diversity, or contiguity, or causation. In all these examinations, the accuracy of our results will greatly depend on the deliberateness and degree of attention with which the process is conducted. Particular caution is requisite, when the design of our inspection is to ascertain the relation of causation between entities, or to decide, whether the relation be one of mere antecedence and sequence.

In inspecting the moral character of any action, that is, its relation of congruity or incongruity with some law of God, inferred by reason from the works of nature, or learned from Revelation, the relation may be so obvious as to be instantaneously perceived, and thus our judgment is intuitive. In other cases, the moral character of the action may not be so clear, and then continued attention and investigation are requisite, either to ascertain, by an induction of facts, the real tendency of the actions in question, or by continued exegetical investigations, conducted according to the laws of impartial hermeneutics, to ascertain the true sense of Scripture, to determine whether the disputed action is or is not interdicted in the Sacred Volume.

For the same general purposes, namely, to ascertain the relations of entities, the mechanist examines, inspects the materials which he designs to em-

ploy. Thus the carpenter inspects a piece of wood in order to discover its relation of fitness or unfitness for the specific purpose for which he intends it, or with a view to perform some voluntary action on it, such as sawing, planing, or cutting it.

In the case of retrospective entities, simple or composite. (1.) These we inspect, or rather our mental representatives of them, in order to revive those representatives, that is, as it is popularly expressed, to refresh our memory. Experience proves, that both knowledge and feeling have a tendency to vanish from the mind. Both become weakened by time, and, unless revived by retrospection, will be lost to us, at least in the present world. When we reflect on the instances of extraordinary memory on record, and combine with them the fact, that some persons of very ordinary powers of retention have, under the influence of disease, recollected facts which they had long forgotten, and rehearsed extended passages of authors in a language unknown to them, which they had heard repeated many years before, but which in health they were utterly unable to repeat, we may well be inclined to regard thought as indestructible, and think it probable that all the mental operations of our whole life will be recollected by us in eternity, and perhaps these reminiscences will be one of the principal bases of our future happiness or misery. But in the present life, there is a constant tendency in the mind to forget what is long past, if it be not revived by reinspection.

(2.) The second object of inspecting retrospect-

ive entities is to view their relations to each other ; that is, to compare them with each other, or a present entity with a prospective one. Thus, we may inspect the relation of causation between the British Stamp Act and our Revolutionary War, both being retrospective entities ; or we may examine the relation of causation between our Revolutionary War and our present enjoyment of free institutions ; in which case we compare a retrospective and a present entity or idea. Finally, we may consider the relation of probable causation between our Revolutionary War and a future regeneration and remodeling of all the governments in Europe ; here we compare a past with a future entity. In this last example we have an instance of the inspection of the prospective knowledge of entities. All the subjects of our prospective knowledge may be subjects of inspection. Indeed, this department of our knowledge, more than any other, seems to be the fruit of voluntary inspection. Every hypothetical case that can be imagined is, at least in part, an inspection of prospective entities.

The process of inspection embraces all the voluntary operations which, in former systems, have been attributed to the faculties of *perception, consciousness, conception, judgment* in moral as well as intellectual and physical cases, *voluntary recollection, analytic reasoning, and conscience*. That the operations of the mind termed *perceptions*, when voluntary, are embraced in the process of inspection, is evident from what was said on the subject of the inspection of present entities. That the op-

erations usually ascribed to *conception* are nothing else than inspection, is evident from the remarks made on the inquiry, how many of our supposed faculties furnish us with knowledge, or how many of the operations of the supposed faculties are cognitive in their character. The only cases which might seem to militate against the classification of the operations of conception under the process of inspection are abstract ideas, such as virtue, vice, &c. But we have already exhibited to you the proof, that these terms designate our ideas of certain relations of real entities which are observed by inspection. The conception of the meaning of a proposition, is nothing more than the inspection of retrospective knowledge, aided by the signs called words, either written or oral.

In the inspection of present entities, the entity itself is the subject of inspection. In the inspection of retrospective entities, however, it is not the entity itself, but our knowledge of it, which is the subject of our inspection. This seems evident from the fact, that, if our original knowledge of an entity was incorrect, a review of it, however frequent, will not rectify it; unless we compare our knowledge with the original entity itself, or with a description of it by another, whose knowledge was more accurate, and in whose testimony we confide; whereas, every attentive review of a present entity tends to correct any error in our first idea of it. These facts also prove the fallacy of Dr. Brown's opinion, that all mental operations are merely the mind itself in certain states. When we review our knowledge,

are not the passive, inert items of this knowledge manifestly different from the active being, or mind, which is at work on them? As well might we say that the wood, out of which the cabinet-maker is framing a desk or table, is nothing else than the workman himself, in a certain state.

The act of *memorizing* is an active operation embraced under the process of inspection. It may be defined thus: The act of memorizing is a voluntary, repeated, attentive review of some entities, or of our ideas of them, or of some signs of such ideas, in order that we may have a retrospective knowledge of either the ideas of the entities, or the ideas of the associated signs. Thus, if we commit to memory a piece of composition with a view to speak it verbatim, we make the recollection of our ideas of the sounds, which are associated with the ideas of the entities, the subjects of our chief attention. But if we wish to recollect only the ideas of the entities themselves, we pay little attention to the ideas of the sounds, and leave them to be recalled at the time of delivery by the ideas of the entities. Thus, it is evident, we are able to make different things the subjects of our aim in the act of committing to memory, and different persons have different habits on this subject. The man who, as it is usually expressed, recollects only ideas, is one who by habit, or possibly by a constitutional predisposition, recollects principally the ideas of the entities themselves about which he is speaking, and trusts to the association formed in his mind between the ideas of the entities and those

of the sounds designating them, for the suggestion of words at the time of speaking. The man distinguished for verbal memory, on the contrary, is one who is in the habit of inspecting the ideas of the sounds as well as of the entities signified by them ; and to his mind, in the moment of delivery, the very words recur in which he had committed the speech. Perhaps, in the one case, the train of the ideas of the signs is the leading train, on which the retrospective energy of his mind is expended ; and this train of the ideas of sounds does, in the moment of delivery, recall the parallel train of the ideas of entities. In the other case, the train of the ideas of entities is the prominent one which recurs, and, by association, brings with it the train of the ideas of the connected sounds. Yet, as there is no relation at all between the ideas of sounds except that of contiguity, whereas the ideas of the entities are related by the additional connexion subsisting between them in a well-digested composition, it is not improbable that the ideas of the entities discussed are in most cases the prominent train in the recollection ; and the different degrees in which sounds are recollected form the difference between ideal and verbal memories.

SECTION II.

Of Arrangement.

Arrangement is that active operation of the soul by which we select some from among the mass, either of external entities themselves, or of our mental representatives of them, and place them, as wholes or

units, in a particular order, with a view to a specific purpose. In present entities, the entities themselves are the subjects of the arrangement. Thus, having a number of ivory balls of different colours before us, after having inspected them, the result of this inspection is a knowledge of their shape, colour, &c., and nothing more than knowledge. But when we select those of the same colour from the mass and place them together, we perform an additional and distinct operation, viz., that of arrangement. In addition to the present entities themselves, this operation is also performed on our mental representatives of retrospective and prospective entities. When, e. g., we resolve to arrange into classes all the various animals which we have ever seen, and of which we have a recollection, we can accomplish the work, though not one of those animals be present. But then it is not the animals themselves (present entities) which we arrange into different classes of quadrupeds, bipeds, carnivorous, graminivorous, oviparous, viviparous, &c., but only our mental representatives or cognitive ideas of them. The purposes of this arrangement, and the principles on which it is made, may be various.

(1.) We may arrange them according to any one of the various relations of entities to each other; such as sameness, diversity, contiguity, causation, majority, minority, progression, proportion, &c. Thus the mental act of comparison in language is nothing else than the arrangement of two entities according to the relation of similarity, together with an expression of their relation in words.

E. g., "Virtue is the pillar of a republic." This sentence means, that virtue in a republic resembles the pillar of an edifice, which supports the fabric. Comparison may be performed on present entities, or on our ideas of them.

The arithmetical processes of addition, subtraction, division, multiplication, are so many species of this second active operation, arrangement, performed by man on different numbers. Addibility, subtractibility, &c., i. e., the capacity of being thus operated on, are properties of the absolute entity number; but the operation of addition, &c., is an active process of the mind of man on these properties. Addition is the arrangement of several numbers into one class or sum; division is the arrangement of a certain number into a given number of parts; subtraction is the arrangement of some of the integral parts of a given number into a separate class or number; and multiplication is the addition of a sum a given number of times.

(2.) The second principle according to which the process of arrangement may be conducted, is that of genus, species, class, &c. The difference between this and the first mode of arrangement is, that in the former only one classification is embraced, whereas, in the latter, there are several grades of similarity. The arrangement of entities differs from the mere reinspection of them, in the fact, that the latter always embraces merely the view of entities, without including any change effected in their relations to other entities or ideas. Inspection can only view the universe of entities as it

exists at the time of inspection, but arrangement changes their order, or connexion, or relation, by bringing those into contiguity which were separate before, and by separating such as were before contiguous. By this process, we form all the varieties of mental associations which are based on any natural principle or affinity; while unnatural and arbitrary associations are the product of what we term the third active process, modification.

The musician, who *composes* a piece of music, performs this process of arrangement. He takes the several individual notes or sounds, and places them into such relation as, by the constitutional influence which they exert on our minds, will produce the effects at which he aims. The act of recording such composition by writing is a process of physical agency.

(3.) This arrangement may be made according to the probative relation of entities to a given proposition or to the human mind. The order in which evidence, that is, related entities are arranged, gives them more or less force or influence upon the mind. This is well understood by the advocate, the logician, and the intelligent and faithful preacher. The successful arrangement of our knowledge or arguments according to their probative relations to the human mind, constitutes the all-important operation of synthetic reasoning, so far as its object is to produce in others, conviction of truths already known to the speaker or writer. The capacity of reasoning clearly, in a public speaker or writer, is nothing else than the ability to arrange his ideas or argu-

ments in their best probative order, and in that order in which they produce their greatest convincing effect, to enunciate them in words, or record them in written signs, which will recall those words to all who read (i. e., inspect) them. Thus we see that *analytic reasoning*, or, more properly, *investigation*, is an operation of *inspection*, while *synthetic reasoning*, that is, the logical arrangement of the result and evidences of our investigation, is chiefly an instance of the second active operation, viz., *Arrangement*. The *formation of generic propositions*, in which the results of our investigations are synthetically proposed, is a *process of abstraction* or *generalization*, and thus belongs to the active process, *modification*. The presentation of the whole to others in oral or written language belongs to the last active operation, namely, the communication of our ideas to others, or *intellectual intercourse* with other minds.

Evidence, objectively considered, is the tendency or fitness of any one entity in the physical, intellectual, or moral universe, or of its relations, to make the reality of another supposed entity credible, that is, apparent to the mind. Evidence, subjectively considered, is the tendency of our knowledge of some entity, or its relations, to make our knowledge of other entities, or their relations, appear true. Here is presented to our view one of the grandest features of intellectual science—truth based upon the rock of the universe, which God founded, while our knowledge is but the shadow or reflection of it, merely its mental representative.

The probative order or relation of entities to a certain proposition, seems to consist in their being detached from all irrelevant appendages, and placed in such connexion of contiguity or succession, in relation to the proposition, as is best calculated for the inspection of the hearer, so as to present the greatest facility for the operation of inspection by the auditors or readers. The more completely arguments are separated from everything irrelevant, the more easily can they be inspected by the mind.

Every species of syllogism is nothing else than a particular arrangement of certain entities, or rather of propositions expressing our ideas of them, such as is best calculated to facilitate their inspection ; and the art of reasoning well is nothing else than the habit of arranging the related ideas in this way for easy inspection. Before we exemplify these observations by the examination of the process of reasoning itself, we would remind the student of the classification of composite entities, that is, of relations as the bases of verbs in human language ; for, as all syllogisms embrace verbs, an accurate idea of the nature of verbs is essential to the comprehension of the subject. We have, on a former occasion, remarked that the words in human language originally and most naturally expressing substantive entities are in grammar substantives, and those standing for adjective entities are originally adjectives. But it is the verbs which alone most naturally express the *relations* subsisting between different entities. In pursuing our examination of syllogisms, we begin with the several parts, and

first inquire, What are they? They consist of human language, of propositions. These describe some of our mental representatives or ideas; and the question is, Of what entities are they representatives, of substantive, or adjective, or composite entities, or of all combined? An example will best illustrate these observations in their application to the structure of the syllogism.

Major proposition: If there is a God, he ought to be worshipped.

Minor proposition: But there is a God.

Conclusion: Therefore he ought to be worshipped.

Here the term God, or letters G, o, d, express the sound, which, in our language, is the sign of a certain idea, which idea is our mental representative of a real entity, viz., the great Author of the universe. This is a substantive entity. The phrase "ought to be worshipped" is a verb, and expresses our idea of a certain composite entity, viz., the relation of moral fitness or obligation between the two parts of a composite entity, viz., God (a Being of a certain character), and his rational creatures worshipping him. The major proposition, therefore, expressed in the language of our system, would run thus: "If there be an entity corresponding to the idea designated by the sound which is spelled by the letters G-o-d, he ought to be worshipped;" i. e., we see the relation of suitableness between him and those actions of his rational creatures called the worship of him. The major proposition, when closely examined, seems evidently to be nothing

else than a sentence expressing in words our ideas of a composite entity, i. e., of the relation of two simple entities to each other. The simple entities are, (1.) A Being corresponding to the idea designated by the sound and word *God*; and, (2.) Those actions of his rational creatures, which they perform with a view of worshipping him; and the relation between them is that of suitableness. The process by which this relation is known is none other than that of inspection. The result of inspection is, in all cases, knowledge; and in this case likewise we can trace no other operation than the act of inspecting the two parts of a composite entity, God and the worship of him by rational creatures, and the result of this inspection is, conviction of the relation. This knowledge or conviction is not optional, but necessary. The minor proposition, philosophically stated, runs thus: "But there is an entity corresponding to the mental representative designated by the sound, which we describe by the letters G-o-d;" "hence he ought to be worshipped" is the conclusion or relation perceived by the mind. It is evident that the only point to be proved in this syllogism is the minor, viz., that there exists an entity which we designate by the term God, and this must be done, and can be done, only by the successive inspection of the entities which constitute the proof.

SECTION III.

Of Modification.

The third active operation or process is termed **modification**, and embraces a class of operations distinct in their nature from those which have preceded. *Modification is that active operation of the soul, by which we take some from among our mental representatives of real entities (rarely the objective entities themselves), and bring them into such forms or combinations as do not correspond to realities; that is, make arbitrary substantive and composite entities out of them.* The materials on which these operations are performed are seldom objective entities themselves, but generally are our mental representatives of them. This operation is distinguished from the two preceding by the following distinct peculiarities: (1.) The operations of *inspection* and *arrangement* act as generally on objective entities themselves, as on our mental representatives of them; whereas, that of *modification* is conversant chiefly about our ideas. (2.) The former two operations take our mental representatives of substantive entities as wholes or units, and leave them such throughout all the process of their influence; take our ideas of the combination of properties found coexisting, and leave these combinations unaltered; but modification changes them from their natural state, and brings their constituent parts or elements into forms and combinations which do not exactly correspond to real entities. This operation embraces, among others, the following processes:

1. The process of *abstraction* and *generalization* ; that is, the process of framing ideas and combinations of ideas, which do not fully represent any one entity, but are used to express a whole class of individual entities which have, in common, the properties expressed by the generic idea and term. Thus the idea quadruped is formed by the process of abstraction. We take the combinations of our mental representatives of the properties found coexisting in each of the several animals, horse, cow, sheep, dog, &c. We compare with each other our ideas of these several combinations of properties, each one of which combinations is found coexisting in one or other of these animals. Thus comparing these several combinations of ideas, we omit from each every individual idea which is peculiar to itself, until at last we have nothing remaining but the idea of four legs, as the property or peculiarity which they have in common, and by which they are distinguished from animals of a different class. In considering this process, let it be recollected that our mental representative of each one of the different coexisting objective properties is separate and independent. We can therefore, with the greatest ease, abstract from our ideas of the combination, any one or more of its elements at option, and use the residue as a substantive entity in our ratiocinations. It is in this way that all generic *terms* are formed.

If we examine the ideas conveyed to the mind by the term *quadruped* and the phrase *four legs*, we instantly perceive a great distinction between

them: the latter designates our idea of a part of an animal, while the former signifies not only a whole animal, but a whole class of animals each of which has four legs. But it is evident that the idea expressed by the term quadruped does not correspond with any individual entity intended by it, any farther than the circumstance of its having four legs. The term quadruped, therefore, expresses one of those general ideas which we refer to the process of abstraction. Thus also the idea expressed by the term *all*, when definitely used, does not correspond fully to any real entity, but is a generic idea embracing a great number of entities.

Of the same character, generically, are negations, and the ideas expressed by particles of speech which have no objective entity in nature corresponding to them. They are, though of different kinds, the product of this power of modification. Thus the word "nothing" expresses a negative generic idea, and is equivalent to not a solid, not a liquid, not a gas, not light, not caloric, &c., &c. The idea is acquired by the perception of the absence of one entity after another, and ultimately the supposed absence of all entities. Generally, however, when we use the term nothing, we employ it in a qualified sense. About absolute nothing we seldom speak, and can say but little intelligently.

Generic *propositions* are formed by striking out from a specific proposition, the name of the individual objective entity of which the predicate of the proposition may be affirmed, and substitu-

ting in its stead some generic name, which comprehends all the individual objective entities to which the predicate is believed to be applicable. One of the most important rules of correct reasoning is, that the utmost caution be always observed not to introduce into our general proposition a term more generic than our actual examinations warrant, not so general as to include any entity, *of which we are not certain that the predicate really belongs to it*, or in regard to which our experience is not sufficiently extensive, and also uniform so far as it goes. This process of generalization or abstraction is one of the most important among all our mental operations.

Among its results are embraced, (1.) Geometrical axioms ; (2.) Metaphysical axioms ; (3.) Mathematical truths ; (4.) Moral general truths or principles ; such as, virtue is productive of happiness and vice of misery.

Hence the opinion of Kant and many other German philosophers, that knowledge of this kind is *à priori*, that is, inherent in the mind, is erroneous. There are, indeed, many truths which may be characterized as universal and unchangeable, which are the properties assigned by him to the truths of pure reason (Reine Vernunft). And there can be no objection to calling them transcendental. But they do not differ in their nature from other ideas. Viewed *subjectively*, these general ideas are phenomena of our minds, are mental representatives of actual relations in nature, abstracted from the entities in which they are found. Viewed *objectively*, gen-

eral truths are relations actually existing in nature, not in an abstract, but in a concrete state, between different individual entities. Thus the axiom, "Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another," is nothing else than a proposition expressing the relation of agreement between different entities, and especially the truth taught by experience, that any two of them which are equal to a third, will also be found equal to each other. But if it be inquired whether these truths are *à priori* knowledge, we reply in the negative. The *individual* relation of equality between the different objects existed before we perceived it; but the general, abstract, subjective idea of this relation, having been formed from the ideas of the individual relations perceived, must necessarily be subsequent to our (empyric) perceptions of the individual relations. The general truth has nothing in nature corresponding to it; because all actual relations and entities are individual. It therefore exists only as an idea in the mind of man. There are, indeed, some laws of the mind itself, which regulate and limit its operations, our knowledge of which is not derived from the observation of external nature. These laws, it is admitted, exist prior to our knowledge of them. But so do the laws of the material universe. And just as we derive our knowledge of the laws of the physical universe by observation of external nature, so we acquire our knowledge of the laws of mind by observing the phenomena of mind. Yet, there is as much difference between the laws of mind and our knowledge

of those laws, as there is between the laws of matter and our knowledge of them. Nor can we perceive any reason why the one should be regarded as *à priori* knowledge, rather than the other; for in reality neither possesses any claim to that character.

2. Fictitious combinations of ideas: (a.) Fictitious simple entities, either substantive or adjective, i. e., fictitious persons and things. (b.) Fictitious composite entities, or relations, or actions performed by one on the other, or existing between several. This process brings different entire substantive entities into imaginary combinations, and attributes to them imaginary actions. To this species of modification belong all the operations of *imagination* and *fancy*; all works of fiction, either in poetry or prose; and also, what is of the same character, though of different design, every species of misrepresentation, falsehood, or lying.

SECTION IV.

The fourth active process is that mental agency which immediately regards and regulates the action of our bodily organs. It may be termed *the mental direction of our physical action*. It embraces all voluntary control over the entire muscular system, by which alone motion is produced in any part of the body. The intrinsic connexion between mind and matter, and the manner in which the latter is made to obey the former, is a mystery to us. The fact of the obedience of the body to the mind is of daily and hourly, yea, of incessant occurrence; but is as incomprehensible to the greatest philoso-

pher, as any other mystery in nature or religion. I will to hold the pen in my right hand, and so to move it as to form letters and words; but why my right hand takes the pen rather than the left, why my fingers move the pen so as to form alphabetic letters rather than mathematical figures, I know not. I can assign no other reason than my antecedent volition, that they should do so. And a man who has suffered a paralysis is surprised when, for the first time, he finds that the muscles of his arm or leg refuse to obey the volitions of his mind.

This connexion between the mind and body, this obedience of the muscles to the will, in healthy persons, being assumed as one of the best-established facts in nature, our next inquiry is, how far is so-called physical action really physical, and how far is it mental? It seems evident that everything about it, except the simple tension and relaxation of the muscles, and consequent locomotion of the body, or some of its parts, is mental. Mechanical skill is an improvement of the mind in directing bodily motion. Intelligence, memory, wisdom in the selection of appropriate materials, and appropriate bodily motions, to effect an end, are involved, as are also other mental processes.

This agency might be divided into different kinds, according to the different organs to which it more immediately relates; or it might be divided into the different processes effected by the hands, by the feet, the eyes, the whole body, &c. Under the operations effected by the hands would be embraced, (1.) The different species of mechanical and

agricultural labour ; (2.) The manipulations requisite to performances on musical instruments, in which there is, combined with much physical activity, remarkable intellectual skill. Of the operations of the feet, walking is the most remarkable. It properly results from the combined muscular effort of the whole body, and consists in balancing the body by leaning forward so far that the centre of gravity is brought beyond the base, and sustaining the body from falling by the continued position of one foot after another in advance of the whole. In all cases of voluntary physical action, we can distinguish the following mental processes : (1.) Selection of the end to be accomplished ; (2.) Knowledge of the ways and means for its attainment ; (3.) The volition to exert the bodily organ ; (4.) The attention of the soul to the organ ; (5.) The inspection of the material on which the agency is to be performed ; and, (6.) The active process of the mind conducting and regulating the physical action.

SECTION V.

The fifth process is that of holding intellectual intercourse with other minds ; or, as it is commonly, though incorrectly termed, *the process of communicating our ideas to others.*

Philosophically speaking, this process consists in exciting in others the ideas which they themselves have already obtained from those entities on which we wish them to think, and exciting them in such order, and in such combinations, and with such adjective properties annexed, as we wish them to en-

tain. When we utter articulate sounds, these sounds, by their exact similitude to those which the person whom we address has heard in connexion with certain ideas, first recall his idea of the similar sound formerly heard by himself, and this recalls the idea of an entity then connected in his mind with that idea of the sound. Thus, by speaking to others, that is, by successively pronouncing the sounds corresponding to the train of thought in our own minds, we not only excite in others the similar ideas which they have received from entities, but we bring them into new connexions, and add epithets to suit our purpose.

This process of intellectual intercourse is carried on in different ways :

I. *By speaking, or expressing our ideas by articulate sounds.* We are born with organs of articulation, by the voluntary action of which we can so modify the expiring breath as to produce specific articulate sounds. The air on which the action of these organs is exerted is only the expiring breath, the breath as it is in the act of passing out from the lungs. The constant inhalation and expiration of breath is, within certain limits, involuntary, and goes on during sleep ; but whether we will or will not modify this breath by the organs of speech, and emit it with such force as to produce sound, is voluntary. The scope of voluntary control which we have over respiration, seems to be just as much as is necessary for speaking, and yet not sufficient to destroy life by a total interruption of breathing. If it were possible to

withhold respiration entirely, a man might at any moment easily put an end to his existence. If, on the other hand, we had no control over our respiration, but were compelled to inspire and expire at regular intervals, our sentences would all have to be of a certain length, or our enunciation could have no reference to their punctuation, and the operation of speaking would be subject to such monotonous interruptions, as would be unpleasantly mechanical. Hence, it is evident, this voluntary control was given, and this voluntary respiration withheld, for these very purposes.

Children find the same pleasure in exercising their organs of articulation on the expiring breath, that they do in using their arms and legs. God has so constituted animals, that the use of their organs is, in itself and for its own sake, pleasant. The fishes skipping about in their watery element, the birds in the atmosphere filling it with warbling notes, exhibit such signs of enjoyment as to leave no doubt, that if the vocabulary of their language were intelligible to man, the feelings would be joyous which they express. For the same reason, children, when they find themselves able to talk, are prone to talk incessantly. Even before they can articulate correctly, they find, by crying, that they can in some measure control their organs of speech, and thus they learn the rudiments of oral action. By continued practice they increase this ability, and in due time they learn to articulate, that is, to speak, with tolerable accuracy.

The following appears to be the manner in which

words become connected with things, or, rather, in which the ideas of oral words, that is, sounds, become connected in our minds with the ideas of external entities. Children see an entity, and hear a certain sound pronounced in connexion with it. The idea of an entity, for example, an apple, obtained by sight, and the idea of the sound obtained by the ear, are received almost simultaneously, and thus, having the relation of contiguity of time, the one, by virtue of this relation, recalls the other. Thus a father approaches his child with an apple; he stretches out the fruit that the child may take it, and, in so doing, pronounces the word *apple*. The child's mind thus receives, almost simultaneously, two ideas, viz., that of the colour of the apple, obtained by the eye, and that of the sound indicated by the written word *apple*, acquired by the ear. Originally the child perceives no connexion between these ideas, the one of sound and the other of colour; but finding the two generally connected by other persons, that is, hearing the same sound pronounced by all who seem to be speaking of the same entity, the child soon learns that the one, viz., the sound *apple*, is used as a sign or name to designate the other, the thing apple. Thus both these ideas, or items of knowledge, having been obtained together, have the relation of (temporal) contiguity, and become so closely related, that if the attention of the mind is by any means directed to the one, it spontaneously pursues this relation, and is conducted to the other. The idea of the colour of the apple may also at any time be recalled by the pres-

ence of another apple, which will afford a similar idea, and thus, by the relation of similarity, recall the first. The visual idea may likewise be mediately recalled by seeing the letters which spell the sound which stands for that idea.

These remarks show us that, parallel to our train of thoughts, the subjects of which are objective entities, runs another coequal train of thoughts, the subjects of which are sounds, viz., those sounds which, by experience, have become associated with those entities. But speaking is an active operation of the articulating organs consequent on a volition to communicate our wishes, commands, or other ideas, to those whom we address; experience having taught us that others associate with certain sounds the same ideas that we do, and, therefore, that the utterance of sounds by us, similar to those which we have heard uttered by others, will excite in others the same ideas which we attach to these sounds.

Properly speaking, however, we neither do nor can excite in others the same identical ideas which we connect with our words. The ideas which all men connect with words are the mental representatives of entities which they originally derive from entities themselves, and which they can derive from no other source. When they hear others pronounce the same, or, rather, exactly similar sounds, they, by the relation of similarity, recall the recollection of the sounds which they formerly heard; and the recollection of these former sounds recalls the ideas formerly associated with them. Thus, when a

speaker addresses an audience, there is a truly remarkable train of collateral and parallel operations running on with the train of the speaker's ideas. Every idea of the speaker is succeeded by the following operations before it accomplishes its design.

(1.) The idea of the speaker himself. (2.) The speaker's recollection of the idea of the sound formerly associated with that idea by himself. (3.) His volition to articulate a similar sound. (4.) The articulating action of his organs on the expiring breath to produce a similar sound. (5.) The hearer's idea of the sound produced by the speaker's voice. (6.) The hearer's recollection of the similar sound which he himself had often made. (7.) The recurrence of the idea which he formerly connected with the similar sound made by himself. All these parallel trains of operations attend every thought conveyed by the speaker. The security that men by this process will substantially understand each other, rests on the fact, that all men derive from an inspection of the same entity substantially the same representative; otherwise there could not be any common language or communication of thought among men.

Our ability to make just such sounds as correspond to our recollection of sounds made by others, results from our being able to make at option coarser or finer, dental or labial, lingual or guttural sounds, and from our ability to discern whether the sounds which we make, and of which we have an idea so soon as we hear them, exactly resemble those which we heard from others.

The structure of the human articulating organs is such, that all men naturally make certain elementary sounds. These sounds are expressed by the letters of the alphabet, and are substantially the same in all languages. Even the difference observed in the number of letters in different languages is often the result of the imperfect state of the art of designating these elementary or alphabetic sounds, and two languages whose alphabets differ most, may, when spoken, bear much greater similarity to each other in their elementary sounds. So far then, at least, as the elementary sounds are concerned, we must answer the long-disputed question in the affirmative, and maintain that language is of Divine origin; because the nature of these elementary sounds results from the structure of the organs which God gave us.

We learn, by early habit, to articulate nearly all the elementary sounds with great promptness and certainty; and it is thus that we learn new languages; because we can form relations of contiguity between our ideas and the words of a new tongue. Nay, although it is a rare attainment, we may, by frequent repetition and long-continued habit, form so close a connexion between old ideas which we were wont to express in our vernacular tongue, and the words of a new language, that we spontaneously think in it; that is, as we reinspect the old ideas, the corresponding words of the newly-acquired language will spontaneously recur to our memory as we advance, instead of those of our vernacular tongue. In the exercise of articulation the breath

is voluntarily modulated into those sounds: one lungs' full after another, leaving only short intervals for inspiration, just as long as we wish to convey our ideas to others; and when this volition is accomplished, the articulating organs become motionless, and the breath is inhaled and exhaled without any sound, except what is termed audible breathing.

II. The second means of communicating our ideas to others is by gestures and muscular action of the countenance correspondent to the thought. How far this kind of communication may be carried, is forcibly exhibited in pantomimic exhibitions, in which a regular succession of scenes is intelligibly represented by gestures and muscular expression of the countenance, without the utterance of a single word. This process it is not necessary for our purpose to examine in greater detail.

III. The third mode of communicating our thoughts is by WRITTEN SIGNS. These signs are of different kinds. (1.) *The regular alphabetical letters.* These designate the elementary sounds which belong to languages in general, and are virtually the same in them all. These signs, or letters, constitute the most perfect form of the alphabet, and in point of time were probably later than the hieroglyphic and syllabic signs. In the Chinese language the written signs do not designate elementary sounds; but at least many of them stand for whole words, and designate those elementary objects which men find it necessary to express in the infancy of knowledge; additional words being formed by a combination of these. You will easily per-

ceive, that the accumulation of signs in this language must be unusually great, and very inconvenient. So much is this the case, that it is said very few of the most learned men in China itself are fully acquainted with all the marks of their own language, and the exact import of their numerous combinations.

Of the syllabic alphabet, intermediate between the Chinese and European languages, we have a modern instance in the invention of See-qua-yah (George Guess), a North American Indian of the Cherokee tribe, which deserves notice. It consists of an alphabet of eighty-six letters, each of them designating neither an elementary sound, as in European languages, nor an entire word, as in the Chinese, but a syllable or part of a word.

(2.) *Arithmetical figures and signs*, which stand for sounds designating our ideas of the entity number. (3.) *Musical notes*, which designate our ideas of such sounds as are used in musical composition.

IV. The fourth mode of expressing our thoughts is by SINGING. This is a voluntary effort to make certain sounds in accordance with different principles, with a view to excite in ourselves or others certain feelings, and sometimes to give interest to certain truths. This mode might, indeed, be regarded as a subdivision of the first or oral sounds.

The exercise of Composition is a complex operation, consisting of an act of voluntary inspection and arrangement of ideas of entities, simple or com-

posite, together with the act of expressing the ideas thus arranged, by signs on paper ; that is, writing the ideas as arranged by us. Thus, e. g., we resolve to compose an essay on the evils of intemperance. We reflect on the entity a drunkard, or our idea of him, that is, inspect it in all its various melancholy and disgusting relations, and arrange our ideas with reference to the object in view, and then write them as arranged. We do not write every idea which the mind lights on in its voluntary inspection, but only those which are particularly suited to our purpose. Here the question arises, What are the new ideas, not retrospective, which we never had before, but which thus oftentimes occur to the mind ? Are they not merely cognitive representatives of relations ; of new combinations of simple entities, which were known before, but never precisely thus combined by the mind ? Now from these new combinations result new relations, which, when viewed by the mind, are called original or new ideas. This feature of suggestion presented some difficulty to Dr. Brown ; but, according to this view of it, its nature would be sufficiently plain. It is incorrect to say that the new idea recurred to the mind. The true statement is this : the simple entities thus viewed together by the mind are inactive, as are also our ideas of them ; but the mind itself is the active agent, which, in voluntarily contemplating, that is, inspecting the entity and its relations, perceives this, to it, new relation, which, however, existed before it was viewed, and was perhaps perceived by many others before, and which would

exist in nature if it had never been viewed by any one.

The preceding five operations, viz., Inspection, Arrangement, Modification, Physical action or agency, and Intellectual intercourse with other minds, appear to constitute all the specific active operations of the soul. To one or other of these every operation of the mind may be referred which is in its nature active, excepting only what remains to be discussed under the mode of their occurrence.

SECTION VI.

Of Attention.

We shall first make a few remarks on the subject of attention before we inquire whether it is entitled to the rank of a distinct active process. Whatever be the active operation in which we are engaged, the clearness, success, and mnemonic tenacity attending it, will generally be in proportion to the degree of attention exerted in the operation. Every one must have observed, that an inattentive perusal of a book leaves an indistinct impression, figuratively speaking, of its contents on the mind; while an attentive perusal produces a directly contrary effect. In conducting an inquiry, if the process be negligently conducted, the result may be a total failure to obtain a clear conviction; but an attentive review, that is, reinspection, of the very same evidence, will often produce clear conviction, and dispel every doubt.

The influence of attention on the degree of feeling excited in the mind is equally striking. In-

deed, in most cases, there can be very little feeling, that is, little pleasure or pain, without attention. The same remark is equally true of knowledge. Thus, the rays of light may be reflected from an object to the retina of the eye, and form the image there, but it will fail to convey knowledge to the mind, if the attention be not directed to it. So also the same entity can produce no feeling unless the attention be directed to it ; or, in other words, unless it be observed. There are, indeed, cases of disease in which painful feeling is irresistibly produced, and we are not able entirely to divert our attention from it ; but in so far and so long as we can divert it, the pain is greatly diminished.

Attention also greatly improves every active operation to which it is directed. The success and accuracy of *inspection* are obviously improved by it in the highest degree. *Arrangement* can also be performed with an accuracy and facility proportioned to the attention bestowed on the operation. The abstractions and generalizations of the active process of *modification* are in like manner greatly improved by attention. Who can doubt, that the excellence of mechanical operations, or of the execution of instrumental music, requires the attention of the performer ? Or who would be guilty of the absurdity of denying, that the communication of thought on any subject, whether performed orally or in writing, can be executed with greater accuracy, and system, and effect, when the energy, the attention of the soul, is expended on the effort ?

In complex operations, also, the influence of con-

tinued attention, that is, of attention combined with *habit*, is strongly displayed. Some talented individuals have thus acquired the ability to conduct a simultaneous train of several operations, each of which ordinarily engrosses the attention of men separately. Thus, of Julius Cæsar it is said, that he could at the same time dictate seven letters to as many secretaries, and that even when engaged in writing himself, he could dictate to four others.

Attention, too intensely exerted, and too long continued upon any one subject, sometimes induces monomania. But it is a benevolent law of our nature, that the lassitude arising from continued attention unlooses, as it were, the grasp of attention, and enables the mind to resume the natural and salutary self-control and equipoise of its powers.

That attention, however, is not a distinct and separate operation, will appear evident from the following facts: (1.) We cannot conceive of it as acting by itself, but only in connexion with some other operation of the mind. (2.) It does not give us any results of its action, distinct from those of the active operation with which it is combined. (3.) It is common to all the active operations. (4.) It seems only to be a property of the active operations conducted at the time. We therefore define *attention to be the energy of the soul exerted in some active operation.*

The causes which excite attention appear, in general, to be these. (1.) A volition to bestow attention on the performance of some active operation. (2.) The present interest or pleasure felt in the op-

eration itself. Thus, we commence the perusal of a book incidentally met with, not knowing what its contents may be, but soon become so interested, that the most intense attention is excited in our breast. (3.) Some impression from without made through the bodily organs. Thus, we may be engaged listening to some interesting narrative ; but, a band of musicians passing by, their music makes an impression on the organs of hearing, and it attracts and diverts the attention. This we suppose to be a correct view of the character of attention, which we, therefore, cannot regard as a separate or distinct active operation.

CHAPTER II.

THE MODE OF OCCURRENCE OF THE FIVE ACTIVE OPERATIONS.

If it be asked, *why does the soul engage in active operations at all rather than not*, we reply, the reason is, because the nature of the soul is active: By this we mean, that the Divine Author of our nature has so constituted the mind of man, that, during his waking hours, it is unavoidably and incessantly engaged in some one of these five active processes. Of this we can be convinced by an examination of our own mental operations. On such an investigation we find, that it is not optional with us whether our minds shall be engaged in thinking

or not; we are constitutionally thus engaged, and can at best, by the most determined voluntary effort, interrupt the succession of thought for a few seconds only.

As to the manner in which this continued action is mediately sustained, several theories might be suggested; but the fact, which is beyond dispute, is all that is requisite to the accuracy of our system; and as we have endeavoured to avoid mere theory heretofore, we shall not at present call your attention to either of these.

If it be inquired, in the second place, *why does the soul, at any given time, engage in one of these active operations rather than another*, the experience of every individual will unhesitatingly reply, that these operations are engaged in in one of two ways: either from deliberate choice or from habit. The testimony of every man's own consciousness, if we mistake not, is decided and conclusive on this subject, and teaches that in one of these two ways, and in no other, do active operations at any time take place.

The mode of occurrence in the active operations of the mind is twofold:

I. Voluntary. II. Spontaneous.

SECTION I.

Of the Voluntary Occurrence of the Active Operations.

The active processes of the soul are voluntary, when we engage in them in consequence of a volition so to do, or, to express the same in popular

language, when they are undertaken from deliberate *choice*. That we do perform such acts of choice every hour of the day, must be evident to every impartial inquirer, from the testimony of his own consciousness.

(1.) The certainty of our performing such acts of uncontrolled choice is just as evident and indubitable to every individual, as is the certainty of his performing any other mental act. All men agree as to the existence of our other mental operations, such as knowledge and feeling; nor do any doubt in practice the existence of our acts of choice, because it rests on the same basis.

(2.) As to the nature of this act of choice, our ideas must be derived from the same source by which we become acquainted with the nature of knowledge and feeling. It is probable, too, that all men agree in fact and practice, though not in theory, in their views of these acts of choice, as much as in their ideas of knowledge and feeling. The differences of opinion which exist do not relate to the existence of the power of willing, nor to the idea which consciousness furnishes of our volitions as mental acts, but to the supposed relations between volitions and precedent operations, and to other powers and principles of the mind. (*a.*) All men agree that these acts of choice differ from acts of necessity, and are in their nature opposite to them. When the fiendlike assassin has deliberately sent the fatal ball through the heart of his victim, we do not censure the bullet that penetrated his heart, nor the rifle which contained the powder, nor the

spark which ignited it, nor the cock which elicited the spark, nor the trigger which moved the cock, nor even the finger which moved the trigger : but instantly perceiving that all these are not voluntary agents, we attribute the blame to the malicious mind, which originated the whole train of second causes. Nor does the common sense of mankind discriminate merely between the voluntary actions of man and the actions of mechanical and irrational agents ; the distinction between the voluntary and involuntary actions of man himself is equally clear, and universally acknowledged. What different feelings from those produced by the voluntary act of the cold-blooded assassin, are excited in every bosom when, as two intimate companions are running through a thicket in pursuit of game, their guns cocked and hands applied to the trigger, the foot of the hindermost is caught in a brush ; he stumbles, and in his effort to regain himself presses unconsciously the fatal trigger, and prostrates his friend, a corpse, before him. (b.) It is only for such actions as are voluntary that we accuse or excuse ourselves, and for these alone can we feel true penitence, if they are contrary to known duty. When we have yielded to the force of temptation, we are conscious of our guilt, because we know that the force of these temptations was not irresistible ; we know that we could and ought to have resisted it. (c.) All men agree, that for their own acts of choice alone, and the consequences of them, can they really and justly be held responsible either by God or man. (d.) Every reflecting man who

has attained mature development of mind, is conscious of the fact that he can and ought to regulate the voluntary actions of his life according to certain fixed rules and principles.

The question now arises, Is the soul, in choosing and refusing from among the acts possible to it, entirely free from any and every bias, and left to make its choice uninfluenced by anything whatever, or do we perceive in the voluntary actions of the soul any evidence to the contrary? If we find, that the great majority of the acts of deliberate choice in all men of every character, under all circumstances, and of every age, are of a particular kind, are calculated to promote a particular general end, and made with a view to accomplish the same general purpose, we are irresistibly led to the belief, that there is in the soul itself a *constitutional* impulse, or *bias*, or *inclination* to that end. This inclination must be prior to the actions themselves, and is among the causes which produce them. It must belong to the structure of the soul itself, and may therefore with propriety be termed a constitutional inclination. If we are not grossly mistaken, the conduct of all men does present evidence of such inclinations in every situation of life, from the cradle to the tomb. Though these inclinations at first view appear numerous and complicated, on closer examination they resolve themselves into the following two constitutional inclinations :

I. THE INCLINATION TO ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FITNESS OF THINGS, *moral, intellectual, and physical.*

II. THE INCLINATION TO WELL-BEING, or the enjoyment of pleasure, present and ultimate ; and the avoiding of pain.

These inclinations are not *faculties*, because they are not sources of distinct species of mental operations. Nor are they themselves mental *operations*, in the ordinary sense of the term, because they exist constantly, and prior to action. Nor are they *habits* of the soul, for habits are merely a facility for the performance of actions of particular kinds, and a tendency to their spontaneous performance, which facility is acquired by practice, and may be changed ; while the constitutional inclinations are permanent and immutable. They are therefore natural characteristics of the soul, and belong to its constitutional structure. This bias seems to have been impressed upon our minds by the great Creator, to determine, in some degree, the general tenour of our voluntary actions ; and experience teaches us that the great mass of all human actions is in accordance with one or the other, or both of these inclinations.

I. *The first constitutional inclination, viz., the inclination to action in accordance with the physical, intellectual, and moral fitness of things*, is an attribute of the soul, the existence of which is clearly established by a multitude of facts. All mankind do habitually evince the existence of this disposition, in a greater or less degree, in their unpremeditated actions. It is this inclination which leads all men, even from their earliest years, naturally to speak the truth rather than falsehood, unless they

have acquired the habit of misrepresentation from deliberate and self-interested calculations. The truth of this fact is not only admitted by men on ordinary occasions, but is incorporated into their criminal codes and judicial proceedings. It is an admitted rule of testimony in all our courts. Accordingly, if the testimony of a stranger be offered in a trial, we inquire whether he has any interest in the issue, which his testimony may tend to produce. And if it be fully ascertained that no interest of his, even of the most remote kind, can possibly be affected by the decision, we naturally expect, in the absence of contrary evidence, that he will not designedly swerve from the truth.

All mankind have a constitutional sense of obligation, a constitutional inclination to obey the moral fitness of things. Whatever men naturally judge to be right, they also feel some impulse to do. This impulse is, alas! too often, and in many persons habitually resisted; yet its existence is clearly taught in the occasional unpremeditated actions, and in the deathbed confessions of the most abandoned. And all who pay the least attention to the moral dictates of their nature, will not only freely admit its existence, but also acknowledge that its empire is justly unlimited; that wherever, throughout the whole range of creation, they perceive a trace of moral fitness, there they also find this impulse accompanying it, and feel a constitutional monition to obey its dictates. This obligation, too, though so often resisted, is seen by all men to be paramount in importance, and in the strength of its

claims, to everything else. It is this inclination which leads men, when travelling in a strange land, to keep the road rather than pass through an adjoining grain-field, where they would destroy the provision which God has made for his creatures. This inclination also urges us to obey the intellectual fitness of things in general; such as, to yield submission to those who have a right to direct, and to receive instruction from those who are older and wiser than we; to arise in the morning when we awake; to take care of things belonging to unknown persons, rather than to destroy them. In short, when we examine the whole sphere of human agency, we find that the crimes of men alone are exceptions to the observance of this constitutional inclination, while the precepts of the law on all subjects exhibit its appropriate dictates. The tendency to observe the physical fitness of things is witnessed throughout the whole sphere of physical action, in every department of life. Thus, apart from every self-interested motive, who can doubt that there is a natural disposition in persons engaged in mechanical or commercial pursuits, to make things right rather than wrong? to make them according to the principles of physical fitness rather than the reverse?

II. *The second constitutional inclination, viz., the love of well-being*, acquires different names in popular language, according as it is habitually indulged in reference to any particular class of entities. This inclination embraces the following, among other modifications: (1.) *Ambition*, which is the habit of

gratifying our love of well-being by the pursuit of such entities and the performance of such active operations as acquire for us the applause and admiration of men. (2.) *Avarice*, which is the habit of gratifying our love of well-being in the pursuit and possession of wealth. (3.) *Love of novelty*, which is the habit of gratifying our love of well-being by the pursuit of frequent change in the objects of our attention, having learned from our experience that any entity excites the greater feeling for being novel to the mind. (4.) *Sensuality*, which is the habit of gratifying the second constitutional inclination by the pursuit of objects adapted to the indulgence of the sensual propensities. (5.) *Love of science*, which is the habit of gratifying our second constitutional inclination by the pursuit of the different objects of human knowledge. (6.) *Social inclination*, which is the habit of gratifying our love of well-being by seeking the society of others. These and various other modifications of the second constitutional inclination are exhibited in the actions of mankind generally.

These two constitutional inclinations of the soul exert more or less influence on the character of our acts of choice, but never destroy the ability to choose; that is, they never act irresistibly. When an individual act of choice is in harmony with both these inclinations of the soul, it is right in the sight of God. But it is evident that the great mass of human actions is an indulgence of the second inclination at the expense of the first, that is, consists in actions which are an indulgence of our love of

pleasure or well-being in violation of the dictates of the physical, intellectual, or moral fitness of things. All such actions are sinful in the sight of God. The first *constitutional inclination* is manifestly the more noble ; but it is evident to all impartial observers, that in the natural state of man the second greatly preponderates : and in this, so far as the mind is concerned, may at least in part consist the natural or constitutional depravity or disorder of man. Self preponderates over God, pleasure over what is right. This constitutional bias of the soul itself, let it be remembered, determines only the general end ; but not the specific means by which, in any case, we accomplish that end. Thus, the second constitutional inclination, in the form of self-interest, inclines our fellow-citizens to seek the melioration of their temporal condition by the construction of internal improvements ; but it does not decide whether they shall do it by making railroads or canals. This latter point the soul itself decides, after an inspection of the relative properties and advantages of both these means of gratifying our constitutional inclination. The several volitions of the mind, resulting from these different sources, are different in regard to comprehensiveness. Some of them are of the most generic kind, as they relate indefinitely to the general end ; others, which contemplate some particular method of accomplishing the generic one, are specific in their character. Resolutions in regard to our general conduct are generic volitions, and exert an important influence on the specific voli-

tions, and other operations of the mind, concerned in executing them.

Besides these constitutional inclinations within the soul itself, by which the Author of our nature has given a general direction to the agency of man, there is also in entities themselves without the mind, a certain degree of motive influence, that is, a certain degree of adaptation to influence the mind to action, in view of which the soul exercises its powers of choice.

All entities without the mind may be divided, in reference to this subject, into two classes :

1. *Our own bodies.*
2. *All other entities in the universe.*

In our own bodies we find certain phenomena, termed *bodily appetites*, which possess a strong motive power. By bodily appetites we here strictly mean the corporeal part, the material part of those appetites. Thus by the bodily appetite, hunger, we mean the periodical action of the gastric fluid on the coats of the stomach (or, as this theory has of late been impugned, whatever other physical change that may be the true cause of the feeling), which results from the structure of our bodily organisms, and was designed by the Creator as a periodical motive to urge us to take the necessary food. The same remarks are applicable to thirst, which is nothing else than that peculiar condition of the throat and fauces, occasioned by the want of a liquid, and causing a desire to obtain it, or some other substance, in order to relieve the pain felt ; and also sometimes in order to enjoy the pleasure occasioned by the reception

of the liquid. The fluid thus taken into the stomach is consumed by the progress of the bodily functions, and its want occasions a painful feeling termed thirst. Both these appetites are the work of God. They are the necessary results of the bodily organization of man, and may justly be considered by him as clear indications of the Divine will, that they should lead to the course of action by which they are relieved, though under the limitations of reason.

The second general class of motives embraces all other entities except the above. The pleasure we expect to derive from eating any fruit, or from perusing the work of a well-known author, acts as a motive to procure the object of our desire. Entities of every class seem to possess some motive influence on the will, e. g., all kinds of food, a landscape, a beautiful passage in any author, literary or scientific. To the mathematician, the pleasures found in the discussion of the relations of space and number are a strong inducement to the repetition of the exercise.

The question here arises, Have these entities any certain motive power which they exert on all minds, and how is their relative strength determined? It is certain that every entity does possess a definite, invariable, intrinsic desirableness, or the contrary; and one entity is more or less desirable than another. Again, when we view these relatively, they all have certain fixed relations to each other, and to human actions and interests, as means to an end. After having weighed the merits of a case or a plan,

we can practically decide which is most suitable, and which presents the strongest inducements to its adoption; and we are seldom in doubt as to what we ought to do, that is, on which side the strongest inducements lie.

But these inducements or entities do certainly not act with irresistible force or mechanical power on the will; otherwise men would always act in obedience to the strongest consideration, that is, to truth, and thus they would act virtuously. It is evidently the duty of all men thus to do; God has made the inducements to virtue stronger than those to vice, the evidences of truth stronger than those of falsehood; hence it is the duty of all men voluntarily to obey the truth by pursuing virtue. But have they no power to act otherwise? The fact that they do, must forever set this point at rest. And it is certain even with regard to our bodily appetites, that we can resist their cravings. A sensible man can refuse to satisfy the most ravenous appetite, when he knows that abstinence is necessary to the recovery of health. In this case, regarding health as a greater motive than present gratification, he wills to obey the stronger motive, and declines eating; while another, under the same circumstances, wills to prefer present gratification to ultimate health.

It seems evident, therefore, that, though men generally do, in matters relating to temporal interests, will in accordance with the strongest motive, yet they certainly can will contrary to conviction and to a sense of duty. Hence it is evident that, though

the determinations of the will are made in view of motives, that is, of a knowledge of entities, they are nevertheless made freely.

The spontaneous recurrence of retrospective knowledge of certain entities exerts an important motive influence upon the soul. When this recurrence is habitual, it will constitute a particular trait in the character of its subject. A certain sphere of this knowledge and feeling, retrospective, present, and prospective, is constantly at our command, and some item or other of it is constantly recurring to us spontaneously, when the attention of the mind is not occupied in some active, voluntary operation. When we are not engaged in any voluntary active process, the tenour of this spontaneous recurrence is regulated by the impressions made on the organs of sense, or by other principles to be enumerated in the discussion of spontaneous inspection. Some such impression is made almost every moment, and each object, seen, or heard, or felt, educes a train of related spontaneous knowledge. Thus each item of present knowledge or feeling gives rise to a train of related ideas, which runs on according to certain laws, until interrupted by some other impression on the organs of sense, or by some process of voluntary action. Peculiar pursuits in life, also, form habits of peculiarly frequent spontaneous recurrence of our knowledge of the particular entities connected with them, which also exert an important influence on the will, by bringing the entities referred to more frequently to bear on it by their retrospective influence. Hence the incalculable advantage of a good,

a religious education. And as knowledge can influence our active operations only so long as it is recollected, the advantage of early good instruction is manifest; because what is learned in early life is longest recollected. And, finally, as a daily, or, at least, frequent attentive review of such truths, tends to rivet them on the mind, and make them the subjects of frequent spontaneous retrospection, we cannot fail to perceive the salutary tendency of the habit of daily perusing a portion of the Sacred Volume, or reading it in our family circle.

Desire is that state of the soul in which an entity, that is the subject of inspection, is exerting its motive power, but the will has not yet made a decision. Hence desire may be regarded as incipient, but suspended volition. Nor is the decision of the will always, or at any time necessarily, in accordance with the desire. Oftentimes we decide against the solicitations of the present desire, in consequence of our recollection of other and more influential considerations to the contrary. And if we direct our attention to these preponderant considerations or objects, and dwell upon them, they will gradually excite desire in us. *Desire is therefore a state of soul, tending to a volition to choose the object by which it is excited, but not necessarily producing it.* Various objects possess different degrees of desirableness in our view; and each one, when it is made the subject of our deliberate attention, will excite its appropriate degree of desire in us.

Desire is a state of mind, which is sometimes of long continuance.

With regard to our power of choice, usually termed power of volition, we may yet remark, that it is confined, in the intended objects on which it determines to act, to some future time. However various the actions which we resolve to do or not to do, they must be done or avoided hereafter. Yet this future time admits of various modifications in relation to the will; we can resolve to do an act immediately, or at some future time more or less distant; we can resolve absolutely or conditionally. The object of every act of volition or choice is the performance or non-performance of some one or more of the five active operations; and one trait of difference between them is, that, while some one or other of the five active operations is always going forward in the mind, the act of choice occurs more rarely and at intervals, either to give a new direction or continued energy to the current active process.

Our entire view of the will therefore resolves itself into the following features.

I. The soul of man does possess the power of free, uncontrolled choice.

II. In the exercise of this power, the soul is influenced (but not certainly or irresistibly determined) by the following things:

1. By its two constitutional inclinations, which relate only to the general end to be aimed at.

2. By the motive power of entities without the mind. These relate to the specific means for the

attainment of the ends pointed out by our constitutional inclinations. These entities are the following: (a.) Our bodily appetites. (b.) All other external entities.

3. By our knowledge of these entities, either retrospective or prospective. This knowledge embraces truth of every kind, which, by generating conviction and exciting feeling, exerts a definite motive influence.

4. By the habitual state of our feelings on similar or related subjects, or, to speak more accurately, by the state of our *susceptibility* of feeling from the object in question; that is, from the degree in which our feelings are susceptible of being excited by said object. Every feeling is individual, and more or less transient in its nature. Every individual feeling must be excited anew in each individual case, either by its appropriate objective entity, or by our knowledge of it, retrospective or prospective. But our *susceptibility* for feeling is permanent, and is increased or diminished, in each individual, by his mental habits. Thus the ambitious man habitually seeks the gratification of his second constitutional inclination, the love of well-being, by the pursuit of human applause. By this habit, the susceptibility of his mind to pleasure from demonstrations of popular approbation, and pain from the reverse, is augmented.

Thus also the sensualist habitually seeks the gratification of his second constitutional inclination, the love of well-being or pleasure, in the pursuit of objects of licentious indulgence.

His mental associations cluster around such

scenes, and his spontaneous mental operations recur to them. By this habit the susceptibility of his mind to be influenced by such objects is greatly increased. Thus, every circumstance, however remotely connected with such scenes, becomes a temptation to him, and every exposure to direct temptation acquires a double influence on his mind. And thus it is that his volitions, in view of such circumstances of temptation, will obviously be influenced by the state of his susceptibility for feeling in reference to them.

The native activity of the soul prompts us to action.

The constitutional inclinations of the soul determine the general character of the ends, or results, at which we aim.

Our knowledge presents to us the various entities, with their different and relative properties, by active operations upon which the proposed end may be attained in various ways and in different degrees.

The different entities exert a motive power proportional to their relative adaptation to accomplish the end proposed, and influenced by the habitual state of our feelings on related subjects; and, finally, in view of all these circumstances, the soul freely determines in its choice of the different possible means of attaining the desired end. We therefore define the will as follows:

The WILL is that power of the soul by which it freely determines, in view of motives, either now or hereafter, absolutely or conditionally, to perform or not to perform some one or more of the five active operations.

SECTION II.

Of the Spontaneous Occurrence of the Active Operations.

When the attention of the soul is withdrawn, the greater part, if not all the five active operations, are carried on spontaneously, viz., inspection, arrangement, modification, the intellectual agency concerned in physical action, and intellectual intercourse with other minds.

The difference between the voluntary and spontaneous active operations seems to consist chiefly in the following circumstances :

1. The former are the results of volition in their commencement, that is, are always begun in consequence of volition ; while the latter are not commenced in consequence of volition, but result from an inherent constitutional disposition of the mind to be always, during waking hours, engaged in some active operation. The reason why one active operation is spontaneously engaged in rather than another, or why one entity is the subject of its action rather than another, seems to be a previous habit formed by frequent or late voluntary action of the same kind, on the same entities, or on our mental representatives of them. Habit is an increased facility in the performance of any active operation, resulting from repeated acts of the same kind. Habit not only renders the performance of any operation more easy, but also enables us to perform it with greater perfection and success. It is truly surprising with what facility and perfection we are

able to perform many active operations when long-continued practice has rendered them habitual; which at first we could perform at all only with the greatest difficulty. After years of continued practice, a student will commit to memory a given piece of composition, in one fifth of the time at first requisite for the task. An expert performer on the pianoforte will with ease execute some of the most intricate and difficult pieces of music, which he could not perform at all, in proper time, before long practice had established the habit from which his ability results. The same is true of all intellectual operations: habit makes them easy, and, in most cases, pleasant. This principle of habit seems to be nothing more than the progressive development of the powers of the soul by continued practice, and is applicable more or less to every part of our mental and bodily organism, not excepting even the constitutional inclinations of the soul. It is witnessed in the rapid reasonings, the almost intuitive conclusions of the experienced logician, in the declamation of the orator, and in the skill and expertness of every species of mechanical operation.

The improvement of the different senses is a subject of great extent and peculiar interest; but we shall not pursue it farther.

The formation of these habits is voluntary, but their subsequent action is spontaneous. When we say, the formation of these habits is voluntary, we do not mean that there are not, in the constitutional structure of our minds and bodies, more opportunities, yea, constant temptations, to the formation of

some particular habits rather than others. The contrary is evidently the fact. There seems to be, even in the mind itself, a greater aptitude for the formation of sinful habits than of such as are holy. Fewer voluntary acts will create or form a sinful habit, and the habit resulting from any given number of voluntary sinful acts is stronger than would result from the same number of acts of a different character. The perverted state of our bodily propensities, since the fall, also leads men into frequent temptations to sin. The bodily propensity is involuntary, but the indulgence of the inspection of objects to which it prompts is voluntary and sinful, and is one cause of the formation of sinful habits.

2. Voluntary active operations are carried on with much more attention and energy than those which are spontaneous.

The spontaneous operations of the mind in many persons constitute far the greater part of all their mental action; and in all persons, even in those most constantly engaged in duties or labours, mental or bodily, they occupy much of their time. Indeed, it is the spontaneous action of an individual that exhibits his real character. Hence, as the spontaneous action results from that which is voluntary, and is correspondent with it, either holy or unholy, it is evident that we are responsible to God, not only for our voluntary action, but also for that which is spontaneous, i. e., for the mental habits by which we are characterized. This spontaneous action has for its materials, like our voluntary action, entities, simple or composite, past, present, or future.

An important fact of a physiological nature touching this subject is, that spontaneous active operations are much less debilitating to the mind than voluntary. The more entirely we can withhold the mind from voluntary action, and even from intense attention to a process of spontaneous thought, the more complete is this state of rest. Hence, riding on horseback or walking in company with others, by presenting a series of changing objects to the mind, and preventing us from entering on a very attentive inspection of any of them, is excellent relaxation. A solitary walk of a student, in which he becomes absorbed in the customary subjects of his pursuit, is but an ambulatory study, and affords very slight relaxation to the mind. On this principle, the different debilitating tendency of various species of mental exercise can be regularly graduated. Each mental process will debilitate in proportion to its difficulty to the student, and to the degree of attention requisite to its performance.

When the mind is fatigued, or, for any reason whatever, does not engage by volition in any of the five active processes, some of them will invariably occur in a spontaneous, indifferent, and careless manner; so that we have little, and sometimes no, recollection of the operation so long as it proceeds in this spontaneous way. The operations which occur spontaneously with the greatest frequency belong chiefly to the process of inspection, and they are generally such as are most frequently, or have been most recently, engaged in in a voluntary manner.

I. *Spontaneous Inspection*.—In the spontaneous

inspection of entities, or their mental representatives, the mind is found generally to proceed in several uniform ways.

(1.) It seems to follow the *relations* of the entities, which are the subjects of its inspection. The relations which are most frequently followed are sameness, contrariety, contiguity—temporal, local, or numerical—and causation. But all the other relations are also occasionally pursued in our spontaneous inspections. Perhaps the relative frequency with which each of the relations is pursued in spontaneous inspection, is not materially different from the order in which those relations have been enumerated. But the course of the mental train of action is often changed by one or more of the principles yet to be enumerated.

(2.) There is a tendency in spontaneous inspection to pursue, in preference, the train of those entities which have *most frequently* been the subjects of its voluntary attention. Thus, the mind of the mathematician pursues its spontaneous rambles in the regions of mathematical science; the mind of the sensualist recurs to the objects of his sinful gratification; and the mind of the faithful Christian delights to dwell upon the topics connected with his high and holy calling. And if several persons, of different pursuits, were requested to give us some account of their reminiscences of a recent tour which they had made, the memory of the farmer would spontaneously recur to the agricultural productions of the country through which he had passed; the painter would think first of the landscapes, the

statesman of some political intelligence which he had obtained, and the Christian, of an interesting conversation which he had heard on the subject of the Redeemer's kingdom.

(3.) The mind more readily recurs to those objects which have lately been the subjects of its attention.

(4.) It pursues more frequently those entities which excite the most pleasant feelings and gratify the second constitutional inclination. This inclination, or love of well-being, is not, in itself, sinful; on the contrary, the joys and pleasures of religion itself are sought in accordance with its dictates. But it becomes sinful when it is so inordinate as to outweigh the sense of obligation to obey the fitness of things, to obey the strongest evidence, that is, to obey truth. This preponderating influence is found in all unconverted persons by nature, and thus all by nature are sinners.

(5.) The mind is diverted from the pursuit of the above-mentioned relations in its spontaneous operations, by the immediate action of some entities, at the time, through the bodily organs.

(6.) It is interrupted by volition. While engaged in spontaneous action we may, for some reason or other, resolve to do something, i. e., to engage in some active process, and thus the spontaneous character of our mental action is instantly interrupted and succeeded by a process of a voluntary nature.

These spontaneous retrospections have, by some recent metaphysicians, been termed suggestions.

This word, though it conveys something of the character of these operations, seems not to be well selected as their generic and characteristic appellation. It seems to represent one item in a train of consecutive reminiscences or associations, as the agent that causes the occurrence of the other, while the mind is regarded rather as the passive recipient of these influences. In reality, however, the mind is the active subject; its spontaneous rambles result from the constitutional activity of its nature, while in these rambles it, by a law of its nature, pursues in preference the channel of those natural relations between the different entities or objects which really subsist between them, or those artificial relations constituted in the course of events, or those habits of mind which proceed from individual voluntary action. The principles regulating these associations are therefore intelligible, and it is also evident that, to a certain extent, they are the result of our most frequent voluntary actions. Their character is therefore, though not immediately, yet ultimately, in a great measure under our control. And just so far as this is the case, we are evidently responsible for the moral character of our spontaneous reminiscences and other spontaneous mental operations.

II. The operations of *Arrangement* are also sometimes carried on spontaneously. If, in passing along the road, we see any animal, and especially one of rare occurrence, how often do we not spontaneously arrange it with the class of quadrupeds, or bipeds, &c., as the case may be; how often do we not

compare it to other similar animals, and thus spontaneously arrange the two by the relation of sameness. Every figure of comparison used by extemporaneous speakers, consists of spontaneous arrangements according to the relation of similarity, expressed in words. And when a person of well-disciplined mind hears a fact which has an important probative bearing, he instantly and previous to volition, even in the act of rapidly reading a book, arranges it with other facts bearing on the same subject.

III. The process of *modification* very seldom occurs spontaneously, especially in persons of veracity and conscientious character; yet, doubtless, the mind of the novelist, who has habituated himself by voluntary effort to the very frequent fabrication of fiction, will, when left unoccupied, sometimes form such combinations spontaneously.

IV. The *mental process regulating our physical action* is very often exercised spontaneously. How many motions of the hands, or feet, or entire body do we not daily perform from mere habit, without volition. How often does the musician find himself engaged in the spontaneous act of singing, and the ambitious orator, in practising emphatic and peculiar pronunciation. How often do some men spontaneously fumble their watch-key, or play with their penknife, without being aware of the fact. In short, all those actions of the body, which are said to be performed from mere habit, are spontaneous operations. Men sometimes, and with truth, assign it as an excuse for particular actions, that they

did them without thinking, did them unintentionally; doubtless some of these acts are spontaneous. Sometimes, however, physical action is performed in a manner which does not properly fall within the division either of spontaneous or voluntary action, but is properly attributed to instinct.

V. The process of *intellectual intercourse* is sometimes carried on spontaneously, in a revery; as is evident from our making articulate sounds in the same spontaneous manner to express our ideas. How often do those who are in the habit of talking much, such as children and some talkative superannuated persons, talk not only without a volition, but even contrary to a resolution not to do so.

A PRAGMATIC VIEW
OF THE
OPERATIONS OF THE WAKING MIND;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXEMPLIFYING THE PRECEDING
PRINCIPLES.

I. WHEN a superabundance of animal and mental vigour has been accumulated during sleep, we make a transition from the sleeping to the active, conscious, waking state. This transition is, in general, independent of our wishes, and seems to be the result of the stimulating or exciting influence of the principle of animal vigour, accumulated during sleep. In some cases the act of awaking is produced by the uneasiness resulting from the accumulation of some of the products of the animal economy, such as the pressure of the urine on the bladder in persons advanced in years, and some other cases which might be cited; but these we should regard as mere exceptions to the general rule. Persons labouring under such difficulties, awake before the time in which the system would spontaneously return to the condition of cerebral preponderance or waking action. And if the accumulated vigour is not yet sufficient to produce this effect by itself, the auxiliary stimulus of the light of returning day will aid in exciting us to a

waking state. This is demonstrated by the fact, that all persons can sleep longer and more soundly in a dark, than in a light room. Thus the adorable Author of our being admonishes us, that night is the proper time for sleep, and that the artificial perversions of day and night, which are met with in some of the more fashionable ranks of society, are not only contrary to the constitution of our nature, but also detrimental to our health.

II. The moment we make the transition from the sleeping to the waking state, the mind begins to act, and the body, particularly the muscles and organs of sense, become subservient to the mind. The first action of the waking mind seems generally to be spontaneous; in most cases it consists in the spontaneous inspection of the objects surrounding our bed. Sometimes this spontaneous inspection gives rise to voluntary action, such as the reflection, i. e., the voluntary retrospection, of some entities related to those spontaneously seen by us and recalled by them. Thus, from the light perceived in the room, the mind of pious habits will revert to the great Father of lights from whom it comes, and to the value of that spiritual light, which constitutes the Christian's greatest and most constant source of happiness on earth and expected bliss in heaven. The worldly-minded, from the inspection of the same light, will be led to reflect on some profitable business or pursuit which this light enables them to prosecute. In this manner more or less time is spent until the next prominent active operation is engaged in, viz.,

III. The *voluntary actions of physical agency*, such as rising, dressing, washing, &c. If we inquire in what manner these voluntary actions take place, we trace them to the constitutional inclination to obey the fitness of things actively prompting us to perform what is right, fit, suitable, profitable, or agreeable to the Divine will. We have a knowledge that it is right or fit to rise in the morning, and, invited by the joint influence of these several considerations, we voluntarily determine to perform the active operation. Here, then, we distinguish the following several things :

1. Our constitutional vigour compels us to act either spontaneously or voluntarily, i. e., it keeps the mind always engaged in some active process during waking hours.

2. The constitutional inclinations of the soul incline us to the end, viz., obedience to the fitness, or propriety, or constitution of things, or pursuit of pleasure.

3. Our knowledge of the manner in which that end will be accomplished, determines the means or individual acts to be performed. Inasmuch as duty, fitness, profit, love of pleasure, often all dictate the performance of the same action, persons of different character will frequently do the same act from different motives. This is a very important fact, and shows that the moral worth of actions must be judged by the view or motive from which they were performed. Those who are in the habit of being influenced by the love of gain, i. e., of self, and personal advantage, will rise early, because

they know early rising to be a means of enabling them to transact more business, and accumulate wealth.

4. The same view seems to be exemplified in the daily duties of men. The Christian is prompted, by an habitual regard to the first constitutional inclination, to obey the moral fitness or obligation, i. e., to obey the Divine will. He knows that the act of offering up his morning and evening sacrifice to the Author and Preserver of his life, is a means or instance of obedience to his will, and thus performs it with benefit and delight. With the same motive he pursues his daily business, because he regards it as a means of supporting his family and of glorifying his God. The man of the world engages in the same various occupations of the day from different motives, some more and others less honourable in their nature.

Thus, throughout the day, various active operations are voluntarily engaged in and pursued. The intervals between these voluntary operations are filled up with spontaneous active processes, the nature of which, as has been already explained, will be influenced by the prevailing habits of voluntary engagement of each individual. Thus, between the voluntary and spontaneous processes, between labours and intermissions of labour, the day is passed. To the several customary meals the individual is invited, partly by the recurrence of stated times, partly by the solicitations of his periodical appetites, and partly by other circumstances.

The close of the engagements of the day and

evening, ordinarily finds every individual somewhat languid, and finally a feeling of exhaustion or drowsiness ensues, and sooner or later the cerebral gives way to the preponderance of the ganglionic action, and he relapses into the state of sleep in which the vigour of his system, if he be in health, is again recruited, and he prepared to pass through the same routine of another day.

OF DREAMS.

BEFORE closing the discussions of this volume, it may not be improper to add a few words on the subject of another species of spontaneous mental operations, which, though properly belonging to the *diseased* action of the soul, is of such frequent occurrence, and oftentimes attended by so slight a derangement of the bodily functions, that it is popularly, though erroneously, regarded as a healthy state of mental action.

The existence of mankind in this life, is divided by a clear and definite line into two very different states; that of dormancy, and the waking state. Between these two conditions, the life of man and of every other animate being is spent. It is our waking action that properly belongs to us as moral beings, and constitutes the appropriate agency of man in life. Indeed, it seems to be the design of the Author of our nature, that sleep should be, as in healthy subjects it actually is, an entire cessation from all conscious mental action. Habitual, deep sleep is a characteristic of sound general health; and those who enjoy the highest degree of it are not conscious of dreaming at all. It, however, not unfrequently happens, that disease affects our bodily functions, and disturbs the exact relation which ordinarily subsists between them and the soul, thus

rendering less distinct the line of separation between our sleeping and our waking hours.

Sleep being properly a physical phenomenon, belonging in common to man, to irrational animals, and, in a subordinate sense also, to the vegetable kingdom, its particular discussion does not fall within the design of our work. In animals it is a most important and salutary restorative process of nature. It is a fact of daily observation, that the performance of the various mental and bodily operations, during our waking hours, exhausts the animal vigour of the system, and that this exhaustion in a healthy subject naturally predisposes to sleep, and results in it. Equally well established is the position, that the healthy subject awakes with the returning light of the morning, refreshed by sleep, and conscious of the feelings of renovated life and vigour, but without any recollection of having been disturbed by dreams. Yet it may, perhaps, be possible to excite dreams in a healthy subject, by designedly acting on his bodily senses during his sleep, and the same effect may with equal probability be produced, when such impression is made accidentally. But we suppose that no healthy person will have any recollection of dreams, unless thus acted on from without.

As we recollect some dreams ourselves, and as others have discovered from our talking, and walking, and other actions in sleep, that we did dream when we had no recollection of it ourselves, the probability is, that the soul is essentially active, that active operations are always going on spontaneou-

ly when we are asleep. This is rendered the more probable, because many of the dreams recollected by us, occurred, while others who observed us saw that our bodies were perfectly motionless, and supposed us to be enveloped in profound sleep. The most perfect repose of the body, therefore, affords no argument against the supposition of constant, spontaneous, mental processes.

Dreams may be regarded as those spontaneous trains of mental operation, which occur, when sleep has, in a great measure, suspended that self-control, through reason and volition, which we possess, and ordinarily exercise when awake. The term dream has often been confined to those trains of thought, of which we retain some recollection in our waking state. But it is also applied to the cases observed by others, though not recollected by ourselves, and is in its nature equally applicable to all other instances of mental action in sleep.

The correctness of this view of dreams is strongly corroborated by the fact, that we often have no recollection of them until some time after, when they are recalled to our memory by some related thought or occurrence, which would, on the principles of association, have recalled the same train, if it had first occurred when we were awake.

In dreams the exercise of reason and volition is not entirely suspended; although it is probably more in a defect of the exercise of these powers than in anything else, that dreams differ from our waking reveries or unrestricted spontaneous mental trains. We can and do sustain conversations ei-

ther mentally or orally ; we enact scenes, and perform various achievements ; in short, all the different powers of the mind appear sometimes to be exerted in dreams, though with various degrees of imperfection. The farmer has sometimes engaged in threshing his grain, the lawyer has prepared his argument, and the preacher has imagined himself in the great assembly, and proclaimed to listless walls the truths of his holy religion. Such cases of somniloquism and somnambulism are within the knowledge of all. Other instances of still more singular and extraordinary morbid action of the mind are on record ; but, as they do not properly fall within the limits of our science, we pass them in silence. From the map of the mind in its healthy state, which we have endeavoured to present, we perceive evidence enough that we are “wonderfully and fearfully,” and, at the same time, benevolently “made ;” and that we “should praise the Lord for his goodness and his wonderful works to the children of men.”

It is an interesting peculiarity of dreams, that they often disregard the exact relations of time and space. Though the scenes are passed through with the utmost rapidity of waking thought, we sometimes suppose them all to have been real, and imagine that months, and sometimes years, have transpired in their occurrence. This singular circumstance may be owing, among other things, to two causes ; to the fact, that in sleep we hold no communion with the visible world through the senses, by which, especially through the succession of night

and day, and the aid of memory, we have learned to measure time, even in its minor fractions, and also the fact, that the exercise of judgment is chiefly suspended, by which, in our waking state, we can distinguish between fact and fiction.

From this view of the nature of dreams, it follows, that however fantastic and unnatural they may sometimes be, yet there will, on the whole, be some analogy between the dreams of any individual, and the habitual traits and peculiarities of his mind when awake. The poet, the mathematician, the lawyer, the politician, the agriculturist, the mechanic, and the minister of religion, will all find in their habitual dreams some special relation to their waking pursuits. Even the peculiarities of genius may often be traced in dreams. The moral character, which is frequently concealed during waking hours, will sometimes be betrayed in dreams; and the Rev. Mr. Young, in his "Record of Providence," relates an instance of a murderer in England, whose dreams led to his arrest and conviction, seven years after he had committed the crime, for which he was eventually executed.

It is also evident from the nature of dreams, that there can be nothing *ominous* or *prophetic* in them. We do not affirm that no dream was ever of this character. The Almighty doubtless can, and, as the Volume of Inspiration teaches, has communicated his will to some individuals in the form of dreams. But this was as certainly miraculous, as if the same communication had been made in open day by a voice from Heaven. What we maintain

is, that dreams have nothing ominous or prophetic in their own nature. As they are spontaneous processes of the mind, they depend for their character, in some measure, on the voluntary waking habits, from which they result. As the peculiarities of these spontaneous processes arise from the suspension of the exercise of judgment and reason in sleep, they must evidently be entitled to less confidence than our waking thoughts. And the adventitious influences on the senses, which tend still farther to modify them, cannot fail to divest them of all claim to confidence. Such are our natural dreams. The fact, that one dream in a million has some resemblance to an event that succeeds, only proves that in these cases men may form somewhat correct anticipations of coming events when awake, and that the same conjecture may recur to them in their sleep, and constitute the burden of their prophetic dreams!

CHAPTER III.

RECAPITULATION, FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWS.

INTRODUCTION. Methodology of Mental Philosophy. Difference between Mathematical and Mental Science, p. 13-20.

Mental Philosophy is that science which discusses the properties and operations of the human soul, p. 21. Various names have been attached to this science, such as *Metaphysics*, *Anthropology*, *Psychology*, p. 21, 22.

The proper materials of this science doubtless are, not the supposed faculties, of which we know nothing directly, but the known phenomena of the mind, and all those other entities, or existences, which exert an influence upon these phenomena, or are concerned in their production, p. 22, 23.

In the classification of mental operations, various systems have been adopted. The first, and most generally received in the English philosophical world, is that into *Nine Faculties of the Mind*: viz., Perception, Consciousness, Conception, Judgment, Memory, Reasoning, Conscience, Feeling, and Volition, p. 23, 24.

Dr. Reid, adopting in the main this classification, separates these faculties or powers into two general classes, viz., *Intellectual Powers* and *Active Powers*.

Mr. Stewart adds to these a third general class, viz., *Social Powers*.

Dr. Brown's celebrated division is into two classes: *External* and *Internal Affections or States of the Mind*, p. 25, 26.

The German division into three faculties, *Sensibilities*, *Understanding*, and *Will*. Professor Upham's view, p. 26.

Unable, after mature deliberation, to adopt either of these divisions, we propose another, founded, not upon the unknown and supposed faculties or essence of the mind, but upon those mental phenomena which are known to us. It is a threefold division, into *Cognitive Ideas*, *Sentient Ideas*, and *Active Operations*, p. 27.

Difference between this and the German system. (a.) In its principle. (b.) In its lines of division. (c.) In the contents of the different parts, p. 28.

On the extent of the several parts of this division, p. 29.

I. The *Cognitive class* embraces Perceptions, Acts of Consciousness, Conceptions, Judgments, Recollections, Results of Reasoning, and the Dictates or Decisions of Conscience, p. 29.

II. The *Sentient class* embraces Sensations, Emotions, Affections, and Passions, p. 32.

III. The *Active class* embraces Volitions, Processes of Reasoning, the Act of Memorizing, the Intellectual Act of communicating our thoughts to others, and some other processes, p. 32.

PART I.

COGNITIVE IDEAS.

Cognitive Ideas are acquired by the mind through the medium of certain parts of the body called organs of sense, when these organs are brought into a particular relation to external objects, and from the operations and powers of the mind of which we are conscious. In this acquisition we distinguish three things, p. 34, 35.

First. The external entity, or object of knowledge ;

Secondly. The knowledge itself ; and,

Thirdly. The process by which the knowledge is obtained.

CHAPTER I.

OF OBJECTIVE ENTITIES AS SUBJECTS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, p. 35.

SECTION I.

Of the different classes of Entities, p. 40.

We constitutionally judge external entities to be possessed of real objectivity, i. e., to have an actual existence out of our minds. An *entity* is anything whatever, of which we can have an idea, p. 35.

When we examine the whole mass of our ideas which are cognitive in their nature, we find that all relate to one or other of the following *fourteen classes* of entities and their relations: Solids, Liquids, Gases, Light, Caloric, Electric Fluid, Magnetic Principle, Space, Number, Time, Mind, Spir-

it, *Glorified Bodies, Deity*, p. 39. Nature of our knowledge of God, p. 40.

The peculiarities of Time, Space, and Number: as three universal, fundamental entities created by God, of entirely peculiar properties, in which, or in the forms of which, all other created entities exist, p. 43.

No one denies that we have ideas relating to all these classes, but not all are agreed as to the question whether they are ideas of realities. It is our opinion that they are.

SECTION II.

Division of these Classes, p. 52.

All these classes of entities may be referred to two generic kinds, viz., *Absolute* and *Concrete* Entities.

Absolute are those of which we can conceive without reference to the concrete class. They are Space, Time, and Number.

Concrete are those of which we cannot conceive except as existing in the absolute class, or being related to it. They are all the others except Space, Time, and Number.

SECTION III.

Subdivision of Individual Entities, p. 53.

Entities may be subdivided into *Substantive*, *Adjective*, and *Composite*.

A *Substantive Entity* is that to which any number of coexisting properties appertains.

An *Adjective Entity* is any one property of a substantive entity.

A *Composite Entity* consists of two or more adjective entities, viewed in regard to some relation existing between them.

SECTION IV.

Relations of Entities.

1. Of Absolute Entities, p. 56.

(a.) Equality, diversity, antecedence, subsequence, &c., of *Time*.

(b.) Equality, difference, progression or ratio, plurality, minority, &c., of *Number*.

(c.) Equality, diversity, contiguity, remoteness, superiority, and inferiority of *Space*.

2. Of Concrete Entities to each other.

(a.) Similarity and diversity.

(b.) Contiguity or remoteness, as to space, time, and number.

(c.) Fitness, physical, intellectual, and moral.

(d.) Analogy.

(e.) Causation or agency. (a.) Mechanical, either uniform or contingent; (b.) Instinctive; and (c.) Moral.

3. Between Absolute and Concrete Entities.

These, (a.) in regard to number, are Addition, Multiplication, Subtraction, and Division; which are active relations of agency performed by the concrete entity man on our ideas of the absolute entity number. (b.) Space. (c.) Time.

These Relations are, (a.) Transitive or Intransitive.

(b.) Absolute or Hypothetical.

(c.) Retrospective, Present, or Prospective.

CHAPTER II.

OF OUR COGNITIVE IDEAS, OR MENTAL REPRESENTATIVES OF ENTITIES.

SECTION I., p. 64.

Of the exact Nature of those of our Ideas which are Knowledge.

They belong to the class of entities termed *Mind*, but are distinct from the mind, and are, with certain qualifications, representatives of things actually existing.

SECTION II.

Of the Criteria by which the Cognitive Class of Ideas is distinguished, p. 64.

I. The Cognitive Ideas have for their objects entities existing out of the mind, or some mental operation of our own or other minds.

II. The Cognitive Ideas are dependant for their character on the entities themselves.

III. The Cognitive Ideas presuppose the previous existence of the entities, from which they are derived.

SECTION III.

On the Nature and Sources of Error in our Cognitive Ideas, p. 68.

In order to obtain a correct view of this extremely important subject, it is necessary first to make some remarks upon the nature and divisions of truth.

All truths may be divided into three classes; viz.,

I. *Real or Objective Truths*; that is, objective entities existing in nature.

II. *Idealistic or Subjective Truths*; i. e., correct mental representatives of objective Entities.

View of the ancient Realists and Nominalists, and of modern German Realism and Idealism; Transcendental Idealism of Kant.

III. Nominal Truths; i. e., correct mental representatives expressed by proper words.

1. Sources of Involuntary Error, p. 74.

I. *Incorrect original mental representatives of entities.* These may arise,

(a.) From a hasty, superficial inspection of entities.

(b.) From forgetfulness of the exact mental representative originally obtained, and a consequent misstatement of it.

(c.) From listening to one part of a statement, and neglecting to listen to the whole.

II. *Incorrect selection of sounds and written words, to express to others the true mental representative which we really have.*

III. *The real imperfection of language, which does not furnish words to express our ideas exactly on all subjects.*

IV. *Mistakes in judging of the motives of others.*

V. *Unintentional illogical reasoning.*

VI. *Misapprehension of a correct sentence, through ignorance of language.*

2. Sources of Voluntary Error, p. 76.

I. *Intentional misstatement of entities, simple or composite.*

II. *Indulgence in the habit of mere high colouring, without directly stating a falsehood.*

III. *Errors resulting from voluntary ignorance.*

IV. *The indulgence of prejudice in regard to persons or things.*

V. *The indulgence of passion.*

SECTION IV.

Division of our Cognitive Ideas, p. 78.

They may be divided in two ways :

First, into Individual and Relative ; and,

Secondly, into Retrospective, Present, and Prospective.

I. *Individual Knowledge.* To this class belongs our knowledge of every individual substance in nature, and also of every individual property belonging to any entity.

II. *Relative Knowledge.* To this class belongs our knowledge of composite entities ; the greater part of our conceptions ; geometrical axioms ; the relations of numbers ; metaphysical axioms ; moral abstract propositions ; and belief, immediate and acquired.

I. *Retrospective Knowledge, p. 82.* This is our knowledge of all our former cognitive, sentient, and active ideas, and is usually termed memory.

It may be divided into *spontaneous* and *voluntary*.

The extent of our spontaneous retrospective knowledge depends on,

(a.) The natural aptitude of the mind for this exercise ; i. e., the natural retentiveness of memory.

(b.) The different degrees of logical accuracy with which our knowledge is arranged on paper, or in the mind, according to the different relations themselves which subsist between the entities.

(c.) The frequency with which the knowledge to be retained was reviewed by the mind, and the interest which was felt in it.

Our *retrospective knowledge* will be increased by the following methods :

(a.) By thinking frequently of the ideas intended to be recollected.

(b.) By reviewing those ideas together which we wish to recollect together, and in the very same order in which we wish to remember them.

(c.) By connecting them, in the act of memorizing, with some idea which we will be sure to recollect at the intended time.

(d.) By the habit of studying subjects rather than books.

(e.) By interesting our feelings in the subject.

II. *Present Knowledge*, p. 86.

III. *Prospective Knowledge*, p. 86. This is all our knowledge of the probable future existence of entities and their relations.

(a.) The *Subject* of our prospective knowledge is *always a composite entity* ; viz., the relation between a present entity and a supposed future entity.

(b.) The *Bases* of prospective knowledge are *Analogy, Causation, and Revelation*.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE ORGANIC PROCESS BY WHICH WE OBTAIN OUR IDEAS, p. 91.

The influence of entities upon the mind is exerted either through the medium of every part of the

body, such as shape, &c.; or through particular parts of the body, called organs of sense. *In all cases*, actual contact of some kind is necessary.

I. The *eye* affords us a knowledge of *colour*, p. 93. It is by experience that we are able to judge of the distance and shape of objects through the sight.

II. The *ear* is a medium, not only of *sound*, but also of *feelings of pleasure or pain*, p. 94.

III. The *organ of touch*, viz., the surface of the whole body, gives us a knowledge of the *shape, texture, solidity*, and *fluidity* of objects, and *pleasurable and painful feelings*, p. 95.

IV. *Taste* gives us a knowledge of *flavours*, and feeling, pleasant or unpleasant, p. 96.

V. *Smell* gives us a knowledge of *odours*, and feeling, pleasant or unpleasant, p. 97.

The connexion of the soul with bodily organs affords no proof of its materiality.

PART II.

SENTIENT IDEAS, p. 100.

Feeling is every degree of pleasure or pain mediately or immediately excited in the mind by entities, simple or composite.

Feelings are known by the following criteria :

I. They have no object beyond themselves.

II. Our feelings are not so absolutely dependant for their character on entities without us, as our knowledge is.

III. Feelings are always preceded by a cognition of the entity which mediately or immediately produces them, p. 104.

CHAPTER I.

CLASSIFICATION OF OUR FEELINGS, p. 102.

All Feelings are either,

I. *Individual*; viz., those which have reference exclusively to ourselves; or,

II. *Relative*; viz., those which have a relation to some other sentient being, or other object.

| | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Individual Feelings. | { | Joy, contentment, hope, sorrow, despair, and all other feelings of pleasure or pain derived through the bodily organs. |
| | | The pleasures of taste, imagination, and memory. |
| Relative Feelings. | { | <i>Benevolent</i> feelings: love, friendship, gratitude, veneration, &c. |
| | | <i>Malevolent</i> feelings: hatred, malice, anger, &c. |
| | | <i>Sympathetic</i> feelings: condolence, pity, compassion, &c. |
| | | <i>Antipathetic</i> feelings: envy, grudging, and what the Germans term Schadenfreude. |

Feelings may also be divided into Sensuous, Intellectual, and Moral: and into Present, Retrospective, and Prospective.

CHAPTER II.

OF ENTITIES AS EXCITANTS OF FEELING, p. 104.

SECTION I.

All feeling, like knowledge, may be traced, mediately or immediately, to entities without the mind, p. 104.

SECTION II.

Entities of every class possess some tendency, though very different in degree, to excite feeling in the mind, p. 106.

SECTION III.

The degrees in which different entities possess this exciting power are very different, and can be accurately learned only from experience; nor can any organ originally afford us this information, except the one through which the feeling is produced, p. 107.

I. The strongest influence is exerted by entities when they are brought into contact with their appropriate organ.

II. The next strongest, when we have a prospective knowledge that we shall, at some future time, probably be the subjects of their influence.

III. The next strongest, when they excite retrospective feeling.

IV. Sympathetic feeling is weaker than its corresponding direct feeling.

V. The least influence is exerted by them, when we view merely their abstract tendency to produce feeling.

SECTION IV.

Entities of the classes of solids and liquids excite more feeling, and exert more motive power when near, than when far off, p. 109.

SECTION V.

The manner in which entities act in exciting feel-

ing, seems to be very similar to that observed in the production of knowledge, p. 109.

SECTION VI.

In feeling, as in knowledge, two things are necessary; viz.,

I. The action of the entity on its appropriate organ; and,

II. The attention of the mind to that organ, p. 110.

CHAPTER III.

SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE MIND FOR FEELING, AND LAWS OF FEELING.

First law. Sensation, no less than cognition, is an attribute of the mind and not of the body, p. 111.

Second law. The original susceptibility of different minds for feeling is very different in degree. Influence of temperament: phlegmatic, choleric &c., temperament, p. 112.

Third law. Excepting this diversity, which results from the different temperaments, the relative degree of susceptibility for the influence of different entities is in all minds naturally the same, p. 113.

Fourth law. Feeling is, in a great measure, involuntary at the time, p. 114.

Fifth law. But we can add to or subtract from the duration or intensity of the feeling, by confining our attention to the exciting object, or directing it to another, p. 114.

Sixth law. When any one feeling or purpose becomes dominant and habitual in the soul, all others inconsistent with it are impaired, p. 114.

Seventh law. The two constitutional inclinations of the soul exert an influence upon the tendency of entities to excite feeling in the mind, p. 115.

Eighth law. Entities always exert a greater influence when first presented, on account of their novelty, p. 116.

Ninth law. Feelings produced in the same person, by the same entity, at different times, may be different, p. 116.

Tenth law. The susceptibility for feeling is increased by attentive practice, p. 117.

Eleventh law. Intense and long-continued feeling exhausts and fatigues the system, p. 118.

Twelfth law. Susceptibility for feeling declines with age and with the decline of the constitution, though that be premature, p. 118.

Thirteenth law. A negligent review of entities diminishes their tendency to produce feeling, p. 118.

Fourteenth law. Time wears off retrospective feeling, p. 118.

Fifteenth law. Feeling is, in general, not instantly excited, as knowledge is, p. 119.

Sixteenth law. The feelings connected with the gratification of our periodical appetites are peculiar, p. 119.

I. They are stronger in proportion to the length of previous abstinence, unless that be extreme.

II. They are increased by the frequent attention of the soul to the entities capable of gratifying those appetites.

III. This feeling is diminished, and eventually suspended, by gratification.

IV. It is interrupted by the debility and increased by the vigour of the body.

(a.) From the preceding considerations, it follows that we are responsible in a great degree for our individual feelings, as also for the habitual state of our feelings or affections, p. 119.

(b.) That feelings are individual, and transient, and continue no longer than the attention of the mind is directed to the entity or to the cognitive idea with which they are connected, p. 120.

(c.) By the *state* of our affections or feelings, is meant the increased or diminished degree of habitual susceptibility for feelings of any particular kind, produced by continued voluntary practice, and also the increased or diminished tendency to the spontaneous recurrence of the ideas of the entities, which produce the feelings in question, p. 120.

PART III.

ACTIVE OPERATIONS.

Active Operations constitute the most important feature of our character as beings responsible to God, p. 123.

The *criteria* by which they are known :

I. Knowledge and feeling are inward effects produced from without. Active operations are outward effects, or operations tending *ad extra*, produced from within.

II. Knowledge and feeling require the entities exciting them to have a previous existence ; but the active operations contemplated by our volitions, are future.

III. The character of our active operations depends but little upon the entities upon which they are exerted.

The *materials* on which our active operations are performed, p. 125.

I. The external objective entities of the different classes.

II. Past mental operations of every class.

III. The natural signs by which these representatives are expressed.

CHAPTER I.

DIVISION AND DISCUSSION OF THE ACTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE SOUL.

All active operations are alike as it respects mere activity, but differ in regard to the end contemplated; in the operation performed; in the results of the action; and in the objects on which they terminate, p. 126.

SECTION I.

Of Inspection.

Inspection is that active operation in which the attention of the soul is directed to some entity, simple or composite; prospective, present, or retrospective, with a view to acquire some knowledge concerning it, p. 127.

The *specific object* of inspection, in *present entities*, may be,

I. To obtain more correct mental representatives of the properties of entities, p. 129.

II. To give more vividness to our mental representatives of them.

III. To ascertain their relations.

In *retrospective entities*, it may be,

I. To revive their representatives, p. 131.

II. To view their relations to each other.

Inspection embraces the voluntary operations of *Perception, Consciousness, Conception, Judgment, Recollection, Analytic Reasoning, and Conscience*. Also, the *Act of Memorizing*.

SECTION II.

Arrangement, p. 135.

Arrangement is that active operation of the soul by which we select some from among the mass, either of external entities themselves, or of our mental representatives of them, and place them, as wholes or units, in a particular order, with a view to a specific purpose.

The *purposes* of this arrangement, and the principles upon which it may be made, are various :

I. We may arrange them according to any one of the various relations of entities to each other ; sameness, diversity, &c.

II. We may arrange them according to any principle of genus, species, &c.

III. We may arrange them according to the probative relation of entities to a given proposition, or to the human mind.

Here is included all syllogistic reasoning.

SECTION III.

Modification.

Modification is that active operation of the soul

by which we take some from among our mental representatives of real entities (rarely the objective entities themselves), and bring them into such forms or combinations as do not correspond to realities, p. 143.

This operation differs from the preceding; because,

I. The operations of Inspection and Arrangement are performed as frequently on objective entities themselves as on our mental representatives of them; whereas, that of Modification is conversant chiefly about our mental representatives.

II. The former two operations take our mental representatives of substantive entities as wholes or units, and leave them such throughout all the process of their influence; but Modification changes them from their natural state, and brings them into forms and combinations which do not actually correspond to real entities.

Modification embraces,

I. The process of *Abstraction* or *Generalization*.

Among the results of this are, (a.) Geometrical axioms; (b.) Metaphysical axioms; (c.) Mathematical truths; (d.) Moral general principles.

Objection to Kant's view of these truths, as knowledge *à priori*.

II. *Fictitious combinations of ideas*.

(a.) Fictitious simple entities; (b.) Fictitious composite entities or relations.

SECTION IV.

Mental Agency concerned in the production of Physical Action.

This embraces all voluntary control over the entire muscular system, by which alone motion is produced in any part of the body, p. 148.

The mode of this influence, of the action of mind on muscle, is inexplicable.

In all cases of voluntary physical action, we can distinguish the following mental processes :

- I. The volition to exert the bodily organ.
- II. The attention of the soul to that organ.
- III. The inspection of the material on which the operation is to be performed.
- IV. The active process of the mind conducting and regulating the physical action.

SECTION V.

Intellectual Intercourse.

This process consists in exciting in others the ideas which they themselves have already obtained from those entities on which we wish them to think, and exciting them in such order, and in such combinations, and with such adjective properties annexed, as we wish them to entertain, p. 150.

This process is carried on in different ways :

- I. By *speaking*, or *expressing our ideas by articulate sounds*.

We do not, however, by speaking, excite in others identically the same ideas which we connect with our words, but such ideas as they formerly at-

tached to the words which we utter. Every idea of a speaker is succeeded by the following operations before it accomplishes its design, p. 154 :

- (a.) The idea of the speaker himself.
- (b.) The recollection of the idea of the sound formerly associated with that idea by the speaker.
- (c.) His volition to articulate a similar sound.
- (d.) The articulating action of his organs on the expiring breath, to produce a similar sound.
- (e.) The hearer's idea of the sound produced by the speaker's voice.
- (f.) The hearer's recollection of the similar sound which he himself had often made.
- (g.) The recurrence of the idea which he formerly connected with the similar sound made by himself.

The structure of the human articulating organs is such, that all men naturally make certain elementary sounds ; alphabetic sounds are, therefore, substantially the same in all languages, p. 156.

II. By *gestures* and *muscular action of the countenance*, p. 157. Pantomime.

III. By *written signs*.

(a.) Alphabetical letters ; (b.) Arithmetical figures and signs ; (c.) Musical notes.

SECTION VI

Composition.

Composition is not a distinct active operation, but is complex, consisting of voluntary inspection and arrangement of ideas of entities, simple or compos-

ite, together with the act of expressing the ideas thus arranged, by signs, on paper, p. 158.

What are called new or original ideas are merely old relations, for the first time viewed by the mind.

SECTION VII.

Attention, p. 160.

Attention is likewise not a distinct operation ; because,

I. We cannot conceive of it as acting by itself, but only in connexion with some other operation of the mind.

II. It does not give us any results of its action, distinct from those of the active operation with which it is combined.

III. It is common to all the active operations.

IV. It seems only to be a property of the active operation, conducted at the time.

Attention is the energy of the soul exerted on some active operation.

The causes which excite attention appear, in general, to be these :

I. A volition to bestow attention on the performance of some active operation.

II. The present interest or pleasure felt in the operation itself.

III. Some impression from without made through the bodily organs.

CHAPTER II.

THE MODE OF OCCURRENCE OF THE FIVE ACTIVE OPERATIONS.

Active Operations are either *Voluntary* or *Spontaneous*, p. 163.

SECTION I.

Of the Voluntary Occurrence of the Active Operation.

The active processes of the soul are *voluntary*, when undertaken from deliberate choice, p. 164.

Do we perform acts of choice ?

Yes ; the certainty of our performing such acts rests upon the same basis with the certainty of our other mental operations, such as knowledge and feeling.

What is the nature of acts of choice ?

I. All men agree that acts of choice differ from acts of necessity.

II. It is only for such actions that we accuse or excuse ourselves.

III. All men agree that only for their own acts of choice, and the consequences of them, can they really and justly be held responsible, either by God or man.

IV. Every reflecting man, who has attained mature development of mind, is conscious of the fact that he can and ought to regulate the voluntary actions of his life according to certain fixed rules and principles, p. 165.

But the soul is not left entirely free from bias in the performance of these acts of choice. There

are two *constitutional inclinations* by which it is materially influenced.

I. The inclination to *Action in accordance with the fitness of things, moral, intellectual, and physical.* This inclines us naturally to speak the truth, and to do whatever is right. Crimes are the only exception to the observance of this constitutional inclination.

II. The inclination to *Well-being*, or the enjoyment of pleasure, present and ultimate, and the avoiding of pain. This embraces Ambition, Avarice, Love of Novelty, Sensuality, Love of Science, and Social Inclination, &c.

These inclinations are not faculties, nor mental operations, nor habits, but natural characteristics of the soul.

The first of these inclinations is evidently the more noble; but in the natural state of man the second preponderates.

These inclinations do not act irresistibly. The soul is secondly influenced by

| | | |
|------------------|---|---|
| <i>External</i> | } | 1. Our own bodies, acting upon us through the bodily appetites. |
| <i>Entities.</i> | | 2. All other entities in the universe, p. 173. |

But these entities act not with irresistible force, else men would be compelled always to act virtuously, since God has made the inducements to virtue stronger than those to vice. Men can and do resist these motives.

The native activity of the soul prompts us to action, p. 175.

The constitutional inclinations of the soul determine the general character of the ends, or results, at which we aim.

Our knowledge presents to us the various entities with their different and relative properties, by active operations upon which the proposed end may be attained in various ways and in different degrees.

The different entities exert a motive power proportional to their relative adaptation to accomplish the end proposed; and, finally, in view of all these circumstances, the soul freely determines in its choice of the different means of attaining the desired end. Our definition therefore is,

The Will is *that power of the soul by which it FREELY DETERMINES, in view of motives, either now or hereafter, absolutely or conditionally, to perform or not to perform some one or more of the five active operations*, p. 180.

SECTION II.

Of the Spontaneous Occurrence of the Active Operations, p. 181.

There are two marks of difference between Voluntary and Spontaneous active operations.

I. The former are the result of volition in their commencement: the latter, not.

II. The former are carried on with much more attention and energy than the latter.

We are responsible to God for all our spontaneous actions.

I. *Spontaneous Inspection*, p. 184.

In the spontaneous inspection of entities or their

mental representatives, the mind is found to proceed in several uniform ways :

1. It seems to follow the relations of the entities which are the subjects of its inspection ; especially sameness, contrariety, contiguity, and causation.

2. It has a tendency to pursue the train of those entities, which have most frequently been the subjects of its voluntary attention.

3. It more readily recurs to those objects which have lately been the subjects of its attention.

4. It pursues more frequently those entities which excite the most pleasant feelings, and gratify the second constitutional inclination.

5. It is diverted from its spontaneous operations by the immediate action of some entities through the bodily organs.

6. It is interrupted by volition.

II. *Spontaneous Arrangement*, p. 187.

This operation is sometimes carried on spontaneously. Every figure of comparison consists of spontaneous arrangements according to the relation of similarity expressed in words.

III. *Spontaneous Modification*, p. 188.

This occurs very seldom, especially in persons of veracity.

IV. *Mental Process regulating our Physical Action*, p. 188.

This is very often exercised spontaneously. All habits of bodily action are spontaneous operations of this kind. But some actions apparently spontaneous are instinctive.

V. *The Process of Intellectual Intercourse*, p.

189, is sometimes carried on spontaneously in a revery; as is evident from our making articulate sounds, in the same spontaneous manner, to express our ideas.

PRAGMATIC VIEW, &c.

I. When a superabundance of animal and mental vigour has been accumulated during sleep, we make a transition from the sleeping to the active, conscious, waking state.

II. The moment we make the transition from the sleeping to the waking state, the mind begins to act, and the body, particularly the muscles and organs of sense, becomes subservient to the mind.

Its first action is generally spontaneous, but this soon gives way to,

III. The voluntary actions of physical agency; which are performed in accordance with the principles laid down in part iii., chap. ii., sect. i.

IV Other voluntary operations of various kinds are undertaken; and the interval between them filled up by such as are spontaneous.

DREAMS.

Dreams are those spontaneous trains of mental operation which occur when sleep has in a great

measure suspended that self-control through reason and volition, which we possess, and ordinarily exercise, when awake.

Dreams can have nothing ominous or prophetic in them, unless they are miraculous.

THE END.

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